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Daily Report
East Europe

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Balkans: Political Issues Impede Arms Control Talks

LD0606165296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1426 GMT 6 Jun 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vienna, June 6 (TANJUG)—It is uncertain whether Yugoslavia, Serb Republic, Croatia, the Muslim-Croat Federation and Bosnia-Herzegovina will initial an agreement on sub-regional arms control in the Balkans here by midnight Thursday.

Conference chairman, Norwegian Ambassador to the CSCE [as received] Vigleik Eide expressed optimism Wednesday evening as to a successful outcome of the talks.

Serb Republic and the Muslim-Croat Federation are the two entities comprising Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Political issues surfaced in the last stage of the talks as a threat to the success of the conference, which opened on Jan. 5 at the Vienna conference on security and cooperation in Europe headquarters.

The Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation opposes the signing of the conference document by Serb Republic, insisting that that would imply the recognition of the Bosnian Serb entity as a state.

Under the provisions of the Dayton peace accords, the deadline for the initialling of the agreement is at midnight on Thursday, while the signing of the document is envisaged to take place in Oslo on June 11.

Conference circles set out that little time is left and that stands are still wide apart on quite a few issues.

If no agreement is reached on as low as possible arms ceilings, Dayton provisions which establish relationships between the armed forces of Yugoslavia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina would go into effect.

debacle of 26 May in the polling stations of the north and south. It now appears that the political struggle at home is of less importance than the battle of declarations and stabs in the back in the chancelleries of Europe and the United States.

The situation so far, in which no official pronouncement has been forthcoming that gives a seal of approval to the election results and the renewed Democratic Party [PD] mandate, seems to give to the parties of the opposition the justice denied them on 26 May. The Radio-Television has so far been obliged to repeat the unofficial statements of Leni Fischer, while passing over in silence or broadcasting in censored form the declarations of the EU and the U.S. State Department. This way of coping with the critical statements of the West and its press does nothing but highlight the crisis caused in the PD camp by the scandal its people concocted. It might be said that it is not necessary to recognize the elections until the parliament meets and the government is formed. Such a claim is absurd at a time when what happened on 26 May has shocked the governments of Europe and the United States, and has made it inevitable that the chancelleries of the West will speak out.

Nevertheless, the first messages have not been slow in coming. The reactions of the European Parliament to the visits of the four Albanian opposition parties, the warning that all negotiations about an agreement of association with be "shelved," and especially the cancellation of the visit to Albania of Santer and Dini are clear signs that anybody with eyes to see and ears to hear will understand. These signs forecast a hurricane for the presidential staff and a long hot summer for those who stole the votes of the Albanians on 26 May.

Albania: UK Rights Group Praises Elections' Fairness

AU0606081696 Tirana ATA in English 1856 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 5 (ATA)—The observers' mission of the British Helsinki Human Rights group says in the report about the May 26 elections in Albania that the observers positively assessed the development of elections in Albania. The May 26 voting in essence was free and fair although its outcome disillusioned the opposition. This result coincided with the survey carried out by a U.S. Institute, the report says.

During the voting day the mission's observers noted that the Commission members and voters moved freely and that the police presence was less than that observed during elections in all former-communist countries. The observers denounce the use of violence in the May 26 protest and stress that "the Albanian people should be congratulated for developing a multiparty democracy and for going to the polls with a good democratic spirit."

The report concludes that according to the mission the observers have monitored many elections in post-communist countries. They are conscious that their opinion of the elections in Albania is different from that of the OSCE [Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe] international human rights delegation. The report says further on that differences between their observations are amazing and that they are waiting for some concrete testimony of what several denouncing reports allege.

Albania: Ministry Dismisses Officers Over PS Rally

AU0606152296 Tirana ATA in English 1301 GMT 6 Jun 96

["Announcement of Interior Ministry"—ATA headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 6 (ATA)—The Albanian Interior Ministry has discharged two high ranking officers, a colonel and a lieutenant colonel, both deputy heads of department in this ministry, as well as five officers of the Tirana commissariats, "for being incompetent to carry out the task they has been charged with."

This dismissal is linked with the incidents created during the Socialist Party [PS] illegal rally on May 28, 1996, at the Skenderbej square in which PS chiefs and sympathizers wanted to protest the results of the first round of the parliamentary elections on May 26.

The Democratic Party won the majority of votes in this poll.

Despite public forewarning by the public order forces, some 200-300 people, members and sympathizers of the PS and other parties, led by their leaders [Servet] Pellumbi, [Namik] Dokle, and [Skender] Gjinushi, tried to reach the Skenderbej square on May 28.

The police forces, after forewarning to disperse, intervened and broke up the small group of protesters, who came out of the PS headquarters.

The Prosecutor's Office is continuing inquiries into the incidents occurring after the disperse of the illegal rally.

Albania: Resignations of Dokle, Pellumbi Said Demanded

AU0606130296

[FBIS Report] Tirana ALBANIA in Albanian on 6 June carries on page 3 an unattributed 600-word report alleging demands within the Socialist Party for the resignation of two of its deputy chairmen, under the headline "Resignations of Namik Dokle and Servet Pellumbi Demanded." No other Tirana papers on 6 June, including the Socialist Party's ZERI I POPULLIT, carry any similar reports.

ALBANIA's report states: "'Namik Dokle and Servet Pellumbi must announce their resignations from leading posts in the party.' Thus the first analysis of the rout of the Socialist Party [PS] begins by formulating a demand for resignations. The PS Presidium has not met, but the demands for the resignations of two of the party's foremost figures is described as coming from the grass-roots rather than from the General Management Committee or the comrades of the presidium. However, none of the protagonists believes that this demand has come from the grass roots. V.K., a familiar figure who has been left in the shade within the PS, replied to our question about who is behind the 'vote of no confidence' in Dokle and Pellumbi by saying: 'I have heard. The history of initiatives from the grass roots is a long one, as you know...'

"Meanwhile, one of the PS deputy chairmen (not of course Namik Dokle or Servet Pellumbi) categorically denied the demands for the two resignations, adding that he did not understand why Pellumbi and Dokle have been linked together so much and perhaps implying that the resignation of some other unnamed figure must be sought first.

"Meanwhile, the debate that began in the last two days of the strike has focused on issues of the election campaign, the decision to withdraw from the elections, the impossibility of finding credible allies abroad, and the electoral platform, which planned to dismantle everything achieved during four years of Democratic Party government. However, these do not seem to be the reasons for demanding the resignations of two of the PS's most important deputy chairmen. Their resignations would create a vacuum and perhaps more scope for the other deputy chairmen Hajdaraga and Meta, something which does not seem to interest very much other forces within the PS. If there is a moral reason to ask for the resignation of Pellumbi, who is incriminated as a former State Security Service agent, it must be found in recent events. The strong position of General Secretary Gramoz Ruci and the revanche of Kastriot Islami both seem astonishing. The latter, one of the main opponents of an end to the strike, unexpectedly revealed himself on Voice of America as a man of dialogue. The demand for the resignation of the two figures creates the impression of a stand taken by moderates within the PS, but the strong commitment of such men as Gramoz Ruci and Islami suggests that they do not support the idea of more scope for reformers within the largest left-wing opposition party."

Albania: DP, CDP Chairmen Discuss Possible Cooperation

AU0606124496 Tirana ATA in English 1100 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Tirana June 6 (ATA)—The Chairman of the Albanian Democratic Party (DP), Prof. Dr. Tritan Shehu, met Wednesday with the Chairman of the Christian Democratic Party (CDP), Zef Bushati, in the DP headquarters. Bushati congratulated Shehu for the DP victory in the 26 May elections. They expressed the need of cooperation to promote democracy and continue reforms for the strengthening of the rule of law based on the fundamental democratic principles, as two forces taking part in the European Christian Democrat Union. Shehu and Bushati discussed the possibility of cooperation in the constituencies where elections will be repeated. [passage omitted]

Albania: Daily Hails 'Final Defeat of Communism'

AU0406180896 Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian 4 Jun 96 p 1

[Unattributed editorial: "Only Communism Has Lost"]

[FBIS Translated Text] When the Democratic Party [PD] chose as the motto of its election campaign the slogan "With us, everybody wins," its was utterly convinced that its victory would be a triumph for the whole of Albania, its rich and poor, and its democrats and socialists. It was also convinced that, when the majority of Albanians lined up behind this slogan of the PD, this would also lead to the final defeat of communism.

This became a reality on 26 May. With the indisputable victory of the PD, the Albanians won and communism conclusively lost.

A positive confrontation with communism, leading to its elimination from the country's political structures, has not happened so fast in any other country of eastern Europe. The European identity of the Albanians was finally demonstrated—of almost all of them, while those who could not find room for Western ideas were weeded out. Of course, nobody ever thought that Europe's 3 million Albanians would also include Servet Pellumbi, Namik Dokle, and Gramoz Ruci. It also became clear to people that Ceka's occidental party was merely a liberal form of communism, and that Ceka was a Socialist Party leftover, while for a long time nobody has been able to prise Skender Gjinushi away from Ramiz Alia or Petrit Kalakulla from the old communist administrative machine or the instructions he receives from Gaqo Nesho's son in the cafes of Tirana.

It was clear to the Albanians that, by deciding between communism and democracy, they were deciding between democratic government and Dokle, Ruci, and Ceka. For them, the PD became a sacred choice, if only because the Europeanism of the Albanians who voted for the PD was more advanced than the division of Albanians into asphalted and unimproved varieties, as preached by Ceka, or the outright antipresidentialism of Dokle and Pellumbi. The Albanians remember the successes they have harvested under the Democratic government, and have thrown into the garbage can the poison spread by the leaders of the Red Front and the self-induced orgasms of Rama.

When the Albanians chose the PD government, their future was clear to them, just as they had a clear vision of their rescue from the back rooms of the Russian Revolution of 1917, the 50 years of dictatorship in Albania, and the wall-like faces of the present Socialist Party Presidium.

The second round of the elections was a further sign of the deserved PD victory. In Sunday's elections [2 June], 67 percent of voters took part, in comparison with 80 percent in the first round. Less than 20 percent of the voters heeded the Socialist call to boycott the second round of the elections, which best shows the size of this party's electorate and proves mathematically how many voted for this party the previous week. On the basis of the facts of the second round, it becomes clear that the Socialists, and the voters handed over free to its satellite parties, won very little. Kalakulla looks ridiculous when he claims to possess a party, as does Ceka, whose votes in Elbasan took one minute to count. They do not represent any electorate in Albania and cannot be considered important in Albanian politics. The importance of each of these people is approximately that of a housewife choosing between different peasants' stalls.

Albania has now determined its physiognomy as an addition to a highly-developed and civilized Europe. Total rejection has been dealt out to those unreformed Socialists who wish the country harm.

Communism has lost. Everybody else has won.

Albania: Long Sentences for Ex-Communist Leaders Demanded

AU0706080996 Tirana ATA in English 1632 GMT 6 Jun 96

[Report by Atlant Frasheri]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 6 (ATA)—Prosecutor Kadri Skera requested on Thursday [6 June] in a trial session 20 year imprisonment term for two former senior PLA [Party of Labor of Albania] officials Pirro Kondi and Qirjako Mihali and 16 for Sulejman Bushati.

After a legal analysis of the penal acts carried out by the above defendants, Prosecutor Skera asked the court to cease the case for the penal act of the crime of genocide, envisaged by article 73 of the Penal Code.

Pirro Kondi, Qirjako Mihali, and Sulejman Bushati were brought to court after a testimony made by the Forum of Independent Intellectuals in the Tirana Prosecutor's Office. The forum accused them of genocide and crimes in cooperation against humanity during the time they were first PLA secretaries in different districts.

According to Articles 74, 67, and 25 of the Penal Code, those guilty of these penal acts face sentences from 10 years in jail to death penalty.

After hearing the final conclusions by the prosecutor, the jury chaired by Gjin Gjoni, decided to hear the final say by the defendants and their attorneys on June 12, 1996.

Bulgaria: Speculation About Changes at BSP Plenum

AU0606160296 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 6 Jun 96 p 2

[Article by Svetla Koleva: "Zhan Videnov's Deputies To Stay in Executive Bureau"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sofia—Sources in BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] headquarters reported yesterday that the four deputy chairmen of the BSP Supreme Council will remain in the Executive Bureau.

Thus, in addition to Doncho Konakchiev and Krasimir Premyanov, who are both close to the prime minister, the "awkward customers" Yanaki Stoilov and Georgi Purvanov will also keep their posts. Yuriy Borisov, chairman of the Parliamentary Commission on Education and Science, who is expected to be offered the post of minister of culture, is very likely to be removed from the "inner circle" of the BSP leadership. Executive Bureau members claim that Nikolay Kamov will be removed from the body because Videnov feels "organic intolerance" toward him. The same sources believe that Vladimir Topencharov will also be sent packing because of his criticisms of the government.

At its meeting today, the BSP Executive Bureau will decide which new members to accept, and the names will have to be approved by the Supreme Council at its plenum on Saturday 8 June. The possibility is also under consideration of enlarging the Executive Bureau by including a broad representation of the regional leaderships.

Bulgaria: Videnov To Seek Resignation of BSP Bureau

AU0606164796 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 6 Jun 96 pp 1-2

[Article by Tanya Geneva: "Zhan Videnov Will Seek Collective Resignation of Executive Bureau"]

[FBIS Translated Text] DUMA learned yesterday that at the plenum of the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] Supreme Council on Saturday 8 June BSP Chairman Zhan Videnov will propose the collective resignation of the entire Executive Bureau. Almost all the Executive Bureau's members have already agreed to this, and the final procedure will be discussed when the bureau meets today at 1600. According to some sources, the only thing certain at present is that the four deputy chairmen—Purvanov, Premyanov, Konakchiev, and Stoilov—will remain in the Executive Bureau. According to others, however, collective resignation means just what it says, implying that the chairman will propose that the plenum elect a completely new membership. As is well known, the BSP Supreme Council will vote in secret on the Executive Bureau membership after the BSP leader has put forward his own nominations.

Interior Minister Nikolay Dobrev will probably be proposed as a new deputy prime minister in the cabinet with responsibilities for the key power ministries, the energy industry, and the military-industrial complex. Within BSP circles, there is growing dissatisfaction with the failure of Doncho Konakchiev as deputy prime minister to maintain a constructive dialogue with the trade unions, so that informed persons believe that after the personnel changes he will stay on only in the post of construction minister.

According to DUMA's sources, Rumen Gechev is expected to remain as deputy prime minister only until the end of June, when he will take up a post abroad, and the Ministry of Economic Development will be closed down. Svetoslav Shivarov will resume his status of deputy prime minister without portfolio.

DUMA's report on 4 June that Kliment Vuchev will be relieved from his post as industry minister has been confirmed. He will probably be appointed as head of the Interdepartmental Council on the Military-Industrial Complex and Mobilization Readiness. Several outstanding professionals are being considered to replace him as industry minister.

The cabinet is considering creating two new ministries—for the energy industry, led by Konstantin Rusinov, who has been in charge of the energy industry until now, or by Rumen Ovcharov, and for posts and telecommunications. According to several independent sources, Lyubomir Kolarov is not expected to remain as chief of posts and telecommunications.

Tomorrow the Democratic Left's Political Consultative Council will meet to discuss the proposed personnel changes in the Council of Ministers. The leaderships of the Ecoglasnost Political Club and the Aleksandur Stamboliyski Bulgarian National Agrarian Union will also meet on the same day. On Sunday 9 June, following the BSP Supreme Council plenum on Saturday, the leadership of the entire Democratic Left will meet in joint session to adopt a final resolution on the changes. It is most likely that parliament will hold a special session on Tuesday 11 June to vote on the cabinet changes.

Bulgaria: BSP Deputy Kamov Previews Party Plenum

AU0606191196 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 6 Jun 96 p 10

[Interview with Nikolay Kamov, National Assembly deputy of Bulgarian Socialist Party, by Kameliya Evgenieva; place and date not given: "On Saturday, the BSP Will Face a Dramatic Problem"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Evgenieva] Mr. Kamov, you have proposed changes in the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] Executive Bureau. It has been said that the bureau will collectively resign on Saturday 8 June. What is your goal?

[Kamov] The problem has existed since the start of 1995. The Executive Bureau membership was nominated by the chairman of the BSP Supreme Council before the elections, but the nature of our political tasks has changed substantially since the elections. This also affects the role of the party leadership, which was supposed to cooperate with the government and the parliamentary majority.

[Evgenieva] Are you hinting that this is not happening?

[Kamov] I am talking about necessary pragmatic changes for the purpose of working together better. I raised this issue at the very start of this year, but there was no reaction. I used myself as an example, so as not to affect anyone else. I talked about the need for a party spokesman who is not committed either to the parliamentary group or the government.

[Evgenieva] However, you are suspected of wanting to settle a personal vendetta with Klara Marinova and of exploiting this situation to remove her from the Executive Bureau....

[Kamov] I would not want to comment on this matter. My proposal for changes in the Executive Bureau was made at the plenum on 10 March, but produced no response. At the last meeting, therefore, I ventured to submit a draft resolution obliging the party chairman to make the changes. However, it is very important to point out that changes should not be made for their own sake either in the Executive Bureau or in the government.

[Evgenieva] Surely you do not expect that a single such step at the plenum on Saturday will solve all the party's and state's problems?

[Kamov] This may sound very strong to the ears of many people, but, at the plenum on Saturday, the BSP faces a dramatic, truly dramatic juncture. It faces a very important choice, one that was made much earlier in other former socialist countries. In Bulgaria, declarations have been made that we have made this choice, but from many of the elements of the administration, it is clearly evident that this has not in fact happened.

The BSP must either finally dissociate itself from its past and choose the path of the reforms or continue along the road that the government has been following for the last 18 months.

[Evgenieva] What precisely will happen after the Executive Bureau resigns?

[Kamov] It seems to be the case that we are carrying out the essence of our policies, the real reforms that the others did not summon up the courage to implement, under foreign pressure, under constraint. The BSP leadership is specifically to blame for this, but, this Saturday, it will have a chance to act to break with the past.

I have in front of me the program statement submitted by the prime minister to the 37th National Assembly. It clearly describes what we had to do.

[Evgenieva] But it was not done, is that what you are saying?

[Kamov] We have passed through a very difficult period. The BSP Supreme Council loaned the government great trust and gave it freedom to act. This ensured our victory in the elections. It is absurd to say that the strategy of the economic reform is being written from this point on. What has been done this year? One of the shortcomings is that, instead of seeking a broader base for the administration, we managed to quarrel with the workers and employers, with the debtors and creditors, and with the intelligentsia—something unprecedented in the history of our party.

We could have acted far differently from the way that we adopted. The reforms are a field in which we might have achieved, if not a national consensus, at least a social treaty. We should have at least asked for the views of the opposition and the main elements of our civic society—the trade unions and public organizations.

[Evgenieva] However, the BSP preferred to implement the reforms by itself. Is it not a bit too late to start a debate on this topic now?

[Kamov] The debate started at the beginning of the year. Remember the heated debates within the Democratic Left Parliamentary Group on the grain crisis at the end of last year. Two ministers were replaced at that time.

[Evgenieva] Yes, but the government first denied that any crisis existed. The demand by the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] for grain to be purchased urgently was rejected, and today the results are evident to all....

[Kamov] This is one of the concrete problems to which an adequate answer must be found. An adequate answer, not one that we ourselves cannot accept within our own private circles. In a normal situations, people are very quickly made to answer for such errors.

[Evgenieva] Why did the government receive such a huge loan of trust?

[Kamov] Because the situation was unique, compared to the other Eastern European countries. It was very serious, and it was natural for us to trust the cabinet and not breathe down their necks. The first attempt to make adjustments and to explain the errors produced an amazingly sharp reaction.

[Evgenieva] Who dug in their heels and resisted?

[Kamov] I am talking about the changes needed at the time of the grain crisis. We have a special habit of exhaustively discussing issues internally. See, even now, certain discussions hardly ever take place in the Executive Bureau and Supreme Council that should not have been held before these possibilities have been exhausted.

I did in fact raise the question of changes in the party leadership following one such exhaustive discussion, I raised it publicly within the party, but no one listened to me.

The fact that we are unaccustomed to seeking consultations with the other political forces cannot be justified in any way.

The extended term in office of the parliamentary group's leadership has failed to reveal that these people have any idea of what is at stake. The way in which they decided the Granitski affair—and he was a member of the apparatus—confirms my impression that these people will never change.

[Evgenieva] The time has now come for me to ask you why no one in the BSP has ventured to name names. Even here, you seem to be avoiding speaking specifically.

[Kamov] I name names in the BSP Executive Bureau, Supreme Council, and Parliamentary Group.

[Evgenieva] Why do you not do it in public?

[Kamov] Oh dear, I hope that we will not reach the stage when one has to seek a fair decision on personnel issues through the press. These matters should be resolved internally, within the party.

[Evgenieva] Judging from your words, however, this clearly cannot be achieved.

[Kamov] That is correct. I have not kept back any name, including that of Zhan Videnov. This issue is one for which he is personally responsible, and he knows that very well.

[Evgenieva] Do you think that Zhan Videnov should be replaced—which is another proposal that has been ascribed to you?

[Kamov] So far, Videnov has failed to convince my by his statements and acts that he is aware of the exceptional juncture that we face—the need to make a correct choice and have the will to do it.

If, on Saturday, the proceedings sound like an analysis and policy made by Zhan Videnov himself, I will be the first to offer him my support. If, however, he is under the influence of his many bad advisers—not only the ones in the Council of Ministers, but also the others who influence him—and if he tries to gloss over the real problems by substituting others, then I will think that he has personally failed.

[Evgenieva] Nevertheless, what will happen on Saturday?

[Kamov] The BSP Supreme Council and Parliamentary Group face their chance, maybe their most fateful moment. Of course, a lot of courage and vigor is needed for this. I would like to hear the voices of some people whom I have not heard until now. I would like to hear people's views, no matter what they are.

[Evgenieva] If Videnov fails to make changes in his cabinet, would you support a no-confidence vote in your own government?

[Kamov] No, never. I will never vote for a motion proposed by the opposition. However, I will think very carefully about how to act subsequently. One may possibly be liked for being stubborn, but I have never heard of stubbornness in government proving to be successful.

Bulgaria: BSP Plenum May Dismiss Sever Ministers

AU0706090896 Sofia STANDART NEWS in Bulgarian 7 Jun 96 p 1

[Staff report: "Seven Ministers Are Leaving"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 6 June, Zhan Videnov promised a small circle of socialist leaders that seven ministers would be leaving the cabinet. In addition to Dimitur Kostov [finance minister], Georgi Kostov [minister of culture], and Svetoslav Shivarov [deputy prime minister and minister of agriculture], the following ministers will also leave the cabinet: Mincho Koralski, [minister of labor and social affairs], Rumen Gechev [deputy prime minister], and Kliment Vuchev [minister of industry]. Lyubomir Kolarov, chief of the Committee on Postal Services and Communications, is also a strong candidate to lose his post because of the "Bulphone" scandal. The Ecoglasnost Political Club sent a letter to Zhan Videnov demanding the dismissal of Mladen Chervenyakov, minister of justice. Ecoglasnost also insists on the dismissal of Andrey Delchev, chief of the Council of Minister's Justice Department. On 6 June, the ministers discussed the changes and decided to announce them tomorrow at the Bulgarian Socialist Party plenum.

Bulgaria: Speculation About Cabinet Changes

AU0706092396 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 7 Jun 96 p 2

[Staff report: "Videnov Keeps Silent About Ministers, Plenum To Determine Changes"]

[FBIS Translated Text] So far the prime minister has not accepted the resignation of Svetoslav Shivarov from the post of minister of agriculture, Efir-2 reported on 6 June. The dismissals of Rumen Gechev [deputy prime minister], Kliment Vuchev [minister of industry], and Georgi Kostov [minister of culture] also are not certain.

On Wednesday, at a meeting of the Permanent Board of the Aleksandur Stamboliyski Bulgarian National Agrarian Union [BZNS] Shivarov announced his resignation from the post of minister of agriculture. He presented his arguments, which were accepted by the BZNS leadership, Dimitur Shopov, BZNS deputy chairman, announced on 6 June. The Red Agrarians will demand certain responsible posts in various economic departments as compensation.

A source at No. 20 Positano Street [Bulgarian Socialist Party—BSP headquarters] maintains that Kliment Vuchev, minister of industry, and Georgi Kostov, minister of culture, will most likely also leave the government. According to him, Rumen Gechev will be dismissed from the post minister of economic development, but it still has not been decided whether he will remain deputy prime minister. On 6 June, Gechev said that only the editors of certain newspapers and no one else, have demanded his resignation.

"If they want me to be the Joan of Arc of the economy, I will resign," Georgi Kostov said on 6 June prior to the cabinet meeting. Finance Minister Dimitur Kostov said that he has a lot to do, and that so far no one has demanded his resignation. Mincho Koralski, minister of labor and social affairs, assured the reporters; "No one is going to dismiss me, because the people find me sympathetic."

Deputy Prime Minister Doncho Konakchiev said it is normal to expect a few committees to become ministries. Sources close to the cabinet maintain that the committees meant are the Committee on Postal Services and Communications, and the Committee on Power Supply. The current chief of the Committee on Power Supply, Konstantin Rusinov, and his deputy, Rumen Ovcharov are mentioned as the most likely candidates foe the post of minister of power supply. A member of the BSP leadership said that Lyubomir Kolarov will not be proposed for the post of minister of communications. This post will most likely be offered to a member of the Aleksandur Stamboliyski BZNS. In order to compensate the other coalition partner of the BSP, Boris Kolev from the Ecoglasnost Political Club will become minister of tourism.

On 6 June, Prime Minister Zhan Videnov deposited a letter at the National Assembly in which he requests a special National Assembly session on Monday, 10 June, at which the cabinet changes should be adopted. Those changes will be specified at the BSP 8-9 June plenum.

Bulgaria: Videnov Declares Intention To Change Cabinet

AU0706093396 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 7 Jun 96 p 2

[Report by Sevda Dinovska: "Zhan Videnov Buried Under Demands for Additional Resignations"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] TRUD has learned that the Ecoglasnost Political Club has asked Prime Minister Zhan Videnov to dismiss Justice Minister Mladen Chervenyakov because "he has not carried out the legislative activities expected of him." According to informed sources, the Prime Minister's Office constantly receives demands for additional resignations. [passage omitted]

The resignation of Professor Ivan Angelov, Zhan Videnov's economic adviser, has already been accepted. Yesterday at 1300, Videnov submitted a letter to the National Assembly administration announcing his intention "to propose personnel and structural changes in the government."

Bulgaria: Political Maneuvering in BSP Analyzed

AU0706132896 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 7 Jun 96 p 10

[Commentary by Genka Markova: "Price of Prime Minister's Resignation Is Higher Than Positano's Top Floor"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The elite of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] has recently begun working toward a single goal—creating the impression that a large-scale personnel change is imminent, in which the key name is Pirinski. According to one variation, Pirinski is a man worthy of competing for the office of president; according to another, he will be the next prime minister. Please note that these are not possibilities suggested by factors outside the BSP but from within the socialist ranks. This shows that the ruling party does not have a long list of substitute players for the leading posts in the country and that they have limited their choices to a single name.

But is that really the case? Is this not a game the leaders are playing in which the intrigue with Pirinski's name is intended to divert attention from a previously arranged scenario? It is well known that Premyanov, Dobrev, and Konakchiev have been entrusted with proposing the BSP candidate for the presidential elections. According to our information, Pirinski is currently the leading candidate, followed by Lilov and Sendov. This internal party standing, which is a result of the BSP municipal conferences—which, in a way, resembled the opposition's primaries—could be accepted or ignored. There will always be arguments to support any party decision.

It is very likely that the party (meaning the circle around Videnov, which continues to be strong and enjoys the support of the party apparatus) will eliminate Pirinski from the presidential race. Since this can no longer be achieved through an ultimatum, encirclement is necessary. That is precisely why the suggestions directed at party voters are not negative (such as Pirinski is unsuitable because it is difficult to cite any prudent arguments against his candidacy except by concocting a compromising affair). The party prefers messages of a different character; for example, Pirinski could very well become prime minister (the arguments used: his experience in the government, including in Lukanov's government, and his moderate distance from emotional topics, without turning this into a cynical arrogance).

Thus one logically asks two questions: Why is Pirinski not really allowed to pursue the presidency, and is the Prime Minister Pirinski option feasible?

If the BSP leaders had intended to nominate Pirinski as their presidential candidate (this candidate will have a chance not only of receiving BSP votes, but also those of voters in the center), they would not have concocted the intrigue with his citizenship in connection with his place of birth. This was followed by an attempt to erase all traces by adopting the amendments to the Citizenship Act proposed by Velko Vulkanov. However, it was done too late rather than too early, and the opposition could now turn to the Constitutional Court to interpret the Act and the amendments. This would have put a question mark over Pirinski's chance at success in the presidential elections.

It has already been said that Pirinski is a predictable person, but the rules of the game cannot be dictated to him. If he were to become president, he would be a new strong center of power rather than an obedient part of the prime minister-president tandem (something about which Videnov admittedly dreams). That is the basic reason why current efforts are aimed not at nominating Pirinski, but at forcing him to withdraw from the game.

The chances of Pirinski becoming the next BSP prime minister are also linked to many unknowns. The BSP Charter, adopted by the 41st Congress, determines that the party leader must be prime minister. Neither the Charter nor the identity of a party leader can be changed outside the framework of a BSP congress. Not only does starting up the clumsy party machinery presuppose a long cycle, but there is hardly anyone suicidal enough to propose such a move in the BSP on the eve of presidential elections. Thus, the possibility of holding an extraordinary party congress is eliminated. That explains the behavior leading up to the presidential elections.

Based on the theory that the cabinet must be stabilized until an agreement is signed with the IMF, Videnov agreed to personnel changes. However, those changes only ostensibly represent wide-scale change in government policy. Indeed, the imminent cabinet changes aim to calm the situation rather than to represent a turning point in the cabinet policy.

Videnov repeatedly demonstrated that he does not respect public opinion (including the opinion of innerparty opponents of the rank of painter Svetlin Rusev, whom he slapped in the face by saying that Bulgaria has better painters). He will again ignore public opinion without any difficulties, because the anticipated changes will produce a certain social response, while the political effect will evaporate even before the presidential elections. Therefore, the great changes (which Videnov will be compelled to make under the pressure of his party members, not because of the opposition) will take place as close a possible to the presidential elections, sometime in early autumn. And until then? The prime minister declared on the "Otkrito" television program that he is prepared to pay the high price of resignation. This ostensibly was a move intended to show respect for public opinion, but the actual "payment" will hardly be made. On the contrary, when pressed to the wall, Videnov will continue to follow through with his intentions, presenting himself simultaneously as a hero, a martyr, and leader-savior of the nation and state.

Thus it appears that Pirinski is not the only one with a key role in the scenario. Indeed, Videnov still has the leading role. Some of his well-wishers claim that this is his last chance and that he must make more than ad hoc changes in the cabinet and the BSP Executive Bureau. However, these changes must remain an internal party matter. Whenever the names of Videnov (and even Pirinski) are invoked, it is always from the viewpoint of the top floor of No. 20 Positano Street [BSP headquarters]. The interests of the state, for example, the stability of the executive power, or the authority of the parliamentary majority are not factors in this script. They are obviously sacrificed to the political interests of the ruling party itself in the context of the presidential elections.

Bulgaria: Zhelev's Defeat Attributed to Popular Discontent

AU0406080196 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 3 Jun 96 p 9

[Commentary by Yovka Dimitrova and Aneliya Velinova: "Crisis Overturned Zhelev"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zhelev became a victim of the crisis because the people are now angry at anyone associated with political power. The incumbent president said that he is disappointed with the government, but also that he has hopes in it.

The president could not or did not want to dissociate himself from the guilt of the rulers. He did not separate his state prerogatives from his election campaign messages.

His not very categorical promises regarding early parliamentary elections in the autumn did not warm the hearts of the Bulgarians, pressed hard now by the prices shock. His pledge to ask the opposition to topple the government came only on the last day of the campaign and somehow went unnoticed with the blow of the new higher prices announced by the cabinet.

The parties that support Zhelev were not able to mobilize their voters or even their activists. The constant disputes within the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union [BZNS] and the reservations about Zhelev among a part of Savov's people [the Democratic Party], had their effect.

Voting in the villages—the BZNS fortress—was weak. In the sixth year of the struggle for the return of the land, Zhelev has nothing to boast about. While the president was touring the villages and towns, the people were standing in lines to buy anything. His last trump—the proposal to establish a presidential republic—attracted the support of those who want a strong hand, but met resistance from the People's Union, which promised to support Zhelev.

The Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] leadership put everything on one card—the "primaries," and began to strengthen its positions among the people, while the people around Zhelev quarreled about whether they should participate in the race against the SDS candidate or not.

Having settled the primaries issue, 134 Rakovski Street [SDS headquarters] prepared an intensive campaign for Petur Stoyanov, sparing neither time nor money. The blue [SDS] candidate went on the full offensive in the towns and villages with rallies, meetings, and statements on national radio.

Stoyanov launched himself as a calm and correct candidate, who avoids rough tactics and blows below the belt against the opponent, even when he wears gloves. The lawyer from Plovdiv even refrained from attacks against the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP].

At the same time, Zhelev, surrounded by the attributes of power, which irritated the people, rested on his laurels. Surrounded by bodyguards, almost inaccessible to the press, the president more and more doubted the value of the primaries, even after he signed the agreement to participate in them.

Not even the greatest SDS optimists expected such an annihilating victory against Zhelev. Let no one be deceived—if the people's discontent had not reached its peak, the primaries would hardly have produced the same result. The number of voters came close to 900,000, while Ivan Kostov [SDS leader] had said that 350,000 would be a very respectable figure.

Many of those who voted for Petur Stoyanov were motivated by the urge to bring about change. He won against Zhelev because he is a nobody in politics.

Czech Republic: Havel Asks Klaus To Start Coalition Talks

LD0606171096 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1500 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Czech President Vaclav Havel received in Prague Castle the chairmen of the following political parties: the Civic Democratic Party, the Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD], the Civic Democratic Alliance, and the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party. Marika Taborska and Eva Hulkova report from the meeting:

[Correspondent] Good afternoon from Prague Castle. At long last we are going to hear from the president what he thinks about today's meeting.

[Begin Havel recording] The meeting is over. I invited to it the highest representatives of the Civic Democratic Party, the Czech Social Democratic Party, the Civic Democratic Alliance, and the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party. The purpose of the meeting was to find out how these parties view the various alternatives of the postelection development and to ascertain the scope for their future cooperation.

First of all, I asked the victorious party, that is the Civic Democratic Party, and the second most successful party, that is the Czech Social Democratic Party, whether they were considering the possibility of a so-called grand coalition, with or without the participation of other parties. Representatives of the Civic Democratic Party and the Czech Social Democratic Party told me they were not thinking in terms of such an arrangement.

Then I asked the present coalition parties whether they were prepared to discuss a new coalition and was told that they were. I asked them whether they had come to an agreement regarding the person who should chair their future coalition talks, and they told me they had come to such an agreement and that the person they had in mind was the chairman of the leading party, Vaclav Klaus.

Having received this information, I asked Vaclav Klaus to initiate the relevant negotiations.

Then I asked the Czech Social Democratic Party representatives if they were willing to give their support to this coalition government under certain conditions. I received a positive answer. On the basis of this, I have called on the representatives of the parties of the current coalition to hold regular talks with the Social Democrats on all aspects of their possible support for the government formed by them.

We also talked about the timetable for the individual steps that should now follow and about filling the posts in parliament. The parties of the outgoing coalition have indicated that, if they agree with the Czech Social Democratic Party on all of the conditions and circumstances under which the CSSD is willing to support the government formed by them and on the nature of such support, they are ready to give their support to the filling of the post of the speaker of the Chamber of Deputies and some other parliamentary posts by representatives of the CSSD.

In conclusion, I asked all of the parties invited to continue their mutual intensive talks. I asked them to brief me regularly on these talks and stressed that I was ready to meet them for further talks at any time.

In my view, the most important outcome of today's talks is the unequivocal assurance by all four political parties that they hold the same view on the foreign political orientation of our country and that they want to continue the transformation processes that began after November 1989.

Finally, I would like to tell you that tomorrow at 0730 I will announce that I have called the session of the newly elected Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic. Thank you. [end recording]

Czech Republic: AFP: Havel Asks Klaus To Form New Government

AU0606162896 Paris AFP in English 1544 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Prague, June 6 (AFP)—Czech President Vaclav Havel on Thursday [6 June] said he had asked outgoing Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus to form a new government.

The announcement resulted from a meeting of the four main political parties, following inconclusive weekend elections in which Klaus's centre-right coalition government was stripped of its parliamentary majority.

Klaus will form his minority government in partnership with the Christian Democrats and the Civic Democratic Alliance.

His coalition won 99 seats in the new 200-member parliament while arch-rival Milos Zeman's Social Democratic Party won 61.

Czech Republic: Daily Urges Chance for Klaus To Form Government

AU0606165696 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 5 Jun 96 p 12

[Commentary by Jiri Leschtina: "Vaclav Klaus Must Be Given a Chance"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The president's hesitation in entrusting Vaclav Klaus with attempting to form a government has only led to a further unnecessary escalation of the confusion and tension. One party chairman held talks yesterday with another behind the back of the third and vice versa, and contradictory statements full of uncertain implications were issued. And, worst of all, as the hours pass idly by, we are forfeiting our credit abroad.

It would just send another unfortunate signal abroad if current Prime Minister Klaus, who is as equally esteemed abroad as President Havel, were not given a chance to begin the job of forming the government.

Therefore, let us hope that the insinuations by Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD] Chairman Milos Zeman, but also by some coalition allies—so far, accepted without a word by Castle circles—that Klaus is not a consensual figure capable of forming the government were more tactical maneuvering than seriously meant stances.

True, Klaus is a tough partner for negotiations. During his term of office, however, he has also demonstrated his ability to accept many compromises. Furthermore, if someone other than the election winner Klaus were to form the government in the first round, this would betray a grave lack of respect for the will of the voters.

Only if the prime minister were not in a position to reach an agreement with the CSSD chairman on bilaterally correct conditions of support for a minority right-wing government would it be possible to claim that he is not the right man for this sensitive period.

Vaclav Klaus has already made it clear that he would accept Zeman at the head of the Chamber of Deputies. Only yesterday, however, Chairman Zeman changed his oft-repeated stance that he will not support a government headed by Vaclav Klaus. Who, then, understands more flexibly the need for compromise?

Incidentally, a peculiar situation prevails within the CSSD. Following his meeting with the president on Monday [3 June], Zeman claimed that a Klaus government is unacceptable, although the party's presidium had previously voted on the exact conditions under which the CSSD will support a minority government headed by Klaus.

The president should not disregard the firm opinion of the Civic Democratic Party's supreme bodies, which support their chairman unequivocally. By expeditiously entrusting the current prime minister with forming the new government, Vaclav Havel will bring an end to the state of mortifying inactivity that is pointlessly ruffling the nerves of many citizens.

Czech Republic: 'Mutual Mistrust' Among Coalition Parties

AU0606160196 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 5 Jun 96 p 2

["Analysis" by Sabina Slonkova: "The Unity of ODA and the People's Party Is Accompanied by Mutual Mistrust"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The situation in the past three days has, on the outside, united the coalition parties, but their bilateral talks have been marked by mutual mistrust. The unofficial statements by the representatives of the individual parties sometimes give the impression that no one trusts anyone.

Publicly, however, all three chairmen—Vaclav Klaus, Josef Lux, and Jan Kalvoda—are saying that they are proceeding absolutely in unison.

The representatives of the Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA], however, concur with the strongest party, the Civic Democratic Party [ODS], in their concerns about the unpredictable reactions of the People's Party because they have not been in a position to judge unequivocally to what extent it will resist the charms of the Social Democrats.

"The fact that the People's Party is not completely united in its view on Zeman's offers has not exactly added to our peace of mind. A substantial majority of the party, including Deputy Chairman Kasal, is more radical, but then there is its leader, Lux, who is willing to make more concessions to Zeman. It is gratifying and fundamental, of course, that Lux in no way intends to flirt with the idea of competing with Klaus for the post of prime minister. Despite this, it is necessary for us to be more vigilant toward the People's Party," said a coalition representative, who, of course, did not want his name published.

In turn, Kalvoda's Alliance is united with the People's Party in its vexation at the fact that the ODS does not always stick precisely to the course of action it agrees upon with its coalition partners. The biggest storm of indignation so far has been caused by Prime Minister Klaus, who, during his meeting with the president on Sunday [2 June], appealed, contrary to the original agreement with Kalvoda and Lux, for the talks on forming a cabinet to be entrusted to him directly and not to the whole coalition. "The People's Party and ODA decided in reaction to this step that they would begin to negotiate with Zeman themselves without the ODS," said another coalition member.

The People's Party is still concerned that a grand coalition government is not quite unacceptable to ODA. Of course, the Alliance's representatives have repeatedly made it clear that they do not support this option. "The development of the situation does indicate that the Alliance's consideration of a grand coalition is unlikely, but we must not forget it completely. Indeed, this coalition would obviously be very unstable, and ODA would thus distance itself perceptibly from Klaus's party. Furthermore, we would not support this government," said a representative of Lux's People's Party.

Following yesterday's coalition party meetings and the talks with Zeman, the representatives of the ODS, the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party, and ODA are of the opinion that they would be acting against their own interests if they were to inflict a blow below the belt against their partners.

"Each of the coalition parties is now pressed against the wall; no one can venture to hop about too much. Now, we have to negotiate tactically on every little word, but then I think there will be a real chance of success," said a senior representative of one of the coalition parties late in the evening.

Czech Republic: Lux Explains Meeting of Coalition Party Heads

LD0606135096 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1200 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Today's meeting of chairmen of the coalition parties ended, according to some observers, far too soon. It caused varied speculation, but it is certain that this afternoon President Vaclav Havel will meet with not only the representatives of the Civic Democratic Party [ODS], the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party [KDU-CSL], and the Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA], but also with the Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD] chairman [Milos Zeman]. Speaking to Czech radio, KDU-CSL Chairman Josef Lux said:

[Begin Lux recording] Our coalition talks this morning confirmed our determination that the next government will be formed by the present coalition. We interrupted the meeting for a technical reason because we had to go to the parliament celebration. I also had to meet with our deputies. So there is no mystery about it.

We are going to have talks with the president. I hope we will agree that the government will be set up by the present coalition, that this coalition will conclude a coalition agreement and will submit a policy statement, and that the three political parties in the coalition agree, together with the Social Democrats, on certain conditions of possible support for the Social Democrats [as heard] and on what parliament should be like. [end recording]

Josef Lux refused to comment on the reports, claiming that, after today's talks, the KDU-CSL and ODA chairmen got into an argument with the ODS chairman.

Czech Republic: Havel Signs Document Convening New Assembly

LD0706091696 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 0800 GMT 7 Jun 96

[Report from Prague Castle by correspondent Milada Richterova]

[FBIS Translated Text] About 30 minutes ago President Vaclav Havel signed a document on convening the Chamber of Deputies. This was a constitutional step by the head of state opening a four-year legislative activity of the new body. Therefore, the date for the chamber's session—17 June—is in line with the Constitution, according to which the president has to convene the new legislators within 30 days after the elections, that is, in this case, by 30 June. This fulfills a prerequisite for convening the deputies' statutory meeting, the date of which will be determined by the current speaker, Milan Uhde.

The Constitution does not stipulate a deadline for this date so, theoretically, it could be either within two weeks or one year, not that the latter is actually expected to happen. However, the date for the statutory meeting of the new deputies requires that they all are in possession of deputies' licenses issued by the Central Electoral Commission. This requirement could be met by the end of June.

Czech Republic: Klaus Comments on Coalition Agreement Preparation

LD0706100096 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 0900 GMT 7 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The chairmen of the Civic Democratic Party [ODS], the Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA], and the People's Party [KDU-CSL] started coalition talks today, which should culminate in the formation of a new government. According to Vaclav Klaus, today's meeting did not deal with the form of support of the Social Democracy [CSSD] for a minority government or with the form of the government policy statement. Parallel with the coalition talks, as he said, parliamentary talks will be conducted.

[Begin Klaus recording] We are preparing a coalition agreement that will have three fundamental components. One of the components is an agreement on the government structure and appointing ministers; the second component is about mutual relations of the three coalition parties in the coming period, about the mechanisms of relations between these parties; and the third component concerns the factual contents of what will be included in the coalition agreement. [end recording]

Czech Republic: Comment: Election Ends 'Political Stability'

AU0606125596 Prague RESPEKT in Czech 3-9 Jun 96 No 23, p 2

[Commentary by Vladimir Mlynar: "Milos Zeman's Big Day"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Surprise, shock—and, in the end, confounded alarm. It is possible to sum up the results of the first elections in the independent Czech state in roughly these words. That is, the gain of just under 30 percent of the vote for the Civic Democratic Party [ODS], 8.0 percent for the People's Party, and 6.4 percent for the Civic Democratic Alliance means that, even after the redistribution of the votes in the second count, the current coalition will not put together the parliamentary majority necessary to form a stable government. The ruthlessness of the parliamentary arithmetic, then, says that neither Vaclav Klaus nor Milos Zeman is capable of forming a coalition government without fateful compromises. If we add to this the fact that the extremist parties—that is, the communists and Sladek's republicans—won the votes of almost one-fifth of the population, we can state that these elections will, in all probability, mean a considerable political jolt.

What the Polls Did Not Survey

It is possible to describe, without discussion, the Social Democrats as the informal election winners. Not only did none of the relevant preelection polls signal their gain of more than 26 percent, but, to be candid, even many of the politicians in Lidovy Dum [the Social Democrats' headquarters] did not believe in such a result. The fact that the party that just got into parliament four years ago (it won 6.0 percent then) has now more than quadrupled its votes is without doubt a personal triumph for Chairman Zeman, who managed to unite the democratic opposition forces. But, at the same time, this is also a hard-to-miss sign of the previously hidden instability of the domestic political scene: Namely, in a normally functioning democratic country, multiplying by several times the number of one's voters during the course of four years would be inconceivable.

The leaders of our two extremist formations can also be definitely satisfied. Ten and a half percent for the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia [KSCM] means that Grebenicek's comrades are hanging on to what they had. At the moment, this is bad news first and foremost for Lidovy Dum: Even though by themselves they would, under certain circumstances, maybe enter into a coalition with Grebenicek, an alliance with the unreformed Communist Party is unacceptable to Lux's People's Party (which must necessarily be an element of any governing majority). Even worse than the KSCM's relative success is the 8.0 percent for the republicans. The fact that compared to 1992 they have strengthened their position by two points is, along with the fact that Sladek's supporters are recruited mainly from the ranks of young people hearkening to primitive nationalism and racism, really alarming news.

The Weak Link in the Chain

From the point of view of the coalition parties, the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party landed best. A gain of something over 8.0 percent not only means that, compared with 1992, it has improved by 2 percent, but, first and foremost, that it has bolstered its position as the balance on the scales between left and right. Josef Lux, who first of all managed to rid his party of the unpleasant stigma of National Front collaboration and turn it into a respected member of the right-wing coalition, can credit another success to his account: His party is the indispensable ally of anyone who wants to form a stable government in this country.

The ODS's result is a little perplexing. In general, something more had been expected, but, on the other hand, it is hard to reproach the party that bore the greatest burden of reform for having won "only" as many votes as it did four years ago. Despite this, however, it seems that, of the parties in the current coalition, only the ODS could garner this so essential 1 or 2 percent more. Unfortunately, the series of minor errors (for example, its too supercilious satisfaction with the work done, an election program that said nothing, and the unfortunate affair with the anonymous sponsors at the start of the election campaign) plus a number of external influences, which will be the subject of many analyses in the months to come, have taken their toll.

The numerically least successful party in these elections, the Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA], has the most reason for self-critical reflection. That is, its result of just under 6.5 percent places it in the role of undoubtedly the weakest member of the coalition, with a very uncertain "voter" future. In other words, if we take a closer look at the preliminary results, we will see that the Alliance was relatively successful only in Prague, which is, of course, the traditional bastion of the right, and also in South Moravia, where, however, the issue is more likely to involve Vladimir Dlouhy's popularity than the ODA's principles. So, if Kalvoda's party again gets itself into difficulties like the affair with the Kreditni a prumyslova banka [Credit and Industrial Bank], this may wipe it off the political scene definitively.

Welcome to Worse Times

The most important thing now is what will happen next. If the preliminary election results are confirmed, there will be a stalemate in the new Chamber. If none of the parties decides in favor of a so far unforeseen alliance, it will be impossible to form a governing majority in this country. But it is also impossible to call new elections because of the nonexistence of the Senate (the Chamber cannot be dissolved). So, therefore, in essence, two scenarios come into consideration.

First, the current coalition may form a minority cabinet, which will exist with Zeman's blessing as long as it suits Lidovy Dum. In this case it is, of course, necessary to take certain things into consideration, such as the absence of Vaclav Klaus in the post of prime minister and, on the other hand, the seat of parliament chairman for Milos Zeman. The second possibility is the establishment of a so-called right-left coalition between the Czech Social Democratic Party and the ODS (again, obviously, without the presence of the two chairmen). Finally, it is impossible to rule out even a scenario envisioning the "desertion" of two or, conceivably, three opposition deputies to one of the coalition parties. After all, the witticism that the number of deputies in a deputies' club is only a matter of the appropriate price is not in vain...

All of these scenarios, however, have one thing in common: They signify an unstable political situation in the country at least for the coming months. And, at the moment, that is the only outcome of these elections. This is not February 1948 [when the communists came to power in Czechoslovakia], it is not even the spread of the "Slovak contamination" to the Czech lands, but it is the end of our previous political stability.

Slovakia: U.S. Advice on Media Freedom Rejected

AU0606134096 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 1 Jun 96 pp 1, 5

[Commentary by Peter Strelinger: "William Orme's New Merry Statements (Do Not) Fill Us With Great Optimism; The Executive Director of the Committee for the Protection of Journalists Is Raising His Warning Finger Again...."]

[FBIS Translated Text] Washington/Bratislava—William Orme, executive director of the Committee for the Protection of Journalists (CPJ), sent Branislav Lichardus, ambassador of the Slovak Republic to the United States, a letter in which he appreciates the recent constructive exchange of views and dialogue on questions of press freedom and voices the hope that this dialogue will continue. Of course, we in Slovakia also greatly appreciate the indulgence of our U.S. tutor (we do not know whether someone appointed him to this role or whether he is self-appointed) because, as one Slovak journalist (Fule) put it, if we did not have an Orme, we would have to invent one!

William Orme positively assesses the fact that Prime Minister Meciar shelved the parliamentary debate on the Penal Code amendment. "We will attentively follow the legislative process for this law in Parliament and hope that it will not be approved in its present form," William Orme wrote.

Our U.S. "friend" rejoices in his letter over the fact that provisions on the protection of information source have been incorporated into the draft press law. To be honest, our daily shares this joy because some opposition politicians have reproached or even sued us (Jan Carnogursky sued Jan Smolec) for not being willing to reveal the source of our information. We do not share Mr. Orme's concern, however, and are not alarmed over the fact that the cabinet has filed charges against the "famous Slovak investigative journalist Peter Toth" because we are of the opinion that democracy should not be mistaken for anarchy (neither in Slovakia nor in the United States, am I not right, Mr. Orme?). When a journalist forgets what his profession is and starts acting like a politician and orator and starts to exclaim and explain before an assembled crowd that "the cabinet has blood on its hands," we do not know what other means are available for the accused party to defend itself than recourse to legal action. What would happen if Mr. Orme dared say something similar about President Clinton, for example? Especially if he were unable to prove his claims, which is the case with Peter Toth.

What Mr. Orme claims further on in his letter to the Slovak ambassador is, to put it mildly, nonsense: "The CPJ is concerned that the investigative journalism of Peter Toth, and his public statements will make him and his newspaper the victim of government intimidation. Other journalists and media could also be similarly affected." Mr. Orme asks the Slovak ambassador to communicate the CPJ's grave concern to President Michal Kovac and Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar.

I suppose that Mr. Orme will soon write another letter and will express new concern when the Slovak CPJ Commission (Mr. Baranek) informs him about my feuilleton "Slovakia's Ass," in which I supposedly grossly offended a certain Slovak journalist. I have no doubt that Mr. Orme will draw from this the new conclusion that even Slovak satire is in the services of government power and Vladimir Meciar.

At the close of his letter to Ambassador Lichardus, however, William Orme proves himself to be a merciful and tolerant man. He expresses the hope that "the present intimidating laws and practices supported by the ruling party will cease so that, next year, Vladimir Meciar will no longer be included on the List of Enemies of the Press."

There is one thing that worries even us, however: What will Mr. Orme and Mrs. Marton do if the Slovak Government and the prime minister mend their ways?

Slovakia: Foreign Ministry on Czech Election Results

LD0606131296 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1000 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs held a regular news conferences today on topical international-political issues. Lubica Lelovicova reports:

[Lelovicova] At the beginning of the news conference, Foreign Ministry spokesman Juraj Matejovsky informed journalists of the ministry's position regarding the results of the elections in the Czech Republic:

[Begin Matejovsky recording] We respect the results of the democratic elections in the Czech Republic. Bilateral relations between the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic are very good. They are standard relations and we are interested in keeping them that way. We are interested in having a stable neighbor, and we hope that the Czech side will succeed in resolving the issue of forming a new government so that it can solve problems dating from the time of the former federation as well as certain topical issues, such as the ratification of the border agreement [with Slovakia] which, unfortunately, has not yet been dealt with by the Czech side.

Let me add that the outcome of the Czech elections did not surprise us because we expected that kind of development. The situation in the Czech Republic is more complex than we were led to believe and the election results confirm that the process of transformation is complicated everywhere. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Slovakia: National Party Leader on Benes Decrees

LD3105224996 Bratislava Slovak Radio Network in Hungarian 1530 GMT 31 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Maria Szabo reports on the news conference held by the Slovak Nationalist Party in Bratislava [Hungarian: Pozsony] earlier today.

[Begin recording] [Szabo] [passage omitted] Jozef Sedovic, first chairman of the Slovak Nationalist Party, has said that his party is alarmed by the Hungarian parliament's efforts to achieve the annulment of the Benes Decrees, which, in his view, are going to be on the agenda again, sooner or later.

[Sedovic, in Slovak fading into Hungarian translation] The policy of the current government in Budapest illustrates absolutely clearly that it is a process, which was prepared and thought out a long time ago, and which is being implemented deliberately and step by step. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Slovakia: Kovac Speaks of Problems at Military Exercises

AU0306132696 Bratislava PRACA in Slovak 31 May 96 pp 1-2

[TASR report: "Army Problems Linked to Money"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The attempts to draw the Slovak Army into political disputes could have very grave consequences and it would be a misfortune for Slovakia." Slovak President Michal Kovac said this in connection with the apolitical nature of the Army on the occasion of the three-day command-staff exercises of the 2d Army Corps of the Army of the Slovak Republic at the Ruska Nova Ves military training facility. He expressed his appreciation for the apolitical nature of the Slovak Army, and said: "The Army has managed very well and without any problems to maintain its good image among the public. The working visit convinced me not only of the readiness of the 2d Army Corps and its command staff to cope with the tactical tasks resulting from the defense function of the Army of the Slovak Republic but it also drew my attention to the weaknesses of the Army, and its needs." Here, he emphasized the problems with combat hardware, and added that many problems are linked to the dearth of funds. "If our goal is to integrate into NATO, one cannot ignore that the maps were handled manually during the exercises just as it was done 20 years ago, while similar exercises in NATO would be impossible without computers and state-of-the-art equipment," Kovac said.

He repeatedly emphasized the need to professionalize the army command corps, which—according to him—would eliminate many of the pitfalls from army life. Regarding the conceivable entry of Slovakia into the NATO structures, President Kovac stated that it could happen in the very near future, and that one needed to reckon on there being less than three years left for the Slovak Army to acquire the necessary technical equipment.

Slovakia: HZDS Deputy Wants Hudek, Lexa To Resign

AU0506202196 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 5 Jun 96 pp 1-2

[Article by Zita Sujova: "According to Frantisek Gaulieder, the Minister of Interior and the SIS Director Ought To Consider Their Remaining in Their Posts"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Frantisek Gaulieder, deputy of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] and member of the Special Supervisory Body [OKO] for monitoring the activity of the Slovak Information Service [SIS], reacted yesterday to the results of the independent expert appraisal of the tape with the recording of the telephone conversation between Slovak Minister of Interior Ludovit Hudek and SIS Director Ivan Lexa. The expert appraisal was made public by Radio Twist yesterday. In an interview for NARODNA OBRODA, Frantisek Gaulieder said that the conclusions of the expert analysis, which confirmed the authenticity of the conversation, did not surprise him in the least. He believes that, if someone wanted to fabricate some forgery, he would have proceeded in a "far more ghastly and compromising manner." Besides, immediately after listening to the tape (on Radio Twist's Journal on 13 May—NARODNA OBRODA note) and after the interior minister's statement on television the same evening, it was "completely clear" to him that "this was the interior minister's authentic phone call with the SIS director." Frantisek Gaulieder is of the opinion that "both should consider remaining in their posts because, in democratic countries, this is quite natural even in the case of smaller affairs." However, he considers the fact that "telephone conversations are being bugged in this country, even between high-ranking state representatives, in this case either at the Slovak Ministry of Interior or in the SIS, to be equally serious."

Frantisek Gaulieder confirmed that, within the framework of a deputies' inspection of the SIS, which he intends to carry out together with Jan Slota, Slovak National Party [SNS] chairman and fellow OKO member, by 15 June at the latest, they will focus on some aspects of both affairs—the kidnapping of Michal Kovac Jr. and the telephone bugging. Asked whether anyone from the HZDS conveyed moral support or agreement with the critical views he has been presenting of late, Frantisek Gaulieder replied: "Some have, but only face to face." On the other hand, no one has officially expressed disagreement with him either. He was not able to say whether, at its meeting on Monday, the HZDS Political Board dealt also with his person, because no one has told him anything so far. Regarding recent pronouncements by the SNS, Gaulieder observed that "Slota has clearly expressed his views and the SNS's attitude toward the present situation on the domestic political scene." Everything else is up to the Coalition Council, of which he is not a member, however.

As Jan Slota announced at a news conference on Monday, coalition talks between the HZDS, the SNS, and the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS] ought to be held today with all three chairmen—that is, in addition to Slota, Vladimir Meciar and Jan Luptak—attending.

[Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 5 June on page 2 carries a 150-word report by "vy" on a similar interview with Frantisek Gaulieder broadcast on Radio Twist on 4 June. According to the report, Gaulieder spoke out in favor of Hudek's and Lexa's resignation because "by taking this step, they would make it easier for the prime minister to solve many problems of the present domestic political situation in Slovakia."]

Slovakia: Expansion of Intelligence Supervision Body Planned

LD0406090896 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 0500 GMT 4 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Speaking at a meeting of the EU-Slovakia Joint Parliamentary Committee in Brussels, Hans van den Broek, EU commissioner for external relations, said that Slovakia has a natural right to be among the first members countries to join the EU. He spoke, however, about misgivings in connection with some aspects of the political and economic reforms in Slovakia. He said that the EU states have voiced these concerns clearly in two demarches.

Augustin Martin Huska, deputy speaker of the Slovak parliament, said at the committee meeting in Brussels that the special inspection body [OKO] which supervises the work of the Slovak Intellgence Service [SIS] is to be enlarged at its next meeting by members of the opposition. Huska was answering questions from members of the European Parliament who reminded him of the promise that Prime Minister Meciar made about this.

Slovakia: Deputy PM Tothova Defends Subversion Law

AU0506133996 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 5 Jun 96 p 4

[Interview with Slovak Deputy Prime Minister Katarina Tothova by Wolfgang Boehm; place and date not given: "Slovakia Is a Newborn Child That Must Be Protected"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Boehm] Slovakia is receiving intense international criticism for its new penal code. This is viewed as an attack on freedom of expression, harking back to the legislation on the protection of the state in communist days. Why do you need a law like that?

[Tothova] Until now our penal code has contained no provisions that safeguard the state's territorial integrity and independence. That is particularly important for a state that has only just been formed. Slovakia is like a newborn child that must be protected. I realize that such values are no longer accentuated to such an extent in, for instance, western European countries that have existed for a long time.

[Boehm] Who does Slovakia have to protect itself against?

[Tothova] We are not protecting ourselves against anyone in particular, we are protecting something that is very valuable to us—territorial integrity, constitutional order, defense capability, and the country's security.

[Boehm] Numerous EU countries, including Austria, see this law as a violation of freedom of expression.

[Tothova] This law does not restrict freedom of expression in any way. Freedom of expression and freedom of the press are clearly enshrined in the Slovak Constitution. Anyone can publish a newspaper in Slovakia. There is no censorship, either.

[Boehm] The law envisages a three-year prison term for anyone who harms Slovakia's image by making untrue statements abroad. Who decides what is true and what is untrue?

[Tothova] Council of Europe experts have examined Slovak legislation. We will see what they conclude. But I realize that the penal code is a delicate topic where every punctuation mark must be right.

[Boehm] Does that mean that the amendments to the penal code might be relaxed after all?

[Tothova] Our justice minister has already held talks at the EU in Brussels, and at the Council of Europe. Individual passages might be made more precise.

[Boehm] A new press law is also in preparation. The opposition in your country is already criticizing it for its fresh restrictions.

[Tothova] This law is still being prepared, but it reflects the complete principle of freedom of the press. It is not true that the law envisages having to obtain permission to issue a publication.

Slovakia: SNS Chairman Considers Party's Changing Views

AU0506205096 Bratislava SME in Slovak 4 Jun 96 pp 1-2

[Interview with SNS Chairman Jan Slota by Igor Stupnan; place and date not given: "The HZDS Should Learn How To Deal Properly With Its Coalition Partners"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The extraordinary session of the Slovak National Party [SNS] Central Council Presidium proposed, among other things, that an extraordinary parliament session be called to deal with the work of the National Property Fund [FNM] and its control.

[Stupnan] Will you ask for the extraordinary session to be held in June?

[Slota] So far, this decision has not been clearly defined. The decision whether we are going to ask for an extraordinary session of the Chamber will be made after the meeting of the Deputies' Club with the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] chairman on Wednesday [5 June].

[Stupnan] Which opposition parties are you going to address when seeking support for your proposal?

[Slota] We have not addressed anyone so far. We have consulted the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS] regarding some of the issues with which we disagree.

[Stupnan] You told the PRAVDA daily on 30 May that the views held by the SNS and the HZDS on the privatization of financial institutions do not differ. You hold a different view on 3 June, why?

[Slota] For the reason that the financial institutions have already reached such a level in the domestic political situation that is politicized out of proportion. We are convinced that, in the near future, to calm the domestic political situation, it would be ideal if the financial institutions operated as they have done so far.

[Stupnan] Could you say under what circumstances the SNS would be willing to support the privatization of financial institutions?

[Slota] Like the ZRS, we demand that the security of the deposits be guaranteed and that this issue not be politicized unnecessarily. Nevertheless, I am convinced that privatization should eventually take place. In these hard times, we have come to the conclusion that it is premature.

[Stupnan] According to the observers of the political scene, the change in your views could be linked to the dismissal of Messrs. Sokol, Trstensky, and Jaska from the bodies of the Slovenska Poistovna (SP, Slovak Insurance) Co., i.e. people close to the SNS.

[Slota] The only SNS supporter or member is Mr. Sokol. I would definitely not relate the change to names. Of course, I am not denying our awareness of what happened in the SP. For myself, I believe that certain measures on the level of the FNM members and some frightened SP employees, who happened to be members of the board, mean that the decision of the SP supervisory board was contrary to contracts and the law. I am not a lawyer, but I am convinced that these problems will soon be normalized.

[Stupnan] The president of the FNM Presidium and the head of the Supreme Control Office are members of the ZRS. So, the criticism should be aimed at their ranks.

[Slota] That is not the issue. What is important is that of the nine members of the FNM Presidium, six are HZDS members. Simply, everyone can count to six. It is a magic figure.

[Stupnan] How do you intend to prevent such situations as when Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar made a decision without the SNS in the instance of the treaty with Hungary, or when he made the statement about purely Hungarian constituencies?

[Slota] I believe that we should discuss these issues on Wednesday. It is an internal affair for the HZDS, to learn how to deal properly with its coalition partners.

[Stupnan] The expansion of the Special Supervisory Body [OKO] for the control of the activities of the Slovak Information Service [SIS] and the control of the National Property Fund are issues that the opposition—including the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL]—brought up earlier. Why did you not stand up more aggressively at the time?

[Slota] The time probably was not ripe. Nevertheless, the situation is ripe now.

[Stupnan] Why did you decide on Saturday to medialize internal problems of the coalition?

[Slota] There always is a cup that sometimes runneth over. I believe that the unbecoming manner of the takeover of the SP building was the last drop that made the cup overflow.

[Stupnan] Do you believe that the government coalition could break up?

[Slota] I believe that it would be a catastrophe for Slovakia. It would be very unhealthy if there were parliamentary elections on the Slovak political scene every second year.

Slovakia: Cernak Views Latest Coalition Infighting

AU0706144796 Bratislava SME in Slovak 6 Jun 96 p 2

[Interview with Ludovit Cernak, Democratic Union deputy chairman, by Gustav Bartovic; place and date not given: "Vladimir Meciar Is Trying To 'Entrench Himself' Economically"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In conjunction with disagreements in the coalition that mainly concern privatization, we asked Ludovit Cernak, deputy chairman of the Democratic Union and former minister of economy:

[Bartovic] How do you explain the recent complications in the government coalition?

[Cernak] After his second dismissal [from the post of prime minister in April 1994], Vladimir Meciar decided not to take any more chances, and so he is now trying to build an economic fortress, to entrench himself. Privatization, particularly of financial institutions, was to be used to achieve this aim. An agreement was therefore reached (which he apparently never intended to honor) on dividing spheres of influence. The personnel changes in financial institutions were bearing this out—Engineer Sokol [former deputy chairman of the Slovak National Party; SNS] was installed in Slovenska Poistovna [Slovak Insurance Company], the Trnava organization of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] got hold of Vseobecna Uverova Banka [General Credit Bank], Konarik's HZDS group of Slovenska Sporitelna [Slovak Savings Bank], and the influence of the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS] in Investicna and Rozvojova Banka [Investment and Development Bank] was strengthened.

[Bartovic] On what has this division of banks foundered?

[Cernak] After supporting the Movement [HZDS] for about one year, the coalition partners, particularly the SNS, started to demand the fulfillment of the privatization promises. At that time, Meciar kept calming them down by means of public pronouncements about the privatization of banks by the end of February (which was an unrealistic, breakneck deadline). According to my information, however, his experts were already then working concurrently on other privatization alternatives.

[Bartovic] What kind of alternatives?

[Cernak] Under the pressure of coalition partners, Vladimir Meciar announced his financial decision—in each of the four [state-controlled] banks, the HZDS was to own 51 percent. The remainder, after subtracting foreign owners' assets, was to be divided. Being aware of how the HZDS enforces its influence in the National Property Fund, the ZRS and SNS chairmen rejected the proposal. Thereupon Meciar set the "steamroller from Zlata Idka" [venue of a HZDS meeting in October 1993, at which Meciar spoke about his plan to "steamroller" his enemies after returning to power] in motion—against his own coalition partners. A member of his cabinet stage-managed the organizational changes in Slovenska Poistovna, and the battle for Slovenska Poistovna started.

Hungary: New Army Chief of Staff Interviewed

LD0606210696 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1630 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The new commander and chief of staff of the Hungarian army is Ferenc Vegh. He is 48 years old. He has seen the past and has also had a taste of the future. He started as a tank officer. He graduated from the Academy of Armored Troops in the Soviet Union and also earned a degree at the Academy of the U.S. Land Troops' General Staff. In an interview today, the major general described the armed force he has become head of as an operetta army. [passage omitted]

[Begin recording] [Vegh] The present army structure cannot be financed. The annual cost of this structure, which was also adopted in the 88/95 parliamentary resolution, should be 143.5 billion forints. However, only half of this sum is available to the army. That is why we have had restrictions, that is why we cannot meet our training and other goals, that is why have had financial difficulties.

However, if we start from the present budget and want to maintain an army from that, its strength and tasks will be totally different. Such an army will only be enough to represent the country's sovereignty, it will not be sufficient for any other tasks.

[Unidentified correspondent] Why did you ask for the prime minister's countersignature for your appointment, since the defense minister could have countersigned it? Does it mean you want to guarantee with the prime minister's countersignature that you will not head an operetta army?

[Vegh] I certainly do ask for the conditions to enable the army to operate, because in the present situation the army is no longer able to carry out its tasks. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] To be honest, general, your rather strong opinion raises several questions for me. First, no sooner had you occupied your post, than you immediately started to sound the alarm bells. How can you afford to do that? How do you have the courage? Do not get me wrong, but was the scenario the following: The Defense Ministry was at a loss in face of the situation and said, there is nothing to lose, here is a former tank commander, let us put our faith into him and let us go full steam ahead, because we are in dire straits and let us keep sounding the alarm bells. What is behind this?

[Vegh] My leadership philosophy is that the commander of the Hungarian army, the chief of staff, is one of the soldiers and at one with his soldiers. I have to represent the values of the army, the interests of the army, because this is my responsibility. I see and foresee that if the situation remains unchanged, it will become untenable; The army will lose all its capability, it will become unmanageable financially, parts of it will collapse, it will not meet its obligations as laid down by the law and by then it will be too late to decide what sort of army to set up.

[Correspondent] What kind of guarantees are there that, let us say, within two weeks, your boss, the defense minister will know precisely the movements of the Mig-29's?

[Vegh] Naturally, the minister will know where the Mig's go on exercises. This has a well-tried mechanism. [passage omitted] However, at the end of the day, the rules of democracy have to be observed by all of us, the appropriate conclusions have to be drawn, and it has to be acknowledged that, in this particular case, we made a mistake, we were wrong.

[Correspondent] [Passage omitted] According to unnamed sources, the information was given out by one of the members of the general staff. In light of all this, how much do you trust the general staff and to what extent is the general staff united regarding confidentiality?

[Vegh] The matter has two sides. My view regarding the future is that defense cannot operate on any other basis than on the basis of consensus. Therefore, we have to inform every party and every member of the Defense Committee and to maintain good relations with them regardless their party affiliation. This is my aim.

The other side is rather unpleasant...

[Correspondent, interrupting] This means that somebody spilled the beans.

[Vegh] Yes. It is an unpleasant matter. It seems a fashionable thing to do nowadays. I hope that before long, when openness prevails at the appropriate levels, this kind of leak will cease.

[Correspondent] Are you looking for the culprit?

[Vegh] Not at all, far from it.

Hungary: State Administration Reform Concept Prepared

AU3105082696 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 30 May 96 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Reform Concept in 10 Parts"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The government has prepared its reform concept for the state administration. However, the trade unions and the employers' interest-representation bodies are rejecting the proposal, which affects ten areas, including pensions, the social sphere, education, public administration, state administration, and taxation. While the coalition partners do not always agree on the specific steps, at the coordination talks that have just started, representatives of various ministries showed readiness for certain compromises regarding content and time.

Although Hungary's economic balance improved considerably following the restrictive measures introduced in 1995, these measures basically originated from two sources: the fruits of one-time measures that cannot be repeated and one-time privatization incomes. In other words, if the state administration reform fails to materialize, we will have to take into account the possibility that the system will break down very soon, and we will again have to face serious balance problems, problems that will again bring about radical restrictive measures. This is how we can sum up the government proposal that outlines some elements of the state administration reform and their timing.

The Finance Ministry listed the tasks in ten groups. There is already some kind of government decision on some of these tasks; moreover, parliament debate has already started on raising the retiring age and modifying public education and higher education laws. The government also decided on the new system of financing health care, and the bill awaits debate.

In these four areas, the opposition completely rejects the proposals for modifying the pension system and the health system, and the antipathy of the affected social-security self-government bodies, professional interest-representation bodies, and the population only adds to all this. One thing is quite unclear in these proposals, namely, how the health care will be better—or at least not worse—with fewer doctors and hospitals, and what will bring higher pensions if people have to take care of this themselves, especially in view of the fact that unemployment could also increase as a result of the increase in the retirement age.

An essential reform of the social security system would be one in which the citizens could definitely rely on the state if they found themselves in a particular situation. At the same time, so far, one can only see the restrictions of the reform plans: They would reexamine the interim and social allowances, spouse allowances, and agricultural allowances. As a positive step, the state would also contribute to this aid, and would extend the social assistance fund, but all this would have to be come from less money. A new social security reform is a basic political issue: the state would like to have more scope and more influence.

There is no need for a comprehensive reform of the tax policy—the proposal points out; only reform-oriented measures are needed here, like favorable taxation of massive savings and investments, and higher progressive taxation of consumption income. The income tax rate would be reduced, and family-assistance elements would be taken into consideration, like the number of children or the status of full-time parent. The proposal does not envisage the introduction of property tax, but it regards the introduction of general real estate tax possible as a source of local income. As a whole, any tax reduction should be adjusted to the state's income demand.

The eighth element of the reform would affect the local government bodies. The role and authority of the often-reorganized counties should be clarified in the course of all this. In addition, considerable attention would be given to the concentration of tasks requiring bigger financial sources or professional expertise; in everyday practice, this would mean obligatory association and the fusion of institutions in small communities.

By the modernization of the system of central budget institutions, Finance Ministry experts intend to give up a considerable number of current tasks, including the relevant reduction in personnel. However, the remaining tasks will have to be fulfilled at a higher level with less money than before.

Financial reform is the last element of the package, and this includes further development of the treasury and the development of the state administration information system and budget planning.

The reform concepts also include a specific pace, and stipulates the monthly tasks. They also stipulate the inevitable coordination. It is already clear, however, that in many areas we are either unable to carry out the necessary social debate and professional-trade union coordination, or the reform of the state administration reform—which is still only wishful thinking today—can only become a government decision, and subsequently a law, much later than the envisaged deadline.

B-H: Commentary Lambastes Bildt, Steiner, U.S. Policy

LD0706095996 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1629 GMT 6 Jun 96

[Commentary by Sekul M. Popovic]

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 6 June (SRNA)—Yesterday's news conference in Banja Luka by Mr. Michael Steiner [assistant to Carl Bildt, coordinator for civilian operations in Bosnia] would certainly not have merited any special attention had he not made extremely untenable and scandalous remarks.

Asked by a journalist with Bosnian Serb Radio-Television: "Why is Carl Bildt not cooperating with Dr. Biljana Plavsic, vice president of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, whom President Karadzic, in keeping with the Constitution, put in charge of maintaining contacts with the international community," Steiner replied, without considering the matter: "According to the Dayton agreement we are obliged to stop communicating with people listed as accused of war crimes."

When the Serb journalist pointed out that Dr. Plavsic is not on any list of war criminals, Steiner, pretending to play dumb and using confused diplomatic logic, virtually repeated what he had just said.

It is not difficult to work out what lies are concealed behind these statements by Steiner. It is now quite certain that the ultimate aim of Dayton's disqualification of President Karadzic and General Mladic is a premeditated plan to destroy any form of sovereignty of the Serb Republic, which is personified in these two honorable Serbs.

And Dr. Plavsic is the kind of Serb politician who would never dice with the sovereignty which the Serb Republic has achieved, and which is guaranteed by the Dayton agreement, and this is why she has also found herself overnight on the list of those deemed unsuitable for contacts with members of the international community, just because she refuses to be a Serb political puppet.

Obviously, as time passes and the September elections approach, all Serb politicians who fail to be cooperative according to U.S. criteria, or who are not prepared to merge the Serb Republic within a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina, could be proclaimed to be war criminals.

In this connection, it should be said that it is no coincidence that a list of potential politicians who have so-called U.S. support in the upcoming elections has just appeared over the past few days. Well-informed sources in Banja Luka say they "have already been singled out and that all of them are from the western part of the Serb Republic in some left-wing, new-fangled parties." We will talk more about who they are on another occasion.

But let us return once again to Mr. Steiner and other international officials who crisscross the skies of Bosnia daily in luxury Implementation Force [IFOR] planes. So far the Serb side has not seen much benefit from their labors.

These gentlemen constantly promise money, but this money is nowhere to be seen. Not a single dollar! These gentlemen hold forth eloquently about democracy, but overnight, for no reason whatsoever, disqualify democratically elected Serb politicians.

They talk about the need to return refugees to their homes, but they forget the clearly set out standpoint of Serb refugees and displaced persons in the last census in March, which indicated that only 0.7 percent want to return to the Muslim-Croat Federation and 0.8 percent to Croatia.

Since their arrival in this area, Carl Bildt and his colleagues have been doing everything in accordance with diktats from abroad, and they are not familiar with the historic and ethnic antagonisms in this region, so Steiner's behavior should not surprise anyone.

One thing is certain, however: the leadership of the Serb Republic will not gamble with the state sovereignty which has been obtained for the Serb Republic and which was achieved at Dayton, and as President Karadzic, Dr. Plavsic and Gen. Mladic are further marginalized and demonized, so their reputation and popularity among the Serb people will grow.

There is no doubt that if free democratic elections were to be held in the Serb Republic today, Dr. Karadzic and his colleagues would certainly win by a convincing margin.

As for Bildt, Steiner, and the other puppets of U.S. interventionism, they obviously will not be able to understand for a long time that they are engaged in a Sisyphean task in the Serb Republic.

B-H: U.S. Envoy, RS's Pajic Discuss Brcko Arbitration

AU0706124196 (Clandestine) Krajina Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] "The arbitration at Brcko can only include an area of 12 nautical miles, from the present borders of the Serb Republic [RS] and the Muslim-Croat Federation to the village of Mauca, i.e., the area of Brka, Brod, and Rakic," stated Miodrag Pajic, municipality president and member of the arbitration committee, in Brcko after meeting with U.S. Assistant State Secretary Lauder. He emphasized that the worst-case arbitration results would leave the border unchanged.

The U.S. diplomat arrived in Brcko accompanied by General William Nash, commander of IFOR [Implementation Force] Sector East, to meet with the municipality officials about the implementation of the civilian and military aspects of the Dayton accord. "Regarding arbitration, we warned Mr. Lauder that this is not a local issue, but one of the most essential public-law issues, and referred him to the leading institutions of the Serb Republic," said Pajic in a statement to SRNA. According to Pajic, it was made clear that the Serb side fully respects the provisions of the Dayton accord regarding freedom of movement, but that a border-crossing procedure, requiring that a crossing be announced and accompanied by the local police, must be followed for the sake of security.

B-H: Warring Parties Agree on Arms Ceilings at Vienna Talks

AU0706073996 Paris AFP in English
0243 GMT 7 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Vienna, June 7 (AFP)—Talks to scale down the military arsenals of parties to the Bosnia conflict, ended on a successful note here late Thursday shortly before a midnight deadline set by last year's Bosnia peace accords, the Norwegian chairman told journalists.

The talks, called for under the US-brokered Dayton (Ohio) accords which ended the Bosnia war, began on January 5 and were sponsored by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

"We have concluded the negotiations. We have resolved the outstanding issues," General Vigleik Eide representing the OSCE said.

"We have distributed a clean text. There are maybe a couple of issues that they still want to check back with the capitals," he added.

The talks brought together Croatia, the rump Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the government in Sarajevo, the Croat-Muslim Federation and the Bosnia Serb entity: Republika Srpska (RS).

A final plenary session will take place at 08:30 Friday morning (0630 GMT) to run over and initial the text negotiated by the five parties, General Eide said.

The text which runs to "around 85 to 90 pages," according to Eide, is due to be formally signed in Oslo on June 11 after which it will be published and will go into effect immediately.

The purpose of the talks, which sought to emulate the East-West Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) treaty, was to set the lowest possible ceiling for five categories of heavy weapon: tanks, other armoured vehicles, big guns of 75 mm or more, combat aircraft and helicopter gunships.

Up to the last few hours, the outcome hung in the balance because of a wrangle over the political status of the five participants. The RS insisted on being treated on an equal footing with Croatia, Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina represented by Sarajevo.

The row had threatened to block the drafting of the final document and the procedures for initialling and signing it.

Diplomats said 10 days after the agreement came into force, an exchange of information would take place between the former belligerents on June 21 in order to determine how much weaponry each party to the accord possessed.

Reciprocal inspections will go ahead starting on July 1 over a four month period to verify the quantities given by each side.

The five signatories will be given a year from then to reduce their arsenals to the levels stipulated in the accord.

The ceilings for each of the five weapons categories are:

Ceilings of Weapons Categories

	Tanks	Armoured Vehicles	Artillery	Aircraft	Helicopters
Yugoslavia	1,025	850	3,750	155	53
Croatia	410	340	1,500	62	21
Bosnia	410	340	1,500	62	21
RS	137	113	500	21	7
Fed.	273	227	1,000	41	14

B-H: Serb FM Comments on Talks With Gen De Lapresle

LD0606184996 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian
1732 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 6 Jun (SRNA)—Momcilo Krajisnik, speaker of the People's Assembly of the Serb Republic, and Foreign Minister Aleksa

Buha held talks in Pale today with General Bertrand de Lapresle, adviser to the high representative of the international community in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina [Carl Bildt]. They discussed the forthcoming arbitration for the area of Brcko, freedom of movement, and a reduction in military materiel.

After the meeting, Aleksa Buha said the arbitration could not take place without its subject being defined and it was not because the Serb and Muslim-Croat side could not agree on it.

"We demanded from Mr. De Lapresle that the whole issue be clarified in a convincing manner so we could get down to work," Minister Buha said.

The Serb side demands that the Dayton agreement be respected—the agreement says the arbitration refers only to the expansion of the corridor around Brcko. The Croat-Muslim federal authorities demand that the arbitration include the town itself.

"We warned De Lapresle about another untenable issue—on one hand there is freedom of movement, but on the other, the Croat-Muslim Federation produces its lists of war criminals. Therefore, anyone taking opportunity of the freedom of movement may be arrested on the basis of these unfounded accusations," the foreign minister said.

Speaking about the military balance, Minister Buha said it was absurd that a conference on disarmament in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina was being held in Vienna, while, at the same time, the international players led by the United States had already started arming the Muslims.

"These two actions are incompatible and we demanded an explanation," the foreign minister said.

General De Lapresle made a brief statement after the talks to the effect that he discussed "some problems" with Speaker Krajisnik.

B-H: Pale TV Reports Belgrade Committee Opposition to Hague

LD0606215796 Pale Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Support for President Karadzic and General Mladic was also voiced at a session of the Committee for the Defense of Victims of the Hague Tribunal, which was held in Belgrade today.

[Unidentified correspondent] The session of the Committee for the Defense of Victims of the Hague Tribunal is still under way. Since February, the Hague Tribunal has been holding sessions and organizing public meetings, attended by several thousand people at a time. The specific reason for today's session is the continued pressure from The Hague and from the centers of world political power. This pressure can only be understood as the internal political logic of the U.S. President: to gain a bonus at the expense of the Serbs on the eve of the elections, when things are going badly for the Americans throughout the world.

The session of the Committee for the Defense of Victims of the Hague Tribunal is under way, but the committee has already adopted three decisions:

First, the committee will send a protest letter to [Radoje] Kontic and [Zoran] Lilic, prime minister and president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia respectively, for allowing the opening of an office of the so-called Hague Tribunal, which infringes on the sovereignty of Yugoslavia.

Second, the committee is under considerable pressure from the people in Montenegro and Serbia and from Serbian communities abroad to develop into a national movement. The committee will soon hold a major assembly, a large public meeting at which it will outline its national program. Of course, all those political and patriotic movements—which have already declared themselves as such publicly— will be invited.

Third, the committee neither recognizes the legitimacy of the Hague Tribunal nor its fair judgment. Various individuals and organizations have already sent a great deal of evidence on crimes against the Serb people to the Hague Tribunal, but the Tribunal is hiding this fact and so far it has not publicly acknowledged these documents. For this reason, the committee will publish its vast mass of evidence and inundate all the political and cultural organizations throughout the world with these facts.

B-H: Serb General Sees 'Very Correct' Relations With IFOR

AU0606204996 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 4 Jun 96 p 7

[Interview with General Momir Talic, commander of the 1st Krajina Corps of the Bosnian Serb Army, by M. Markovic; place and date not given: "Hopes of Peace"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Markovic] What about the problem of those returning from the fronts, those who, following the signing of the Dayton agreement, have been demobilized?

[Talic] We have been expecting such problems, but they are difficult to solve.

Although our economic resources have been preserved, there are no jobs. The economy is not able to employ such a large number of people who had been in the war until recently. Today, they are willing to do anything to feed their families. Meeting these people, who have spent the entire war on the front, is as difficult as losing a battle.

[Markovic] There have been an increasing number of statements that the RS [Serb Republic] Army is not up to the tasks it has been set. Is this an excuse or a fact?

Wrong Impressions Have Been Dispelled

[Talic] I reject this as both an excuse and as a statement of fact. This is simply not correct. The army has accomplished its tasks completely. A Serb state has been created, and the people have been protected. No one can deny this. [passage omitted]

[Markovic] What are relations between the VRS [Army of the Serb Republic] and IFOR [Implementation Force] like concerning the implementation of the military part of the Dayton agreement?

[Talic] Very correct. There have been no misunderstandings, because we have been adhering to the deadlines and agreements. The part of the agreement that refers to the obligations of the army has been realized completely. IFOR respects the views and stands of our command. In the talks with the representatives of the multinational forces, we learned that they came to the RS with the impression that we are far behind civilization, that we consider war as the only solution. Now they have seen for themselves that the people and the Army of the RS want a lasting peace.

[Markovic] Do you think the war in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina is over, that it will not start again?

[Talic] This does not depend on the RS, but also on other players. If the international community wants the war to stop, it will find ways to ensure that will it not start again. We are certainly aware of Alija Izetbegovic's statement that the Muslims have not buried the hatchet. Whatever, it is our duty to do everything we can to preserve the state that we have won. This is our duty to those who have given their lives for it and to the future generations.

[Box, p 7]

Muslim Tricks

[Markovic] A high-level IFOR command has recently moved from Sarajevo to Prijedor. This has caused suspicion and negative comments among the people. How do you see the presence of General Walker in that area?

[Talic] According to my information, the IFOR presence in Prijedor is temporary. The main reasons for Walker's presence are the problems regarding the freedom of movement on the territory of Prijedor, Sanski Most, and Novi Grad [Bosanski Novi]. To be more precise, the problems lie in the incorrect interpretation of the provisions of the Dayton agreement.... It is well-known that the Muslims' attempts to enter our territory are to be blamed for that. Their en masse visits serve the purpose of the preelection campaign. They are being organized exclusively by the extremist Muslims. We are not allowing this. Walker wants to see for himself whether this constitutes an abuse. I told him that the Muslims have never had the custom of visiting the graves of their dear, their close, or their more-distant relatives, unless they have converted into Serbs in the meantime. Gen. Walker also knows the fact that the Serbs are not allowed to enter the Muslim territory and visit their homes. So, an attempt to visit the graves of relatives in Sanski Most ended tragically for one Serb. He was killed by the Muslims.

B-H: Swedish IFOR Organizes Joint Military Commission Meeting

AU0606171296 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1552 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Doboj, 6 June (BETA)—Tomi Johanson, commander of the Swedish battalion from the Nordic-Polish IFOR [Implementation Force] brigade, today organized a meeting of the joint military commission in Sockovac on Mt. Ozren. The meeting was attended by all the invited representatives of the Army of the Serb Republic [VRS] and one representative of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Despite the fact that the VRS representatives from the Tuzla-Podrinje region attended the meeting, entitled "Transition to Peace," the meeting did not meet expectations as the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina was only represented by a representative of the 2d Tuzla Corps, Colonel Muharem Efendic.

The Swedish IFOR battalion today celebrated their national independence day. The celebration was also attended by General William Nash, commander of the U.S. IFOR contingent based in Tuzla.

B-H: NATO Denies Increasing Patrols To Catch War Criminals

AU0606194696 Paris AFP in English 1917 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, June 6 (AFP)—NATO denied Thursday it had stepped up patrols in the Serb's Pale stronghold to boost chances of arresting war crimes suspects, saying wider deployment of western forces in Bosnia was a natural development.

Colonel Mark Van Dyke, spokesman said "there had been much confusion" over the issue because of "various statements by other officials including member nations of NATO."

He was referring to comments by General Jean Heinrich, deputy commander of the NATO-led Bosnia peace Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia, who said Wednesday patrols had been increased.

Heinrich's comments followed a statement at the weekend by US Secretary of State Warren Christopher in which he said NATO forces would conduct more dynamic, high-profile patrols to increase the chances of nabbing suspected war crimes.

Karadzic, and his military commander Ratko Mladic, have been charged with crimes against humanity and genocide by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague.

But Van Dyke said "the spreading out in the country will include Pale and we'll increase our presence in Pale as well as other areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina, because NATO forces no longer needed to concentrate on the inter-entity boundary line."

The boundary separates the Moslem-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska, the two entities which make up Bosnia-Herzegovina's new-look post-war institutions.

Van Dyke said he had discussed his statement with the senior spokesman of General George Joulwan, commander of NATO forces in Europe, adding "the guidance I have reiterated...came directly from General Joulwan."

The Bosnian government has made the appearance of Karadzic and Mladic before the UN tribunal in the Netherlands the "condition of conditions" for the holding of Bosnia's first post-war elections in mid-September.

B-H: Serb Refugees in Vojvodina Support Karadzic, Mladic

LD0606172996 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1335 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Novi Sad, 6 Jun (SRNA)—On behalf of those Serbs who were expelled from the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and are receiving medical treatment in Vojvodina, the bureau of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic in Novi Sad sent a letter of support today to Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic, and General Ratko Mladic, commander of the main headquarters of the Serb Republic Army.

Those "who lost their nearest and dearest, their property, and parts of their bodies" express their support for their leaders, Karadzic and Mladic, "who after a bloody war have been subjected to the most monstrous accusations, unheard of in the history of mankind."

President Karadzic and Gen. Mladic are begged not to give way as a result of the sick and arbitrary manner in which the world leaders are exercising their power on the Serb people.

"Our nearest and dearest have shed their blood for four years, have given their lives or parts of their bodies, remaining forever crippled, but are proud to have their own state and their own leaders from whom they expect help and support in order to cope with present hardships, and those still to come, as painlessly as possible," the letter of support says. The letter ends with an appeal to all Serbs, wherever they are, to unite and to protect their good leaders who prevented the implementation of the Islamic declaration.

B-H: Reaction to Film Footage of Mladic in Srebrenica

969B0027A Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE in Serbo-Croatian 10 Apr 96 p 4

[Article by Kemal Kurspahic: "Documents on Srebrenica: Crime Immortalized by Camera"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Mladic began the massacre with "triumphant enthusiasm," accompanied by a cameraman; conviction that Karadzic and Mladic will be arrested.*

Washington—Monday evening, on ABC's widely watched half-hour show "Nightline," the United States saw a stunning document on the direct involvement of Serb General Ratko Mladic in the massacre of the populace of the Srebrenica "protected area" in July of last year. Footage was shown that was filmed under the direction and orders of the general himself by a cameraman from Serbian television. Specifically, the camera travels to the scene of the crime in the same car and shows Mladic in transit, after which—on 10 July 1995—he issues orders to his troops, who are advancing toward Srebrenica: "Head for Potocari, and don't stop!"

He Even Ordered UNPROFOR!

What stuns the hosts and viewers of this powerful documentary film is the primitive arrogance of the Serb general, who apparently believes that he is embarked on some sort of heroic "triumphant campaign" in which he needs to bring along a television crew, failing to consider that what he is actually ordering is serious, self-damning material. The camera—faithfully following the general right into the massacre—also captures his belittling and condescending attitude toward the Dutch UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] officers at the base in Potocari, to whom he snarled when they said that they were waiting for orders from their superiors: "I give the orders here!"

That afternoon, on 12 July, apparently under the general's orders, the operation of separating the men from the women and children began, although there were also children among the men who were forcibly taken away. The killing and rapes began immediately after that. The Dutch soldiers, who did not lift a finger to prevent the mass killing of thousands of people "under their protection," nevertheless kept lists with hundreds of names of people who had sought their protection, but who were never seen again.

The eager "chronicler of history" also filmed Serb antiaircraft guns firing on Srebrenica refugee camps in the hills, a shot of one of Mladic's soldiers wearing a stolen UN blue helmet and calling on fleeing residents to surrender while guaranteeing their safety, and rows of starving people who were brutally liquidated.

Arrest: Not Whether but When?

Also filmed was another self-damning statement by a Serb soldier. Asked by the cameraman how many residents of Srebrenica had surrendered (thus far), he says: "Three to four thousand." Since then, there has been no trace of those people who surrendered. They "disappeared" into mass graves or were left to decompose in the mountain clearings where their remains are currently being collected by UN investigators. The same organization that guaranteed their status as a "protected area" and then shamelessly turned them over to Mladic's cutthroats.

A reporter from the reputable NEWSWEEK, Rod Norland, who writes a moving article in the latest issue of that magazine entitled "Death of a Village" on the calamity that befell the male populace of Lehovici, near Srebrenica, said on "Nightline" that the Serb forces tried to clear away all traces of the crime, but that they did such a poor job that it did not take investigators and journalists long to find abundant evidence of mass crimes around Srebrenica. Asked whether he thinks Mladic and Karadzic will end up before the Hague tribunal to stand trial for war crimes, that reporter said:

"There is no question that they will be arrested; the only question is when that will happen. IFOR can do that whenever it wants and I am convinced that it is simply waiting for the right moment."

"Nightline" also interviewed several surviving witnesses of the mass crime against the Srebrenicans, who are all willing to testify about that calamity before the Hague tribunal.

B-H: Bildt 'Cool' on Cassese's Demand for Sanctions on Serbs

AU0606171196 Paris AFP in English 1651 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, June 6 (AFP)—UN War Crimes Tribunal chief Antonio Cassese called Thursday for the reimposition of sanctions against Bosnian Serbs, but got a cool reaction from the top civilian official in Bosnia, Carl Bildt. [passage omitted]

Bildt refused to comment directly on Cassese's remarks, but said sanctions would only be reimposed in case of a breakdown of the entire process.

"What I must assess is whether things are broadly speaking moving towards something that could gradually improve with all that the problems are there," said Bildt. "If I see that we are faced with something that could be the more or less imminent breakdown of the entire process, due to massive and deliberate non-compliance. [sentence as received]

"In those cases we have massive instruments available to use (but) then we are in a situation where the entire process will have to be reconsidered, and I think reconsidered rather fundamentally."

Sanctions against the Bosnian Serbs and their main sponsors during the Bosnian war, the rump Yugoslavia of Serbia and Montenegro, were imposed by the United Nations in 1993 and suspended in February this year.

They can be reimposed automatically within five days on reception by UN Secretary General Butrus Butrus-Ghali of a report from Bildt on non-compliance with the Dayton accords, unless the UN Security Council decides otherwise.

However, Bildt noted his power to call for the automatic reimposition of sanctions ran out 10 days after Bosnia's first post-war elections, due in mid-September. [passage omitted]

B-H: Bildt Says Elections 'Vital to Bosnia's Future'

AU0606191296 Paris AFP in English 1836 GMT 6 Jun 96

[Report by Jon Boyle]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, June 6 (AFP)—Top civilian peace coordinator Carl Bildt warned Thursday Bosnia risked permanent division unless the country's first post-war elections were held on time later this year.

Bildt said the mid-September elections were a key test for the Dayton peace accords for only then could national institutions—a collective presidency, a cabinet and parliament of Serbs, Moslems and Croats—come into being.

He said Bosnia's two entities—the Moslem-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska—risked becoming de facto separate states unless they were forced to work together in nationwide bodies.

Speaking after a meeting between Bosnian Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic, federation officials and Serb premier Gojko Klickovic, Bildt said the polls were vital to Bosnia's future.

"I'm very keen to have elections because the structure of the peace accord is that only after the elections (do) we start setting up the common institutions," he said.

"I see the number one mission I have as trying to overcome the partition of the country. The longer we delay the setting up of the common institutions, the more difficult will be the task."

He said the longer the federation and the Republika Srpska could "operate as virtually two independent political systems, with the only meetings they have in my office," the greater the chances of a permanent division of the country.

"We must have common institutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina (but) they can only come after elections," he said, adding: "The test is going to come after the elections."

"But that does not mean we will accept any sort of elections," he added, a reference to comments by Robert Frowick, whose Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe is supervising the polls, that only renewed conflict would prevent the polls.

Bildt said his job was to ease the birth of the new institutions by getting them to talk to each other before the elections because there was "ample room for interpretation" in the Dayton accords, he said. [passage omitted]

B-H: Ganic, Schwartz-Schilling View Conditions for Elections

AU0606192096 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Ejup Ganic, member of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and vice president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, received Christian Schwartz-Schilling, international mediator for the Federation, and talked with him about problems in implementing the agreement and [words indistinct]. Special attention was devoted to the situation in the field, the freedom of movement of citizens, and accompanying phenomena, as well as the preparations for the forthcoming elections for which necessary the preconditions and atmosphere necessary for and implied by democratic elections should be ensured.

It was asserted that the results of the genocide and power within [words indistinct] war crimes must not be legalized. It was also said that conditions for the free movement and return of refugees [word indistinct] still do not exist in all parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina and, therefore, neither do the conditions for the election campaigns of all interested (?political parties) and independent candidates.

B-H: SPD President, Schwartz-Schilling Discuss Elections

AU0606164896 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Nijaz Durakovic, president of the Social Democratic Party [SDP] of Bosnia-Herzegovina, today received Christian Schwartz-Schilling, mediator of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, who was interested in the SDP's stands on [words indistinct] in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the forthcoming elections in our country. A joint assertion was made at the talks that, without freedom of movement and political organization and activity, and without elementary security for the citizens, the elections cannot be regular and democratic. Without removing Karadzic's criminal clique, the elections in the Serb entity will be meaningless. Both sides agreed that the forthcoming elections should [words indistinct] existing relation of power and political parties be affirmed that would be capable of ensuring peace and the reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

B-H: EU Mostar Administrator on Coming Elections

AU0706145796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 7 Jun 96

[Report by Halid Setka from Mostar—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] At a news conference at the EU Administration headquarters in Mostar today, correspondents were briefed on the activities of Administrator Casado in the past seven days. It was stressed, among other things, that the preparations for the elections are well under way and that talks on that issue had been held at all levels. Halid Setka reports:

[Setka] Replying to the question of whether all the dilemmas regarding the voting by Mostar Serbs in Belgrade and Nevesinje have been removed, which was one of the topics of talks between the mediator of the Federation, Schwartz-Schilling, and Mr. Mirko Pejanovic [head of the Serb Civic Council], Casado said:

[Casado, in Spanish with passage-by-passage translation into Serbo-Croatian] I must stress that the agreement of 25 May, which was accepted and signed by all sides, does not envisage the opening of polling stations in the countries other than the four mentioned in the agreement.

[Setka] He also spoke about the voting by expelled residents of Mostar in Germany, Switzerland, Norway, and Sweden. In reply to the specific question on whether the governments of these countries have replied positively to the request by the EU, and whether the names of the towns in which the voting will take place are known, Administrator Casado said:

[Casado] We have set up a commission for voting abroad. This commission has already started working, which shows its efficiency. The commission will tell us, I think, in one week, by 15 June, the exact names of the places in which voting will take place. [end recording]

[Setka] Talking about the incidents that have happened in the past few days in Mostar, Casado said that they are occurring in both parts of the town. A representative of the European police said that the incident that took place in the suburb of Bijelo Polje last night, in which one resident from the western part of the town was wounded in a shoot-out, had no political background.

B-H: Bosnian Serb JUL President Comments on Elections

AU0506150396 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] In a special statement for Radio Yugoslavia, Milorad Ivosevic, president of the JUL [Yugoslav Left] of the Serb Republic [RS], pointed out that the elections in the RS, as well as in the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina, represent an opportunity to establish stability and free the people from the psychology of war, turning it, in peace, to economic renewal.

Ivosevic pointed out that it is important to create regular and equal conditions for the elections. Under such conditions the citizens, then definitely freed from nationalism, will orient themselves toward a future in which tolerance will win over hatred and freedom over (?fear).

I am convinced that, through these elections, the Yugoslav Left, together with other leftist forces, will manage to bring peace, stability, and equality to citizens of the RS regardless of national, religious, and other affiliation, RS JUL President Milorad Ivosevic said in the statement for Radio Yugoslavia.

B-H: Bijeljina Rally Shows Support for Karadzic, Mladic

LD0406175596 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1508 GMT 4 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Bijeljina, 4 Jun (SRNA)—All participants in a large rally of support for the [Bosnian] Serb Republic leadership, which was held in Bijeljina today, said that the charges against Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic represent an assault on the entire Serb nation and asked that the international community not meddle in the internal affairs of the Serb Republic.

Addressing the people at the rally, Bijeljina Mayor Dragan Ljubojevic said that the charges against the Serb leaders are shameful and that they represent "charges against the entire Serb nation, just because it did not allow its centuries-old enemies to slaughter it and throw it into mass graves."

"The champions of a false democracy are again trying to behead the Serb knights," Ljubojevic said, adding that "Karadzic and Gen. Mladic cannot be tried for not allowing the extinction of their own people."

Dragan Micic, people's deputy to the Serb Republic Assembly, said that the trial of the Serb leaders is at the same time a trial of all the Serbs, while Mirko Jovic, chairman of the Serbian National Renewal, said that "thanks to Karadzic and Gen. Mladic, the Serb Republic has become a serious state, which obviously irritates some people in the international community."

The rally was also addressed by people's deputy Milan Novakovic, Serb fighter Rade Jovic, refugee from

Visoko Dragan Miric, and by Radoslav Kanjeric, chairman of the municipal committee of the Serbian Radical Party in Bijeljina, and others.

B-H: Local Serb Ruling Party Committee Backs Karadzic, Mladic

LD0506115796 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 0850 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Rudo, 5 Jun (SRNA)—The municipal committee of the Serb Democratic Party in Rudo held a special session yesterday and sent a telegram of support to the Serb President Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic, the commander of the main headquarters of the Serb army.

The municipal committee also elected its chairman, deputy chairmen, and various party commissions.

Zoran Stjepanovic was reelected chairman and Mitar Vidakovic, Gordana Kojic, and Gojko Topalovic were elected deputy chairmen.

B-H: Radio Zid Head Criticizes Dayton Accord, Election Rules

AU0606165996 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1121 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Kragujevac, 6 June (BETA)—Zdravko Grebo, editor in chief of Radio Zid, told today's NEZAVSINA SVETLOST that the elections in Bosnia represent a chance for political life in Bosnia-Herzegovina to become a "bit more decent."

Grebo said that everyone was obsessed with the elections, but those who should be most concerned are "fairly phlegmatic."

"Election rules are scandalous. Two different electoral bodies have be established. This is creating a certain discrimination against some people in some areas at the very start," Grbo said. [passage omitted]

"Presently, we have the most paradoxical victory of the three national parties. By overthrowing a one-party system, they are establishing three one-party systems in Bosnia-Herzegovina," Grebo said, adding that the moment Bosnia-Herzegovina offers a "real political choice, real chances for Bosnia to set itself up as a state" will emerge.

Commenting on the Dayton agreement, Grebo said that it "did not recognize realities brought about by the war."

"It (the Dayton agreement) is full of compromises. I do not think it will last long, and it will not lead to correct solutions," Grebo said.

"I sometimes have the impression that there are two agreements, a public one and a secret one. Bosnia-Herzegovina was publicly recognized as a state, and, secretly, the state whose external borders are guarded by someone does not exist. There is not even the minimum of some worthy system that could be shared by all of its citizens," Grebo concluded.

B-H: Investigators Probe Suspected Mass Grave in Rail Tunnel

AU0606191596 Paris AFP in English 1821 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Caparde, Bosnia-Herzegovnia, June 6 (AFP)—UN war crimes investigators Thursday probed a suspected mass grave site in a railway tunnel in a hardline Serb area of eastern Bosnia.

Mine clearance teams with sniffer dogs were called in to search the tunnel after a trip wire was discovered, however they failed to uncover any unexploded munitions, one of the mine experts told AFP.

The officials from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia spent five hours in the tunnel, near this town, 20 kilometres (12 miles) west of the nationalist Serb stronghold of Zvornik.

However, the team remained tight-lipped about the results of its work. Officials are expected to return to the site over the coming days.

Zvornik was one of the first towns from which Serbs "ethnically cleansed" Moslems at the start of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1992. Thousands of civilians were expelled and, according to UN officials, scores were killed at nearby industrial plants.

B-H: Radio Reports on Mass Grave Found Near Srebrenica

AU0606190296 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] U.S. satellites have lead the Hague Tribunal investigators to direct their investigations of mass graves to the eastern part of Bosnia as 2,700 Bosniaks are supposed to be buried in a mass grave there. The team of international [word indistinct] still cannot confirm the number of people buried in this mass grave near (Nova Kasaba), however (?six) bodies have already been found in a 2.5-meter-wide plot of land.

B-H: Muratovic, Cassese Brief Press on Hague Proceedings

AU0606145796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic today received Antonio Cassese. Following the meeting, the officials briefed journalists.

[Begin recording] [Muratovic] We discussed all aspects of cooperation with the Hague Tribunal. We broached several very important issues: first, our continued cooperation [words indistinct] pertaining to discovering war criminals. We have pledged to extradite all war criminals and submit all evidence of war crimes irrespective of nationality, religion, or any other affiliation. We believe that this is our and everyone else's legal and moral obligation. We hope that our move will influence the international community to do everything to ensure indicted war criminals are [word indistinct]. We also discussed (?the consequences) of not extraditing war criminals [words indistinct], the implementation of the Dayton agreement, and several topical issues, that is, furthering cooperation with [words indistinct].

[Cassese in English with superimposed translation into Serbo-Croatian] I am very satisfied with my talks with Prime Minister Muratovic and other meetings I had in Sarajevo. I believe that the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina has proven that it is the only country in the region which is fully cooperating with the Hague Tribunal. Other countries, Croatia for example, are less cooperative. Two individuals have been arrested at the request of our prosecutors. The individuals in question are currently in jail. They will be extradited to the Hague Tribunal in a few days. This is the best proof that Bosnia-Herzegovina is fully cooperating with us and takes our work, which is to implement justice, seriously.

It is our intention to investigate individual responsibility; I believe that only individuals, rather than groups, are responsible for the crimes committed. There are only guilty and innocent parties. The guilty ones have to be tried and convicted. I am very pleased that the cooperation is going so smoothly, and I am pleased with Prime Minister Muratovic's announcement that Bosnia will be helping us with evidence of not only former enemies, but also those residing on territory controlled by the legitimate authorities. None of the other sides are doing so. That is why I would like to reiterate that I am very satisfied that our cooperation continues in the best possible spirit. [end recording]

In response to a journalist's question whether the international community was extending full support to the Hague Tribunal, particularly in regard to the arrest of suspected war criminals, Cassese said:

[Begin Cassese recording] Everyone is complaining about the Implementation Force's inability to arrest Karadzic and Mladic. I have also been informed that Kordic is free in Herzeg-Bosnia. He should be arrested because according to our information, he is obstructing free and fair elections. I nevertheless believe that these people will be arrested; it is only a matter of time, of months. They are prisoners [words indistinct]. As you know, special proceedings against Karadzic and Mladic are to begin on 27 June. As a result, an international Interpol arrest warrant can be expected. [end recording]

B-H: UBSD To Present Ante Markovic as Election Candidate

AU0606155896 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1439 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 6 Jun (BETA)—The Sarajevo Committee of the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats (UBSD) has announced that Former Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovic will appear on the party's list of candidates at the forthcoming elections.

The UBSD leadership has refused to comment on this statement. It is therefore not clear whether Markovic has agreed to be a UBSD candidate. What is certain is that he and Selim Beslagic, leader of the party and Tuzla mayor, are in frequent contact.

At the forthcoming elections, the UBSD plans to put forward six candidates for the post of Presidency member, two from each of the three peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina. [passage omitted]

B-H: Soljic Gives Reasons for Nonagreement on Defense Law

AU0606183496 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Speaking at a news conference in Sarajevo today, Vladimir Soljic, minister of defense of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, expressed his opinion about the reasons why the Law on Defense of the Federation has still not been adopted. Here is a report by Amra Durakovic:

[Begin recording] [Durakovic] The draft law on defense was prepared by the previous government of the Republic and Federation. This law was in conformity with the law and Constitution and as such was submitted to the Constituent Assembly. Deputies failed to agree on two issues. The first one is linked with [word indistinct] and, as Minister Soljic put it, the Bosniak side is trying to put as many powers as possible above the Federation whereby, according to him, this law would be more a republican law.

The second issue is connected with the right of choosing the component. Namely, the Croat side advocates the right to choose the component in serving in the army, while the Bosniak side opposes that.

However, as these two items are concerned, both the minister and his deputy [words indistinct] have nevertheless coordinated and signed some issues. (?The remaining) disputable issues have been solved in Washington.

However, as Minister Soljic put it, problems arise when the Bosniak side does not accept things that its representatives have signed in Washington. In reply to a journalist's question about what the Bosniak side does not accept, Minister Soljic said the following:

[Soljic] Let me give an (?essential) example. According to the Bosniak side's proposal, the president and vice president of the Federation do not belong to the defense system. What kind of defense system is that, in which the highest representatives of the executive power do not belong to it? Although it was put down that a soldier has the right to choose the component, the Bosniak side [words indistinct].

[Durakovic] In connection with the most recent Geneva meeting, Mr. Soljic said that not a single document in connection with the country's defense was signed at the meeting.

This is how the defense minister expounded upon the essential reason why the defense law has not been adopted so far:

[Soljic] There are two grounded (?fears). The Bosniak side has a constant fear that the Croat side can secede, that it can make a separate [word indistinct]. The Croat side is also afraid of [word indistinct] and of the creation of an army of the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] type. Both people have justified [word indistinct] but we are here [word indistinct] very important factor here to create an atmosphere and confirm in practice that this fear is becoming ever smaller.

[Durakovic] Let us add at the end that Minister Soljic is nevertheless of the opinion that a compromise can be reached and that this is more a political than a professional problem. [end recording]

B-H: Army 3d Corps Tank Unit Performs 'Tactical Exercise'

AU0606153896 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 6 Jun 96

[Report by Sefik Mujkic]

[FBIS Translated Text] The units of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina are using the period of peace, among other things, for the regular training of those who have opted for the professional army of our country. One such exercise was demonstrated by the 3d Corps today in the presence of numerous officers and the representatives of the General Staff, as well as the U.S. land forces that are part of IFOR [Implementation Force]. Here is a report by Sefik Mujkic:

[Mujkic] The tactical [metodsko-pokazani] exercise was carried out by a tank unit from the 7th Muslim Mechanized Brigade, which demonstrated in the best possible way the level of training and readiness to act in every situation and in every location. Major Azem Omerbasic, head of the Armored-Mechanized units of the 3d Corps of our army, presented the introductory explanation and the goals of the exercise. Captain (?Mirzet) Loverenovic was in charge of the exercise. After the exercise, Brigadier Halil Brzina, commander of the 7th Muslim Mechanized Brigade, said, among other things, the following:

[Brzina] As you saw yourself, the exercise was indeed well-organized, according to all [word indistinct] rules, and the soldiers and officers displayed skill, enthusiasm, and expertise in their work. This was evident during the exercize itself. All issues that are part of such periodic tests have been covered. As the commander of this brigade, of [words indistinct] unit, I am completely satisfied with was done by the soldiers and [words indistinct].

[Mujkic] Among the numerous guests of this exercise, there were the U.S. military attache, Colonel Michael (?Oversfield), and Brigadier General Sakib Mahmuljin, commander of the 3d Corps. Here is what he said:

[Mahmuljin] I would only like to present the impressions that the U.S. military attache has just conveyed to me, namely, that he was impressed by what he had seen and that the level of training that was shown here today is very high, according to the very high standards of professional U.S. soldiers. Therefore, this is one of the best confirmations of what we have seen here today.

Croatia: CE Sets Tougher Conditions for Admission

*LD0606180196 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1631 GMT 6 Jun 96*

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, June 6 (TANJUG)—The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has sent a new letter to Zagreb, requesting that Croatia meet obligations it has assumed in order to be admitted to the council.

The council listed as the most important condition for Croatia's membership cooperation with the Hague-based International War Crimes Tribunal as well as in the implementation of a peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Moreover, Croatia's membership depends on its behaviour in eastern Slavonia, Barania and western Srem and the respect of Serbs' human rights there.

Zagreb is also expected to respond to Serb refugees' requests to return to their homes.

Croatia launched an aggression on Serb Krajina in early May and August 1995, triggering an exodus of about 250,000 Serbs. Moreover, about 500,000 Serbs have left Croatia since it launched a war of secession from the former Yugoslavia.

Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic has said that Zagreb authorities will respond to the Council of Europe, with the committee of ministers being expected to discuss Croatia's membership in the council on June 24.

Croatian press reported on Thursday about the conditions set by the Council of Europe, saying the conditions mainly coincided with those already agreed to by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman.

The Zagreb daily VJESNIK said the council insisted that Zagreb secure a dignified return of Serbs to Croatia and compensate for the property they have lost.

The daily said the council insisted that a court investigation be launched into crimes against people and their property as well as into violations of human rights.

Croatia: UNHCR Asks Authorities To Change Amnesty Law

*AU0606201296 Beli Manastir Radio-Televizija Republike Srpske Krajine Television in Serbo-Croatian
1830 GMT 5 Jun 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] The UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] appealed to the Croatian authorities to change the present selective amnesty law as this is the precondition for the return of the Serb refugees. This is what special UNHCR envoy, Soeren Jenssen Petersen, stated in Erdut today after meeting with the president of the Serb province, Goran Hadzic.

Mr. Petersen said he was pleased with the position of the Serb side regarding the rights of Croat and other refugees to return to the District of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem.

Croatia: FRY Official Alleges 'Croatian Crimes' in Vukovar

*AU0606202196 Beli Manastir Radio-Televizija Republike Srpske Krajine Television in Serbo-Croatian
1830 GMT 5 Jun 96*

[FBIS Translated Text] At today's news conference in Vukovar, Dr. (?Vojislav Dabic), director of the Serb Congress Information Center [direktor Informacionog Centra Srpskog Sabora] in Belgrade, presented many indisputable pieces of evidence of Croatian crimes committed in Vukovar and its surroundings.

Lawyers Branko Munizaba and [name indistinct], and Borislav Savic, president of the Association of Victims of Croatian Regime from Vukovar, were also present.

[Unidentified correspondent] It is through Tomislav Mercep [president of the Association of Croatian Volunteers of the Homeland War] and similar criminals, whose activity I have been keeping up with since 1991, that we want to prove that the Serbs were forced to respond to the organized terror, behind which stood the Croatian regime, by putting up resistance, said Dr. (?Vojislav Dabic), director of the Serb Congress Information Center in Belgrade.

Stating that the results of the investigation conducted by The Hague Tribunal investigators in Vukovar in late May are satisfactory, (?Dabic) added that these investigations will dispell the international community's myth about the armed rebellion and aggression of the Serbs against Croatia.

At the news conference, organized in the [?building of the] Association of Victims of the Croatian Regime in Vukovar, Dr. (?Dabic) said that, through direct testimonies, The Hague Tribunal investigators were presented with the facts about Croatian crimes in Paulin Dvor, the slaughter in Sarvas, the assassination of Josip Rajhl Kir, crimes against civilians and the wounded in the Vukovar hospital, and other issues.

Dr. (?Dabic) said that, in the investigation, particular emphasis was placed on the crime against the imprisoned Serbs in Paulin Dvor near Osijek, for which Branimir Glavas [head of Osijek-Baranja County] is directly responsible, and the taking of blood by force from prisoners and the wounded in the Vukovar hospital. He said that the fact that prisoners were taken on the basis of their blood donor cards—particularly those with rare blood types, from whom the maximum possible quantities of blood were taken—is a crime in itself.

He explained his thesis that the Croatian regime is behind the crimes by providing several concrete examples. The Hague Tribunal investigators were told that the idea of ethnic cleansing of this area came into being at the Croatian Democratic Community [word indistinct] meeting held in Tomislav Mercep's house in Bogdanovci. In addition to Mercep, Vladimir Seks, Ivan Vekic, and Branimir Glavas, parliamentary representatives at the time, and Marin Vidic-Bili, Croatian Government commissioner for Vukovar Municipality, also attended the meeting. According to Dabic, this clearly indicates that senior officials of the Croatian regime gave the green light to the crimes committed against the Serbs in Vukovar and its surroundings.

Croatia: Officials Discuss Plans To Reconstruct E. Slavonia

AU0606200696 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 4 Jun 96 pp 1-2

[Article by Snjezana Canic: "Serbs Reviving Z-4 Plan"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Osijek, 3 June—The cooperation of the implementation committees and the communication of the heads of those committees with the Serb side in the name of the Government Bureau for Transitional Administration are at a standstill. Such is the present situation in the process of peaceful reintegration. Mirko Tankosic, deputy head of the Bureau, stated this on 3 June at the meeting of the Headquarters for the Return of Displaced Persons from Osijek-Baranja County. Stating that the present representatives of "authorities" in the region under the UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia] were actually persons who had contributed to the destruction of Croatia in the war and that these people were appointed deliberately, Tankosic claimed that the negotiations with the Serbs are an important factor in the work of the implementation committees and are necessary for the establishment of Croatian authority in the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem under the supervision of UNTAES.

"We want to be well prepared for the return so as not to be unprepared as we were after Operations Storm and Flash," Tankosic pointed out. He repeated that Croatia's primary goal is to integrate the Croatian Danube basin, that the second is to live in peace, and that Croatia will remain faithful to that policy. Should peaceful reintegration prove impossible, however, it is in Croatia's interests to reintegrate the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem as soon as possible. Stressing that the other side was trying to present itself to the world as a "victim" and as a highly organized entity that wants a high degree of autonomy and to assimilate displaced persons who have returned to that region, Tankosic said: "We have also noticed that the Serb leaders want to revive the 'Z-4 Plan [Zagreb-4 Plan]' that would block the process of peaceful reintegration, especially as it is necessary to monitor the present situation in that region."

Reporting on last week's meetings in the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Reconstruction and Development, which were attended by Gerard Fischer, the UNTAES civilian-affairs chief, Tankosic stressed that the preferred concept was to help the UNTAES-administered region, which is collapsing, but only in a way that corresponds to solutions offered by the Croatian Ministries. The solutions, as Tankosic said, cannot be determined by the present Serb leaders, and Croatia will insist on the manner of peaceful reintegration—the implementation of which might have seemed too irresolute, especially in issues regarding displaced persons.

At the meeting of the Headquarters for the Return of Displaced Persons in Osijek-Baranja County, the proposal on the structure of public utilities in the occupied territory was also presented. Mirko Barisin, chairman of the Headquarters and vice prefect of Osijek-Baranja County, said that the proposal would be delivered to the Office of the Transitional Authorities and General Jacques Klein. Mentioning the meeting with representatives of towns that have organized public utilities—such as Darda, Bilje, and Knezevi Vinogradi—that was held two weeks ago, Barisin announced that Unikom and Vodovod companies will temporarily assume the tasks of organized garbage collection and waterworks supervision after the return to the UNTAES-administered region. Approximately 58 million kunas should be invested in solving the problem of water supplies in that region. The equipment of the Komus company from Beli Manastir was also listed, and 9 million German marks [DM] will be necessary for its reconstruction. Reconstruction plans for the gasworks and main-gas system have already been drawn up for which about DM66 million will be needed.

Tihomir Salajic, another negotiator with the local Serb representatives, spoke in the name of the municipal authorities. Warning that communication with the other side had only gone as far as making contacts and exchanging information, Salajic suggested that a special session of the Osijek Municipal Authorities should be held, which the representatives of occupied municipalities and the Headquarters for the Return of Displaced

Persons would attend, in order to assess the possibilities for the work of Unikom and Vodovod after the return. Salajic thinks it would be necessary for the town to assist the public utility companies, especially regarding the utilities' infrastructure. Accepting the suggestion, Marko Barisin pointed out that the financial help for the reconstruction and development of the public utility infrastructure after the return will be provided by the international community and the Ministry of Reconstruction and Development, and added that they have the consent of the representatives of the municipalities, which will provide the necessary workforce for the reconstruction.

Croatia: E. Slavonia Serbs Claim Right to Self-Rule

LD0606184496 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1748 GMT 6 Jun 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Mickovci, June 6 (TANJUG)—Coordinator for talks with Croatia in the Serb region of eastern Slavonia, Barania and western Srem, Vojin Susa, said Thursday that the region should be accepted as part of Croatia, but that Serbs as a majority people there must win the right to self-rule.

Speaking in a session of the region's assembly, Susa said, 'All debates about the region being independent of Croatia must end, because this position will win no support either in the east, or the west, or here.'

Susa said a major obstacle to the Serb self-rule in the region was the Croatian law on territorial organisation that did not contain such provisions.

He said Serbs should direct their activities towards altering this law as well as the law on partial amnesty for Serbs that is contrary to the Croatian-Serb agreement.

Serbs in the region and Croatian authorities signed an agreement in November 1995 under which the region was placed under a one-year U.N. transitional administration whose mandate can be extended for another year.

The U.N. administration and administrator Jacques Klein have already made efforts to demilitarise the region. Moreover, special police units whose members will wear U.N. symbols will soon start patrolling the region.

The region is the only part of the Republic of Serb Krajina that has not been occupied by Croatia.

Serbs in Croatia proclaimed their own state, the Republic of Serb Krajina, in 1991, after Croatia launched its war of secession from the former Yugoslavia. Croatia occupied western parts of Serb Krajina in early May 1995 and northern and southern parts in August 1995. Serb Krajina was under U.N. protection at the time.

The assembly also stressed difficulties in oil supplies after the closing of oil fields in nearby Djeletovci. Serb authorities request that the oil fields remain under Serb control and that crude oil be refined in Croatian refineries.

Croatia, however, insists that the oil fields be immediately placed under control of the central oil industry in Zagreb.

Croatia: E. Slavonia Serbs To Ask UNTAES To Extend Mandate

LD0606203096 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1846 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Mirkovci, 6 Jun (TANJUG)—The assembly of the Serb region of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srem decided today to form an experts' committee to prepare a platform for negotiations with Croatia on the future status of the region and to demand from the UN Security Council that the UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia] mandate be extended for a year. [passage omitted]

"Before the platform, which will be a basis for all the negotiations with Croatians within the joint commissions, is adopted by the regional assembly, we shall consult the UN administrator, Jacques Klein, too," Vojislav Stanimirovic, the chairman of the regional executive committee, said.

The experts' committee will consist of 15 members.

The assembly decided to demand immediately that the UN Security Council extend the UNTAES mandate for another year. The Erdut agreement envisages such a possibility and the executive committee will act upon the decision straightaway. The first year of the UNTAES mandate ends on 16 January 1997. [passage omitted]

Croatia: Serb Radio Says Croats Want To 'Sweep Clean' Slavonia

AU0606204396 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1610 GMT 5 Jun 96

[Commentary by Petko Koprivica, including recorded excerpts of statements by an unidentified Croatian official and Mato Simic, president of the Association of Displaced Persons of Croatia, for "Slavonian Television" in Osijek on 4 June]

[FBIS Translated Text] While the Serb District of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem is observing and implementing the demilitarization process and the entire Erdut Agreement as planned, in which the authorities of the Serb District have displayed a great deal of cooperation, what can be seen in their lovely country are threats of force—because, for all these years, the Croats have been lying [word indistinct] to their people.

These Croatian political losers are taking things back to the beginning, uttering unsupported and false statements about real facts, which was the case in last night's television debate in which some Croatian politicians took part. This is the subject of Petko Koprivica's commentary.

[Koprivica] The content and main messages of the program entitled Current Issues Regarding Peaceful Reintegration, carried by the distinguished, so-called Slavonian Television last night, resembled most a pile of black seeds of evil threatening generations to come.

The conclusion derived from what was said—with the exception of some statements—is that all Serbs are sinful and their responsibility is collective. This fascist Croat phrase is a well-known one, but let us not go too far back into the past. What happened to the Serbs who stayed in their houses in the western parts of the Krajina last August is common knowledge. Five thousand of them—mostly old people—were killed.

Here is an answer given by one of the officials interviewed in last night's program to the question: Why such a Croatian crime against the Serbs?

[Unidentified Croatian official] The best solution after all is that there should be as few Serbs as possible in this area, so that we can return with our heads up. It is necessary to know who is the aggressor and who is the victim in this homeland war.

My recommendation is that Serbs should leave the Croatian Danubian area.

[Koprivica] Let us remind the audience that, before this war, over 800,000 Serbs lived in Croatia. The Croatian ethnic broom has swept away over 700,000, and certain forces in their lovely country, embodied in the appearance and words of Mato Simic, president of the Association of Displaced Persons of Croatia, would now—loyal servants of the evil ideology that they are—like to use their ethnic broom to sweep clean the District of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem—clean of Serbs, naturally. Simic, imbued with hatred, said: It would be best if there were no Serbs in this area. Moreover, he accused UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia] and the UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees] of working in the interests of the Serb people.

It may be said that in this way Croatia has, through one of its officials, again publicly—on television—stated that a peaceful resolution of the crisis is as much its concern as is melted snow.

[Simic] In this case, I support a clean ethnic area—no Serbs in eastern Croatia. I think that they have done so much evil that the Croatian people cannot forgive them—nor can the national minorities who lived in the area—with all due respect to the Serbs who are here, on the free territory of the Republic of Croatia. Them I see as equal to all the other citizens, and I hold no grudges against them. I think they have shown loyalty towards us, and they should be acknowledged, but [word indistinct] occupied territory it would be good if there were no Serbs in the future.

I do not support the view that we should take their private property away, and I propose, both to them and to our displaced persons, the future returnees, that the property of the Serbs should be bought, that the Serbs should exchange their property with Croats from other parts of the former Yugoslavia—Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Vojvodina—and, in this way, we can be very good neighbors in different countries one day. As far as the further development of our relations is concerned, it will be up to official policies of the Republic of Croatia and their Yugoslavia to arrange.

[Koprivica] This is one of the things that Mato Simic, president of the Association of Displaced Persons of Croatia, said last night at the Osijek Television studio. What is there to be said after such messages?

If Croatia wants a peaceful resolution to the crisis, there is nothing to be done but to get rid of the propaganda services of Mato Simic and people like him—there are probably quite a few of those in their lovely country.

Croatia: Djukic Sends Tudjman Letter on 'Purges' of Serbs

AU0706080496 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1052 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Zagreb, 6 Jun (BETA)—Milan Djukic, president of the Serb National Party [SNS] and Croatian Assembly deputy, has sent an open letter to Croatian President Franjo Tudjman in which he points out that "there has never been so much injustice done and human dignity trampled as there has been now against the Serbs in Croatia."

"There have never been in Croatia fewer Serbs with greater bitterness and grief," Djukic writes and adds that "there are no more Serbs, they have left, their homes have been torched, and their return is being avoided."

"Not only have Serbs physically been cleansed from newly liberated regions, but purges are being carried out continuously and precisely throughout Croatia. There has not been a single registration of Serb national employment in the last couple of years and employment is mostly being regulated with dismissals," the SNS leader said. [passage omitted]

Croatia: Mistreatment of Serbs in Croatian Jails Alleged

LD0706120796 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1103 GMT 7 Jun 96

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 7 (TANJUG)—Serbs in Croat prisons have been left to the mercy of the prison authorities, and the proceedings against them are only a mockery where the judge and jury are one and the same.

Testimonies to this effect have been heard from recent Krajina Serb prisoners who arrived in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on Thursday following a May 30 decision by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman to grant amnesty to 76 Serbs captured during Operation Storm last August.

Of the 60 Serbs who asked to come to Yugoslavia, few were willing to give their names because, as they said, they did not want their statements to harm those who remained in prison.

Dragan Darbuk told TANJUG that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had registered him as late as January 1996, although he had spend nine months in the prison of the Croatian city of Karlovac.

Slavko Vujaklija, registered by ICRC in Sept. 1995, confirmed that ahead of ICRC visits, prison guards hid away all prisoners they did not want to be seen.

A former inhabitant of Vrgin Most, who asked not to be named, was captured on Aug. 6, 1995 together with his 12-year-old son. He said that Croatian troops had opened gunfire on a column of refugees from Krajina, mainly made up of women and children who were moving towards Yugoslavia, and run them down with tanks.

He said he had been beaten and his clothes and documents torn, while his son was threatened with a knife. They were then taken to the prison in the city of Sisak where over 2,500 Serbs, mainly old people, were shortly brought.

The torturers in the Croatian prisons were exceptionally strong and mentally retarded, the released Serbs claim. They committed brutal crimes because 'nobody normal could not do something like that.' They stripped their prisoners, then beat them, broke their arms and inflicted almost fatal injuries.

Prisoners who asked for medical treatment were tormented even more and only when the guards saw that someone was at death's door, was he sent for a brief visit to the doctor. The next day the beatings resumed.

According to this witness, a prison guard openly said that the aim of this kind of treatment was to either kill off or at least maim for life 80 percent of Serb prisoners over the next three years.

In the Karlovac prison there remain about 25 prisoners and all have received lengthy sentences. The majority are old disabled persons who were ineligible for combat duties.

FYROM: SOFA Agreement, U.S. Accord Analyzed

AU0606150996 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 6 Jun 96 p 2

[Article by Z. Petrov: "Huge Step Forward To Promote Relations With the United States"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Three days ago, the Macedonian and U.S. Governments exchanged diplomatic notes on the agreement that regulates the status of the forces of the two states, which represents a bilateral act that raises the mutual relations to a much higher level. Let us recall that, on the same day, the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] verified the agreement that regulates the status of the forces of NATO member countries and of the countries that participate in Partnership for Peace [PFP] program. This protocol, which was ratified at the session of the Macedonian Parliament two days ago with an absolute majority, creates a legal base for the participation of the Macedonian Armed Forces in joint maneuvers of the PFP program that will be held outside our state.

So far, this agreement (SOFA [Status of Forces Agreement]) has been signed by all the alliance members and seven countries that are participating in the PFP [Partnership of Peace] program (a mini-SOFA agreement). Actually, this act may raise some dilemmas among those who are not well informed: Why did the Republic of Macedonia sign a bilateral protocol on the status of NATO formations—that is, of the other members of the PFP program—knowing that the United States plays the leading and decisive role in NATO?

According to some information from the Defense Ministry, it is by coincidence that the two independent initiatives are coinciding. The first is the usual procedure for the fulfillment of the scheduled arrangements with NATO, after Macedonia's admission into the PFP. It is the so-called mini-SOFA Agreement that Macedonia has signed in an exceptionally short period of time. Although we were among the last to be admitted into the PFP, as its 27th member, on 30 May (just one month after the submission of the so-called Individual Program), we moved straight to this agreement, which, so far, has only been signed by seven PFP members. Allegedly, the expectations were that this could not come true earlier than the end of this year or the beginning of next year. Now, Macedonia has the possibility of completing on time the final regulation of the status of its forces that will take part in the maneuvers in Albania in July together with some other NATO and PFP member countries under the name "Peacemaking Eagle '96."

The signing of the other additional bilateral agreement, or protocol, with the State Department as an exchange of diplomatic notes, although it followed an identical procedure, has a totally different character—that is, there are totally different reasons for it. One of the priorities, as we found out, is contained in the undefined future of the UNPREDEP [UN Preventive Deployment Force] in Macedonia, which is at the end of its present mandate because of the latest UN Security Council Resolution on the reduction of the number of its troops, and also because of the announced pressure (mainly coming from Moscow) for a further reduction of its troops in Macedonia. This agreement automatically regulates the status of the U.S. troops in Macedonia, and, according to the resolution that was adopted in February, this year, they represent a surplus in the contingent. The essence is that, since two days ago, the U.S. units in Macedonia, in accordance with the latest agreement, are under the U.S. flag. In other words, the Macedonian-U.S. agreement on the status of the forces creates a legal basis for the stay of the U.S. troops in Macedonia that will only be regulated further between the two countries. As we discovered, the United States has regulated its relations with Japan, South Korea, and Panama in an identical way. So, the conclusion is that, for Macedonia, this agreement represents a huge step forward in the establishment of its own security and in relations with the United States.

FYROM: Frckovski on Talks at CEI, NACC Meetings

AU0606175596 Skopje DNEVNIK in Macedonian 6 Jun 96 p 2

[Article by Saso Ordanovski: "Reinforcement of Macedonia's Regional Position"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Berlin—"I think that my stays in Vienna and Berlin were exceptionally successful and fruitful for Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], because they contributed equally to the multilateral and bilateral plans for the reinforcement of the Macedonian position in some important regional, security, and political developments," Foreign Minister Ljubomir Frckovski told DNEVNIK after his one-week stay in Vienna and Berlin, where he attended the regular ministerial meetings of the Central European Initiative [CEI] countries and the North Atlantic Cooperation Council [NACC].

"The two main points that were discussed in Vienna were the enlargement of the CEI by five more members and the preparations for the conference in Florence on 13 and 14 July, at which the developments in the post-Dayton situation will be discussed. In Florence, the CEI will emerge as a single entity with the address of my Austrian colleague Wolfgang Schuessel. We discussed a scaled approach; the different situations in the region after the Dayton initiative for peace and cooperation. There are three ways to define the regional approach and the way in which it can be revitalized from the inside: the Bulgarian initiative, in which the term region is applied to the Balkans; the U.S. approach that implies southeastern Europe; and the French definition that embodies the former Yugoslav republics plus Albania.

"In this context," Frckovski says, "I reiterated the Macedonian position, according to which the term 'former Yugoslav' has to be abandoned and according to which it is necessary to speak about the situations in the separate states in the south of the Balkans or in southeastern Europe. Furthermore, the so-called functional regionalism (economic cooperation, telecommunications, transport, and so on) is not in dispute. However, the other segment of the regional identification of the state is impossible, because it ignores the totally different situations in the countries in the region regarding their ties to collective security systems, the degree of privatization, the level of minority and human rights, the relations with the neighbors, and so on. In this sense, I believe that my colleagues in the CEI, as well as in the countries of the European Union, have finally agreed that the regional initiatives must be much more flexible in their approach in order to arrive at a more productive regional association. We even propose that such approaches should be carried out in different 'baskets,' the contents of which will be different for different countries."

In assessing the work of the NACC in Berlin, Minister Frckovski said that the "general impression is that the Russians are demonstrating a softer approach regarding NATO expansion.

"Now," Frckovski said, "in order to meet Russian security interests, there are discussions on transforming the Partnership for Peace [PFP] initiative from a 'waiting room' for NATO entry, into a permanent part of NATO, as a further guarantor of European security. This is a kind of a political and not military expansion of NATO. Nevertheless, it is still too early to speak about definite formulas."

At the end of his stay in Germany, Minister Frckovski delivered a lecture on the subject of "The Priorities of Macedonian Foreign Policy" at the European Institute in Berlin.

FYROM: Frckovski Describes Bilateral Meetings

AU0606193496 Skopje Radio Macedonia Network in Macedonian 1330 GMT 6 Jun 96

[Statement by FYROM Foreign Minister Ljubomir Frckovski on 6 June at Skopje Airport upon his return from visits to Vienna and Berlin—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] The subjects that were discussed in Vienna during the meetings of the CEI [Central European Initiative]—whose member we have been for a number of years—and in Berlin, at the meetings of the North Atlantic Council, were as follows: At the first meeting the CEI group approach was discussed as well as the post-Dayton meeting that is to be held in Florence on the post-Dayton situation, including the efforts that every country will have to make for peace and stability in the region. On 13 and 14 June, there will be such a discussion.

The second part refers to our bilateral meetings. We met with the Bulgarian, the Ukrainian, the Italian, and the Polish foreign ministers. We exchanged views on separate bilateral cooperation. With the Italian foreign minister we discussed the evolving clause that is a condition for our access to the European Union and some basic bilateral questions. We invited him to pay a special bilateral visit to Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], apart from the one that is scheduled in two days.

We discussed with the Bulgarian colleague about a way out from the present situation, particularly concerning their initiative for a peace conference that we have supported. We reiterated that they as hosts have to provide for the presence of all countries in the region that are interested, that they have to solve the question of how to name us. This comes as an unexpected problem because this was not a problem at the last two conferences, and it will be very bad if our public sees this as a further step to the cooling of relations. I believe that this was understood and I think that they will make efforts for solving this in the second term that has been scheduled for the conference. Until then there will be expert consultations about the language problem that they have with us.

The discussions in Berlin were held on two levels: First, the reforms inside NATO for adaptation concerning its expansion, and second, how the countries who are candidates for NATO are getting prepared for this process within the Partnership for Peace. Here there was some news, that is that the Russian view on expansion of NATO was softer, and Mr. Primakov was the one who offered possibilities for a political expansion rather than military. (endall) 061330 zb/dyrek

FYROM: Frckovski Views Relations With Bulgaria

AU0706100896 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 7 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubomir Frckovski, Macedonia's [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] minister of foreign affairs, expressed optimism about a quick resolution of the language dispute between Macedonia and Bulgaria. As NOVA MAKEDONJA pointed out today, this optimism is based on the results of the recent meeting between Frckovski and his Bulgarian colleague, Georgi Pirinski, in Vienna. Our correspondent Kostadin Filipov reports from Skopje:

[Begin recording] Upon his return late last night from the forums in Vienna and Berlin, the chief of Macedonian diplomacy repeated some of his assessments of Macedonia's relations with its neighbors, including Bulgaria. According to him, at the very beginning Skopje accepted the idea of convening a Balkan conference on peace and stability in southeastern Europe. However, the change in the Macedonian position was prompted by the intention of the Bulgarian hosts to treat the Macedonian delegation as representatives of FYROM. According to Frckovski, for a state such as Bulgaria, which recognized Macedonia under its constitutional name, this could be interpreted as a sign of reverence toward Greece and of a further cooling in relations between the two states, at the initiative of Sofia.

Nevertheless, Frckovski did not reject the possibility of Macedonia's participation in the Sofia forum, within the framework of the new term, providing that the matter of under which country's name the Macedonian delegation will appear is resolved, and so long as other Balkan countries demonstrate an interest in holding the forum.

In this context, the chief of Macedonian diplomacy also viewed upcoming efforts to resolve the so-called language dispute between Sofia and Skopje. He said an agreement could be reached by this week or next.

As reported, Bulgarian experts are expected here to hold talks on this topic. [end recording]

FYROM: Party Officials Discuss Decision on Referendum

AU0606173996 Skopje DNEVNIK in Macedonian 6 Jun 96 p 3

[Article by Vesna Dodeva: "Now the Constitutional Court Will Not Have the Authority for the Initiative on Early Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The leaders of the opposition VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] and DP [Democratic Party], Ljubco Georgievski and Petar Gosev, the initiators of the initiative for "150,000 signatures for a referendum on early elections," announce that they will ask the Constitutional Court to assess the legality of the initiative.

Two days ago, the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] decided, with 66 votes "for" [out of 86], that the initiative is unconstitutional. The members of parliament who voted for a referendum believe that the decision is a "constitutional coup d'etat" and the introduction of a legally unstable situation in the country.

Ljupco Popovski, the secretary of the SDSM [Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia] believes that the initiators must ask the Constitutional Court for justice.

"I suppose that the initiators are not pleased with the conclusion that we have reached, and they have the right to start an initiative in the Constitutional Court, which is competent to decide whether the decisions of the Assembly are in conformity with the Constitution or not," SDSM Secretary Ljupco Popovski says.

"The initiators have the right to address the Constitutional Court. If we allow the citizens to overturn the authority with such self-initiatives, it can lead to absurd situations," Mersel Biljali from the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity] says.

According to some legal interpretations, the decision of the Assembly is a separate act and, as such, it cannot be subject to Constitutional Court analysis. If the Constitutional Court judges decide to discuss whether rejecting the initiative, then they can only do so if the Court gives expanded explanations about the court's competence. According to some speculations, however, the Assembly has deliberately passed a decision, that is an act, for which the Constitutional Court can proclaim itself incompetent.

"Breaking the Constitution is another contribution to a political state and not to a state ruled by law. We will inform the Council of Europe about this Assembly decision," Petar Gosev says.

"The session that was held two days ago put Macedonia in a more unstable position, which will reinforce spontaneous and individual radicalism," Ljubco Georgievski announces, and adds that he is not optimistic that the Constitutional Court will declare the initiative constitutional. Georgievski says that the opposition has been urged by thousands of calls from citizens to implement "alternative, street democracy and some other forms of civil disobedience."

"This is dangerous for the present and future situation in the Republic of Macedonia, because political and not legal methods are being used and because the political superpower is destroying the law," Stojan Andov, the Liberal Party leader, says.

Andov believes that the tone in the discussions of those opposed to the initiative was "frightening" and that it evinces the resistance and arrogance of the authority toward the citizens.

"This constitutional coup d'etat is a textbook example of the behavior of subjects in various spheres of interest for the sake of accomplishing their own intentions and goals. This is a further step toward anarchy and the destabilization of the country, and the responsibility for this situation falls on the government—that is, its servant, the so-called parliament," says Rufi Osmani from the PDPA [Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians].

Dzeladin Murati from the PDP [Party for Democratic Prosperity], who voted for the initiative, unlike the other deputies from his party, considers this to be a done deal.

"I do not see what more can be done. If there are any other mechanisms, I am not familiar with them," Murati says.

Sami Ibraimi from the PDPA-NDP [PDPA-People's Democratic Party] says that it was not the Assembly that suspended the Constitution, but it was the Constitution that suspended the Assembly and the will of the citizens who signed for early elections, because the constitutional act has ambiguous implications. "The regulations must be defined in order to avoid similar manipulations," Ibraimi says.

"The initiators must now not lead the citizens into unexplained situations regarding the law, the Constitution, and regulations. In order to avoid ambiguities between the government and the opposition, the initiators must present a minimum explanation on the directions of the civil initiative," Mirko Tripunovski, secretary of the Socialist Party, says.

Ljupco Popovski from the SDSM appraises that the initiative as a serious warning of dissatisfaction among the voters.

"We have started from the principled view that the Constitution and its regulations, the way that we have understood them and in consultations with experts in this field, do not create the conditions or legal bases for a referendum on early elections. We have 330,000 voters, and therefore it is difficult to accept an automatic referendum just because others wish it."

FYROM: Parliament Rejects Report on Work of Radio, TV

AU0606153596 Skopje MIC in English 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] After more than four hours of discussion yesterday, the representatives to the Republic Assembly did not accept the report on the work of the Macedonian [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] Radio and Television (MRTV) for the last year. They emphasized the over-employment in this institution which destroys the creativity and discourages the employees. The volume of repeated programmes is growing, while the quality of the new ones is deteriorating. This applies particularly to the inefficiency in collecting the means for RTV subscription, despite the legal regulations.

The General Director of MRTV Melpomeni Korneti emphasized that the situation in which this house is in should not come as a surprise at all, because in the first 14 months there were no regulations regulating the subscription, while the decree passed in 1995 should have taken much less, that is, the Law on radio-diffusion and the Law on MRTV should have already been adopted. After a short debate, the Law on privatization of the state capital was adopted.

Poland: Presidential Aide on Hillary Clinton's Coming Visit

WS0706100996 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 7 Feb 96 p 6

[Interview with Marek Siwiec, under secretary of state in the Presidential Chancellery, by Rudolf Hoffman; place and date not given: "Before the Visit"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Hoffman] What can you tell us about the coming visit of Mrs. Hillary Clinton, wife of the U.S. President, who is coming to Poland on 1 July?

[Siwiec] It will be a kind of individual, independent presentation of a certain part of the presidency; Bill Clinton's wife is engaged in some public activities. What the American organizers of the visit would like to achieve suggests that they are concentrating their efforts in presenting the U.S. First Lady as a person actively involved in social and cultural issues, as someone who wants to learn more about this part of Europe. This is also very important for us because people in America know relatively little about our part of the world. We, in turn, will have a good chance to present ourselves as well as we can.

[Hoffman] Your visit coincided with the visit by Lech Walesa to the United States. What opinions about the visit did you hear when you were there?

[Siwiec] As a country that has a rather large minority in the United States, Poland is a kind of bargaining chip for the Republicans and Democrats. Visits such as the one by Lech Walesa are used as occasions to win the votes of the American Polonia. Promises are made that it is hoped will be put into effect.

[Hoffman] Thank you for the interview.

Poland: Walesa Comments on U.S. Trip, Right-Wing Unification

WS0706112996 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 7 Jun 96 p 2

[Article by K.Gr.: "Lech Walesa Criticized Jerzy Gwizdz"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "I dealt with issues that are important for Poland—entry into NATO and the EU," former President Lech Walesa said on returning from his trip to the United States. He met with, among others, U.S. President Bill Clinton and Bob Dole, Clinton's rival in the coming election.

Lech Walesa said that in the United States he also held talks with entrepreneurs who would like to offer financial support to the Gdansk Shipyard. They are to come to Gdansk in a week. He did not reveal any names or other details.

The former president criticized Jerzy Gwizdz, former head of his election campaign staff. He announced that Gwizdz does not have the right to quote his name in talks on right-wing unification. Nonetheless, he did not directly criticize the "New Poland" idea, an initiative proposed only a few days ago, which involves the merger of the campaign staffs of Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, Marek Markiewicz, Leszek Moczulski, and Walesa. However, he added that he did not authorize Gwizdz to support this initiative. It is worth recalling that Jerzy Gwizdz made a statement at the New Poland initiative meeting, in which he said that he would take a stand on this initiative only after a discussion with the former president.

Walesa did not reply directly when asked whether he would prefer to be the patron or the leader of the post-Solidarity election list. He believes that center-right politicians suffer from a Walesa complex: "They know they will never outdo me."

The former president surmises that Boris Yeltsin will lose the elections in Russia and will not want to relinquish power. He did not elaborate on this remark, and, after a moment, he said jokingly that he made that remark on purpose, to provoke journalists.

Poland: Kwasniewski on NATO, Russian Relations, Domestic Issues

BR0706124596 Milan IL SOLE-24 ORE in Italian 6 Jun 96 p 4

[Report on interview with Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski by Attilio Geroni in Warsaw; date not given: "Kwasniewski: Moscow Must Bear With Us Over NATO"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Warsaw—[Passage omitted] To coincide with Italian President Oscar Luigi Scalfaro's visit to Warsaw, Kwasniewski granted IL SOLE-24 ORE an interview in which he touched on relations between Italy and Poland, integration into NATO and the EU, and the consequences that eastward expansion of the Atlantic alliance may have on relations with Russia. The Polish president stressed "the great importance and longstanding tradition of bilateral relations" and said he was certain (as confirmed by his talks with Scalfaro yesterday) that he could count "on the unconditional backing that Italy will give Poland's aspirations to join NATO and the European Union."

The Polish head of state described economic relations between the two countries as "excellent," not least because Poland was a trading partner experiencing "a period of strong growth, with increasingly clear laws and regulations for foreign investors." All in all, there were no outstanding problems or issues between Italy and Poland, things could not be going better, and Scalfaro's visit represented "another major signal to this effect."

Poland, which is historically and geographically a country that has always been in the front line in the crises that have swept Europe, is hypersensitive to the issue of NATO's eastward expansion, a matter that is without any doubt whatsoever also a priority for the postcommunist ruling class, which has been in government for two and a half years and which Kwasniewski has led to renewal and recovery.

"Will we change our political strategy toward Russia in the event the communists win? No. Our policy toward Moscow has always been and will always be marked by two elements: constancy and patience. Constancy because it is in our interest as well to have good bilateral relations, and, above all, because we will never change our minds: We want to join NATO regardless of the outcome of the 16 June election. Patience means that we understand certain fears felt by Russia, and this is the very reason we will seek to explain, whether to Yeltsin or Zyuganov, that an eastward expansion of NATO does not necessarily mean setting up a European military structure against Russia. Of course, it will not be easy: NATO's image of a creature of the Cold War dies hard in Moscow. But Poland's goal will be to get the message across that the process represents another step toward the building of a new security structure in Europe."

Kwasniewski also came out strongly in favor of the outcome of the NATO summit held in Berlin, which had paved the way for "a new security structure on the continent, and not a Cold War-style military alliance." Commenting on the statements made by Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov, the Polish president welcomed what he himself described as "greater flexibility." In Kwasniewski's view, a major stride forward had been made: "Before, they always used to say no on the grounds that enlargement was an act against Russia itself, but now they are saying that it can be discussed, that perhaps the problems are different, such as that of the deployment of troops and nuclear weapons on the new members' territories." [passage omitted]

Referring to one of the hot issues in Polish politics over the past few weeks, the fate of the Gdansk naval shipyards, Kwasniewski said he was "pessimistic" regarding the economic viability of an overpoliticized enterprise, and he defended the privatization policy set in motion by the Left, stressing that "67 percent of the GDP was generated by the private sector last year, and the sale of particularly sensitive sectors of the Polish economy, such as the tobacco industry, has been successfully concluded." [passage omitted]

As to the date of the parliamentary election, which could be held from next spring onward, he thought it advisable to hold it as soon as possible: "I think it should be held in the first half of the year because that would allow more time to form the new government and enable this government to draw up the new budget."

Poland: Sejm Approves National Security Council

WS0706102896 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 7 Jun 96 p 3

[Report by "AN": "RBN—Yes, KOP—No; No Approval for Committee"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On Wednesday [5 Jun] the Constitutional Commission of the National Assembly rejected President Aleksander Kwasniewski's project to include a provision on the State Protection Committee [KOP] in the draft constitution. It did, however, approve the establishment of the National Security Council [RBN].

The president wanted to reactivate KOP, an institution known from the times of the Second Republic of Poland [1918-39], to "coordinate the activities of state organs in the field of defense readiness and security." It was to be headed by the president, with the prime minister acting as his deputy. As many as 26 Commission members from various political groupings rejected the concept.

The provision of the small constitution on the RBN will be included in the draft of the new constitution in unaltered form. The RBN is to advise the president on issues of "internal and external security."

Poland: Sejm Deputy Explains Rejection of Defense Committee

LD0606120096 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1005 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The draft new constitution will not include a State Defense Committee [KOP], which the president proposed. The aim of KOP would have been to coordinate activities connected with the state's defense combat readiness and security. Parliament members, chiefly representatives of the opposition, objected to the idea. But the constitution will envision the setting up of a National Security Council [RBN]. This will be an advisory body for the head of state in internal and external security matters. This is what the Constitutional Committee of the National Assembly [Sejm and Senate combined] decided [yesterday]. Jacek Taylor from the

Freedom Union thinks the committee's decision is correct because his view is that the legal role of the rejected KOP is unclear:

[Begin Taylor recording] The name of the RBN itself suggests that its task will be to advise and nothing more. We have had very interesting experiences with a KOP, particularly during martial law. When one reads documents pertaining to martial law, its imposition, and subsequent functioning, the role of KOK [Committee for the Defense of the Country] appears very diverse and, to be blunt, unclear to the very end. So it is a very good thing that the Constitutional Committee is moving away from cultivating this odd body. There will be a council and it will advise. The problem now is to establish its composition. [end recording]

Poland: Issues Surrounding Concordant Viewed

WS0706100796 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 4 Jun 96 p 5

[Article by Ewa K. Czaczkowska: "A Parting of Ways"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Issues pertaining to the ratification of the Concordat have an impact not only on church-state relations, but also on the internal situation in the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]. And they show more clearly now that the interests of the Polish president and the SLD are unraveling. Wishing to be a president of the entire nation, Aleksandr Kwasniewski has agreed to ratify the Concordat and to include a relevant preamble in the constitution, even at the cost of losing the support of a portion of his left-wing electorate.*

Almost the day after he was elected president, Aleksandr Kwasniewski, whose election program comprised anticlerical and antichurch slogans as the most important tenets, changed the tone of his statements and gradually agreed to meet the church halfway. His former party colleagues are beginning to reproach him publicly for this and to remind him of the content of his presidential campaign's slogans, such as adopting a concordat after the constitution, liberalizing the antiabortion law, and making the constitution ideologically neutral. As regards state-church relations, the SLD and the president's ways are gradually parting because something else is at stake in the gambling game between the SLD and the Namiestnikowski [Presidential] Palace. The leftists will stand in the elections as early as next year. They will be the first whom the electorate makes accountable for the Concordat, the antiabortion law, and the constitution. To run the country effectively until the end of his term in office, which he began only recently, and to think of another term in office, the president must establish good relations with the church. He must do so even at the cost of losing a portion of his electorate—determined opponents of the Concordat—in the hope that he will find support of other segments of the electorate. The SLD leaders, however, have the right to be afraid that a portion of the anticlerical and antichurch electorate, dissatisfied with Aleksandr Kwasniewski's policy, who voted for the leftists in 1993 and for the incumbent president in 1995, will express its opinion on the issue in the parliamentary elections as early as next year.

Not Everyone Has the Time To Resolve Issues

Hence, it is not surprising that, when Aleksandr Kwasniewski says that the time has come for the Sejm to adopt a decision on the ratification of the Concordat and that this must be done before the parliament leaves on holiday, the SLD leaders reply that "there are neither technical nor statutory opportunities." Sejm Speaker Jozef Zych also specified June as the time for voting on the agreement with the Vatican, but, after he met with both the president and the prime minister, said that first the Sejm will adopt a decision on the fate of an extraordinary commission that was set up to discuss both the compliance of the Concordat with legislation and a future constitution (which does not imply that during this vote a group of deputies cannot propose an issue to immediately begin the work to ratify this agreement). According to the plans of the same Sejm, this extraordinary commission had to—before late December 1995—assess the compliance of the Concordat with a draft constitution, but if there was no draft constitution, the deputies would have to vote on the Concordat. There was no draft constitution and commission head Zbigniew Siemiatkowski submitted an application to prolong the term of the commission for six months. The six-month time frame is coming to an end, but the Sejm has discussed neither an application nor the Concordat, waiting, according to our lobby interviews, for the results of diplomatic negotiations with the Vatican.

But, when the NIE weekly made public the contents of the letters between the Polish Foreign Ministry [MSZ] and the Holy See regarding the unilateral interpretation supplement to the Concordat drafted by the Polish Government, it became impossible to do anything about the issue. New proposals stopped appearing. Aleksandr Kwasniewski admitted in GLOS WIELKOPOLSKI that "the publication of the letter has made our contacts stiffer." But the letter, as it turned out from its contents, did not introduce anything essentially new. It only envisaged detailed approaches to resolving issues in Concordat-related laws, which the government has not managed to draft so far. But the MSZ statement had to become an important element in political games inside the SLD because it had to assist both SLD "pragmatists" and the president's politicians in convincing hesitant deputies to vote for the ratification [of the Concordat] and to provide them with a sufficiently strong alibi when they are confronted with an anticlerical electorate. At the same time, this letter became a weapon in the hands of those who oppose the ratification of the Concordat. Jerzy Urban admitted in TRYBUNA: "I opposed a prospective adoption of the Concordat by a small majority of votes." The leaders of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP] were forced to make public statements that their stance on the issue has not changed—that is, first the constitution must be adopted and only then comes the Concordat, which, in essence, must be renegotiated. But fears about a possible left-wing split due to the Concordat remained. Deputy Stefan Ceranka from the SLD said in Siedlice on 1 June—ZYCIE WARSAWY wrote about this—that the president "would like to break the spine" of the left-wing deputies when he meets with them in mid-June.

SdRP leaders not only separate themselves from the president's statements, but also challenge a decision by the coalition government addressing church-state relations. After the Cimoszewicz Cabinet adopted a decision to pay salaries to priests teaching religion at schools beginning on 1 January 1997, the top SLD politicians said immediately that this must not be done from the state budget. This is being done according to Jozef Oleksy's election recommendations regarding the need for the SLD to keep aside from the government and resembles the tactics used by Waldemar Pawlak, chairman of the Polish Peasant Party, which is part of the government coalition.

A Compromise in the Preamble

Recent talks between the top church leaders and the president on the Concordat have also led to a rapprochement of their positions on the constitution.

The president mentions the need to meet the church halfway, which certainly will not be accepted by all of his former party colleagues. As Primate Jozef Glemp said in his talk with the Catholic news agency, "The introduction of a preamble could become a compromise." One can also hear more moderate statements by bishops. Bishop Jozef Michalik, chairman of the Episcopate's Commission for Constitutional Issues, who not long ago regarded the draft constitution as nihilistic and totalitarian, said last week: "I would like to resort to a compromise as regards the content of a new constitution, so that all Poles could accept it." Due to the fact that the primate and the president say that the introduction of a preamble is enough to reach an agreement, there are no grounds to believe that the real situation is different. But it could be surprising how the church will accept—judging from statements by its representatives—an incoherent constitution, with a preamble referring to God and unchanged clauses that had been reproached for months by the bishops for being axiological?

Perhaps a preamble is the price for which the church will assess the draft constitution calmly, not urging that it be defeated in the referendum.

Back last year, the bishops did not rule out an opportunity to publish a special, crisis letter to the people regarding the constitution. Bishop Tadeusz Pieronek says now that the church's attitude to the constitution must be limited to a calm assessment. It is not difficult to guess that this change in position is a result of the bishops pondering the results of the presidential elections. "The church cannot impose anything. Anything imposed by the church has no internal value," said Bishop Pieronek in an interview by RZECZPOSPOLITA.

Poland: Auschwitz Supermarket Construction Conflict

WS0506125596 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 5-6 Jun 96 p 2

[Article by "KNYSZ" and Jacek Kalabinski: "Government Versus Shopping Center"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The government opposes the resumption of construction on a supermarket in the vicinity of the Auschwitz concentration camp by the Maja joint venture. Aleksandra Jakubowska, spokesperson of the Polish Government, yesterday warned that law enforcement bodies may even be used as a last resort.

Jakubowska said that the resumption of construction work is arbitrariness on the part of the investor. No circumstances had appeared that would change the negative decision made by the Bielsko-Biala voivode. The Voivodship Administration will try to persuade the investor to quit the construction work; it has administrative methods at its disposal.

Let us recall that in March the Bielsko-Biala voivode suspended the construction of the supermarket conducted by the Maja joint venture due to the fact that it was situated opposite the Auschwitz Museum. Jewish organizations protested against this investment, and the authorities ascertained that it did not comply with the town's development plans. The Maja joint venture resumed work last Monday, claiming that it was in line with the construction law. In particular, the voivode did not keep to the deadlines within which, in accordance with the construction law, he should have made a decision on the fate of the investment.

The Bielsko-Biala Voivodship Administration has a different interpretation: Administrative regulations and not construction regulations should be applied while making a decision on suspending construction work. Therefore, the resumption of work is illegal before the completion of investigatory proceedings, being conducted by the regional administration in Wadowice and authorized by the voivode.

Rabbi Avi Weiss from New York, who is famous for the protest actions held in Auschwitz, yesterday announced that he was going to come to Poland to oppose the construction of the shopping center in the vicinity of the former concentration camp. A statement of the Amcha organization, which is led by Weiss, says: If it is necessary, we will lie down in front of the bulldozers.

Poland: Article Views Conflicts Within SLD

WS0606144396 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 3 Jun 96 p 3

[Article by Eliza Olczyk: "SLD, Which Has So Far Portrayed Itself as a Uniform Team, Is Falling Prey to Internal Conflicts; Together but Separately"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *During a recent meeting of the chiefs of member organizations of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], Jozef Oleksy, chairman of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP], said that, apart from the opposition, there are currently as many as five independent political entities in the political arena—the president, the government, the SLD, the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], and [Finance Minister] Grzegorz Kolodko. He added that, although President Aleksander Kwasniewski and Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz originate from the SLD, that does not have much influence on what they do.*

Jozef Oleksy brought to light what had been pulsating under the SLD's skin for a few months and what SLD politicians had usually denied—internal problems. The SLD, which has so far been portrayed by its leaders as one river comprised of many streams, is increasingly resembling streams that cannot merge into one current.

Since the presidential elections, it has become increasingly clear that Aleksander Kwasniewski and his former colleagues from the club are parting ways. In addition, one cannot but notice that the government, too, makes decisions that do not fully conform to the club's will. Within the club itself, the SdRP's domination is becoming increasingly clear, which does not necessarily please other members. There are many signs indicating that the SLD, which has so far portrayed itself as a uniform team, is falling prey to internal conflicts that are accompanied by problems within the ruling coalition, which is further complicating the situation.

The Chairman's Ambitions

The SLD is becoming a group of solo players. As is usually the case with soloists, every one of them has his own vision of policy, and these visions do not necessarily conform to one another.

Having been compelled to resign from his prime-ministerial post, Jozef Oleksy set it as his goal to strengthen both his position within the SdRP and the entire party. For a few months he has been saying that he is going to change the image of the Social Democracy and transform it into a modern European party that will be open to vast numbers of voters. He visits virtually all of the regional conventions of the SdRP.

During the convention held in Bialystok in March, Oleksy said that the party should become open to Christian left-wingers (though he emphasized that this was merely an idea needing discussion) because millions of Catholics also vote for the left wing. He also noted that next year the SdRP should present its program to society "through the prism of a housewife, the street, young people, and women."

At the convention held in Poznan in April, the SdRP chairman said that the left wing should speak about patriotism because there is no reason to give the right wing an exclusive right to national traditions and symbols. In the opinion of Oleksy, it is time to take out the label of a programmatically atheistic party of the SdRP, which it inherited from the Polish United Workers Party. At the same time, the party chairman added that the SdRP's laicism and attitude toward the church had not changed: The postulates concerning the church's separation from the state and the right to abortion remain.

During the convention held in Ciechanow in May, Jozef Oleksy emphasized that the party's stance on the Concordat had not changed—first the constitution, and then the Concordat. He also spoke about the need to create a new image of the party in which ideology would be replaced by a package of universal values characteristic of a social democratic party.

In the opinion of Oleksy, justice should be the party's main guideline. Its program should contain the element of social democratic humanism and emphasize the party's European nature.

In Zamosc, Oleksy dwelt on a program for the countryside, the implementation of which should ensure a good life for its residents. One of the components of this program would be to invigorate the activities of cooperatives.

"The Polish countryside should not be owned by one political party. There is a very strong left-wing electorate in the countryside," said Oleksy, and simultaneously criticized the government for an impasse with regard to the state's regional policy and the country's new administrative division. In his opinion, because of the lack of such a policy, local communities have missed their chances to develop.

To put it briefly, Jozef Oleksy is evidently going to fundamentally rebuild the party and create a formation that would be able to considerably enlarge its ranks without losing the current electorate, even though such actions might be risky.

Evidently, the final goal of these actions is to strengthen the party so much that the voice of the Social Democracy becomes decisive, even though this goal remains in the shadow. This can be confirmed by the aforementioned conference of the leaders of the Alliance's members, during which it was said that it was time to stop admitting small organizations into the Alliance and switch tactics from quantity to quality.

Tadeusz Iwinski's statement for GAZETA WYBORCZA, who argued that, in the future, activists of the All-Polish Trade Unions Agreement [OPZZ] (currently the strongest SLD faction along with the SdRP) should vie for seats in the Sejm from a party list, and not a union list, was another sign.

The Troublesome Government

In an interview with PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY, SdRP Secretary General Jerzy Szmajdzinski bet on the party's egalitarianism.

"We must say what the greatest challenge for us is," he said. "In my opinion, this should be the striving of all state structures to reduce the disproportions between the rich and the poor by increasing the value of labor and appropriate remuneration for it. We should negate egalitarianism based on privileges, wealth, and power."

SdRP politicians are being "prevented" from developing this program by their own government headed by Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, who for some reason does not understand the slogans voiced by politicians. Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz, another soloist in the SLD, has always been taking his own roads, and, although he became the prime minister of the coalition government, he is obviously not going to change this. For example, the government is supporting Deputy Prime Minister Grzegorz Kolodko's proposals concerning taxes, even though SLD members turn up their noses at them.

The government is also "preventing" OPZZ and ZNP [Association of Polish Teachers] activists, who had to protest the government's policy toward employees of the budget sector, particularly health care and education employees, from gaining popularity and a parliamentary mandate. It came to a situation in which the ZNP led education employees' protests against the government. Does it not ring a bell?

The government cannot cope with crime and urged the SdRP to issue a resolution on organizing public protests against growing crime.

From the resolution adopted by the SdRP Supreme Council Presidium, one learns that, facing growing crime, the SdRP supports and will help create a public protest movement against violence. The resolution obliged SdRP parliament members and aldermen to uphold actions by appropriate state authorities and party members to help create and support all kinds of local public initiatives aimed at preventing and curbing crime. Such a resolution is more suitable for the opposition than a ruling party. Incidentally, it has provoked caustic remarks by opposition groups, which say that the ruling party is only able to protest against crime but is unable to do anything to improve the situation.

It is not strange that the government is more and more openly criticized by its own party. At the latest meeting of SLD leaders, Jozef Oleksy allegedly said that pressure should be exerted on the government to implement the SLD's proposals.

Aleksander Kwasniewski is not sparing criticism of the government, either. During the All-Polish Conference of Presidents, Mayors, and Village Administrators held in Poznan, he criticized the government administration, arguing that the state is not well organized, the administration is expensive and inefficient, central administration prevails, citizens are confused with procedures, and undefined powers contribute to corruption. He also stated that new public administration centers should soon open in the regions and take over a part of the government's powers.

The President of All Poles

Aleksander Kwasniewski, the Alliance's main solo player (though formally he is no longer connected with either the SLD or the SdRP) is evidently going to become a president of all Poles, in accordance with his promises from the election campaign. Because of this alone, he is separating himself from the SLD.

Since he assumed the presidential office, he has not found time to meet with his former club and party.

In an interview with PRZEGLAD TYGODNIOWY early this May, Jerzy Szmajdzinski, chairman of the SLD club, said that the president was looking for an appropriate date, and such a meeting would probably be held soon. He also emphasized that, during the past few months, SdRP politicians and government members had not had any problems getting in touch with the president with regard to concrete issues. However, Kwasniewski's stance is causing embitterment among many members of the Social Democracy, which is being amplified by Kwasniewski's well-remembered statement that he is going to be nonpartisan forever.

The issue of the Concordat is the most vivid example confirming that the president and his former colleagues have parted ways. In an interview with TRYBUNA on 30 April, to a question about his attitude toward the Concordat, Aleksander Kwasniewski replied that there were different opinions on this issue within the SLD itself, ranging from very uncompromising ones to more moderate ones, which he himself advocates.

"My stance is invariable," Kwasniewski said. "I think we should search for solutions that will not lead Poland into a conflict between the state and the church at the end of the 20th century. (...) The problem lies in the fact that formally the Concordat has already been signed by the Polish authorities, and the parliament should determine whether it is for ratifying it or not. If it proves that it is possible to clarify doubts, this must be done publicly, under a raised curtain."

Meanwhile, it has become clear that it is better to resolve such matters in the privacy of offices, and, just as Hanna Suchocka's government, with President Lech Walesa's approval, negotiated an agreement with the Vatican without a public debate three years ago, Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz's government has currently been conducting confidential talks on a declaration concerning the Concordat, with the approval and support of President Aleksander Kwasniewski.

Three years ago, the SLD made the issue of the Concordat a leitmotif of its election campaign, the main argument being that it had been negotiated in secrecy and that such behavior was inadmissible. Prime Minister Cimoszewicz is currently publicly regretting that correspondence about the declaration on the Concordat has been brought to light. Of course, the SLD is in a favorable situation because other parties will not criticize it for ratifying the Concordat (perhaps except for the Union of Labor, which is insisting on precise laws regulating the Concordat).

Nobody knows, however, what the voters—who are very sensitive to the issue of ratifying the Concordat also because of the campaign conducted by the SLD—will say about this. All of this must certainly worry SLD members in light of the coming parliamentary elections. These concerns have been mirrored on the pages of the NIE weekly, which actively exhorted its voters to vote for Aleksander Kwasniewski during the presidential elections six months ago.

However, NIE has recently mercilessly attacked the president. We could read in an editorial that "Kwasniewski is preparing an electoral fiasco for the Alliance, whose chief he once was. We have learned that methods of winning over deputies from the SLD club are already being planned so that they vote for the Concordat. The recalcitrant are to hear the following: Either you support it or you will not find your name on the election list next year."

The weekly clearly sets the president's interests against those of the SLD club, proving that they are at variance with one another. In the same issue, the weekly published enigmatic material containing, as the author himself said, threats and insinuations addressed to an unidentified top individual from the SLD. In the opinion of the author, the individual gives priority to servility to the United States over the internal interests of the SLD.

Appetite for Power

The president has revealed another one of his features—an appetite for power. During a meeting of the National Assembly Constitutional Commission, an attempt to extend the president's powers with regard to state defense and security in a new constitution was made.

This time, SLD representatives, who would usually actively support Aleksander Kwasniewski's ideas, kept conspicuously silent, which was as meaningful as open criticism. Another interesting incident occurred at a Constitutional Commission meeting, during which regulations concerning possibilities of changing the new constitution were discussed. One of the regulations envisioned that the right to come forward with an initiative to change the constitution would be granted either to 140 members of parliament or to the president. SLD Deputy Grodzicki asked whether the right to come forward with an initiative did not mean overly broad powers of the president with regard to this issue. In response, he was told by a presidential representative that a president elected in a popular vote equals 140 parliament members. It was a dialogue from the era when Lech Walesa was president and Aleksander Kwasniewski the Constitutional Commission chairman.

Aleksander Kwasniewski's appetite for power has led to a situation in which even TRYBUNA has recently dared to timidly criticize him. The author asked whether certain things are seen differently from the presidential chair, given that President Kwasniewski is demanding more powers for himself than Chairman Kwasniewski once allocated for this office, while conducting the work of the National Assembly Constitutional Commission.

It is thus becoming increasingly clear that Aleksander Kwasniewski not only gave up his party ticket, but is also decisively conducting a policy that does not need to be favorable for the SLD. As it is, the president has more than four years until the next elections, while the Alliance will have to fight for parliamentary seats as early as next year. What could become Kwasniewski's success, for example, the ratification of the Concordat, does not have to be good for his former club.

The president would also like to attain more power than he was willing to give to his predecessor, and he can do this only at the expense of the government and the parliament—that is, at the expense of his former colleagues from the club.

Poland: Miller on Coalition, Reforms, Opposition

WS0406101096 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 30 May 96 p 4

[Interview with Leszek Miller, chief of the Council of Ministers Office, URM, by Blazej Toranski; place and date not given: "The PSL Is Not the Opposition"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Toranski] Do you agree with the opinion that the PSL [Polish Peasant Party] is an opposition party?

[Miller] If it were an opposition party, it would have to withdraw all of its members from the government. Curiously, PSL ministers do not voice opinions suggesting that the coalition no longer exists. Such views are popularized primarily by [PSL] local activists and leaders who are not in the government. Despite the fact that we are entering an election race, the coalition will survive.

[Toranski] Yet this coalition marriage has never before engaged in brawls similar to the ones that happened just recently. Adam Struzik even threatened in Lublin that the SLD [Democratic Left Alliance] might have to rule all by itself. While on a visit to Gizycko, [PSL leader] Waldemar Pawlak said that the PSL wants other taxes than the ones set by the government. Is this purely preelection rhetoric?

[Miller] It seems to me that this is preelection rhetoric aimed at securing a victory in the elections. However, this tactic appears to be erroneous because it has already been used by Waldemar Pawlak in the presidential elections. He distanced himself from the government and coalition, which proved to be ineffective and, even worse, could have been a reason for his subsequent defeat.

[Toranski] Nevertheless, you warned your coalition partner that 100 leading PSL officials might lose their positions.

[Miller] I try to be consistent in everything I do. If the PSL wants to leave the coalition, it should take along all of its ministers and voivodes [voivodship leaders].

[Toranski] It seems, however, that everything divides you—the Concordat, reform of central government, sales of real estate to foreigners, death penalty, powiats [smallest administrative units according to proposed self-government reform]—while only positions and money keep you together.

[Miller] Not everything divides us. Speaking about powiats, there are also SLD members who oppose them. They are mostly deputies from towns in small voivodships who feel threatened by the reform. You can find internal divisions also in other areas. Still, most of the program tasks that we included in the declaration when creating our coalition are being carried out successfully. I do not see any reason to break the alliance that we set up three years ago. After the parliamentary elections, we will make a new decision.

[Toranski] According to Jerzy Hausner, URM's general director, the coalition is "paralyzed and incapable of governing efficiently."

[Miller] I am surprised that Jerzy Hausner, head of Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko's advisers, has not resigned by now. If I thought the coalition had exhausted its capabilities and was an obstacle frustrating further development, I would resign.

[Toranski] Will we see the "second push" [two preceding words rendered in English], akin to the Balcerowicz and self-government reforms, this year?

[Miller] Many bills prepared by the government are stuck in the Sejm for a long time. For example, the program of health-care reform has been there for several months, while the [legislative health care] commission is working on it very slowly. The bill on state civil service was sent to parliament 15 months ago, and it was not until recently that work on it was expedited. Fortunately, work on the reform of the administrative and economic central institutions is proceeding very efficiently.

[Toranski] Why does it take so long? Is the Sejm as overburdened with work as the courts?

[Miller] This may be because of our legal culture, or maybe we try to regulate too many things by legislative acts. You cannot "remake" it.

[Toranski] Let me repeat, then: What reforms should we expect within this year and until the end of the SLD-PSL rule?

[Miller] Definitely, health-care and social insurance reforms, as well as a reform of central administrative and economic institutions, which will profoundly change the structure of the Council of Ministers.

[Toranski] This last reform is earning you quite a few enemies in your own administration.

[Miller] Any reform combining or dividing some structures elicits a feeling of endangerment. This one, too, will be unpleasant for many people. But you cannot avoid it. This must be done despite all fears.

[Toranski] The reform of the central government strengthens the position of prime minister and voivodes. But, without large region-voivodships [regiony-wojewodztwa], it makes no sense.

[Miller] At the recent Council of Ministers meeting, we discussed amendments to the constitution that could strengthen the position of prime minister so that he could define the powers of his ministers. The Legislative Council criticized that proposal and advised the renunciation of this idea altogether. In my opinion, this should be implemented to make the government's structure flexible. Voivodes, too, should have more powers. And we will certainly create—although I do not know when—large voivodships. Voivodes will have a strong position, if only to guarantee the state's territorial integrity and oppose the proautonomy tendencies shown by large regions.

[Toranski] This, however, cannot be done by the present coalition, a fact that you understand perfectly.

[Miller] Until now, it has been a difficult task for all previous coalitions. Let me recall that, in 1993, when Professor Kulesza drafted the concept of powiats and large voivodships, [former Prime Minister] Hanna Suchocka suspended its implementation because parliamentary elections were close at hand.

[Toranski] You recently announced plans to lay the foundation of government civil service that would be immune to political turmoils. But in Poland changes at the helm of government have always triggered personnel reshuffles in ministries and voivodship administrations.

[Miller] Ministers and voivodes, as well as their deputies, will occupy political positions. Meanwhile, the civil service will cover lower positions. The highest government civil service official at the voivode level will be a director of the voivodship administration. This position will be contended by various candidates. Only a candidate who proves his high qualifications will be selected to hold it. In this case, he will be independent from voivodes and their deputies, who may change. This director and his colleagues will stabilize the civil servants' corps. Voivodes cannot be included in the civil service sphere because they are the government's ambassadors in the field. If a government changes, the ambassador should be replaced as well.

[Toranski] Can an ambassador not be a professional?

[Miller] Yes, he can. But, because he is appointed by the government, he should be prepared to resign along with the government, unless the next prime minister wants to keep him in his position.

[Toranski] What did you, once an altar boy, feel when you heard the recent statement by John Paul II about the deliberate atheization of Poland?

[Miller] I believe that the pope's words do not correspond with the sentiments of millions of Poles, a large group of whom are Catholics. I do not think the citizens feel they are subjected to deliberate atheization.

[Toranski] Then why is there no place for God in the constitution?

[Miller] Because the constitution should be the confirmation of a religiously neutral state, a state based on principles that were laid down a long time ago in Western Europe.

[Toranski] Do you feel a diabolic satisfaction and inner contentment over the fact that the political right is still not able to unite?

[Miller] Every once in a while I ask myself whether the Polish rightists can unite and the leftists become divided. A typical trait of Polish rightists is their subjugation to ideology. What is more, right-wing politicians have a moral attitude compelling them to believe that they are always right. Anyone standing just a little further from them (even if still in the same camp) is denied this privilege. This is the prime thing that impairs all integration processes.

[Toranski] What ideas would you, a left-wing politician, propose to unite the right wing?

[Miller] In my opinion, the rightists could unite in two cases. First, if a charismatic leader appears in their ranks. Such a person is nowhere to be seen right now and will probably not appear. Second, integration could be achieved in the face of a common enemy. The SLD is such an enemy for the right-wingers, but they see enemies in their own camp as well. As long as right-wing politicians are unable to cast away the burden of ideology and give up their theatrical postures and gestures, they will remain defeated and weak.

[Toranski] And will you be ruling for the next 10 years?

[Miller] For the next 10 years, Aleksander Kwasniewski will surely be president. I am convinced that he will win reelection. As for the SLD, we will see. Until now, it was easy because, while in the opposition, you can go much further, engaging in flamboyant rhetoric and having no responsibility for your words. From now on, the test will be tougher. However, inasmuch as we have maintained a strong position in all popularity rankings for the past three years, I look at the [parliamentary] elections scheduled for next year with optimism.

Poland: Chief of General Staff Wilecki Profiled

WS0506075096 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 27 May 96 pp 16-18

[Article by Pawel Wronski: "The General Who Would Not Bow to Ministers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Who needs General Tadeusz Wilecki as chief of General Staff today? Aleksander Kwasniewski does—in his desire to be president of all the Polish people, including the general. Wilecki will, however, remain chief of only the vestiges of the General Staff's recent position.

Speaking in Warsaw at Polish Army Day celebrations on 15 August last year, Gen. Wilecki scolded politicians and the press, since "in the information din created by some groups of politicizers and amenable media, every call to reason is lost." Every pretext is good enough to strike at the Armed Forces."

Standing next to the chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army were [then] President Walesa and Prime Minister Oleksy, with the minister of national defense in the background. Gen. Wilecki ought to save a picture of the ceremony as a souvenir. He was the second-ranking person in the state at the time. The Army's autonomy under his command was almost equal to what it enjoyed under the Second Polish Republic [1918-39].

An Unwanted Man?

That was barely 10 months ago. What is Wilecki's place on the Polish political scene today? One has the impression that, after the defeat in the presidential election of Lech Walesa, with whom he was closely associated, Wilecki seems to somewhat resemble the title character in Lermontov's *The Hero of our Times*—an unwanted man. There are few politicians who would want to put up a fight for him. Yet there is a long list of people who have worked with the general and would rather have nothing to do with him.

In 1992, President Walesa first took notice of Wilecki, then commander of the Silesian Army Group. Jerzy Milewski, head of the presidential National Security Office, established contact with the general on instructions from Walesa. It was Milewski who suggested Wilecki's appointment to the position of chief of the General Staff. "I perceived him as an efficient officer, an independent-minded man," Milewski later recalled. Yet the official explanation supplied by Defense Minister Zbigniew Okonski for Milewski's departure last year from the position of deputy defense minister were statements he had made in an interview for WPROST magazine. In the interview, Milewski expressed doubt whether there was civilian control of the Army in Poland and suggested that this principle had been violated by Wilecki. He says today that the general lacks the psychological disposition to perform the functions of chief of General Staff.

The second person instrumental in Wilecki's promotion was Janusz Onyszkiewicz, the defense minister in [Prime Minister Hanna] Suchocka's Cabinet. It was Onyszkiewicz who presented Wilecki to the president in August 1992 for appointment to the post of chief of the General Staff. A year later, during the campaign preceding parliamentary elections, he had to bear dozens of slights from the general because of his refusal to allow campaigning by Army staff on behalf of the Non-Party Bloc in Support of Reforms (BBWR), backed by Walesa.

Danuta Waniek, the present Chief of the Presidential Chancellery and former deputy minister of defense under [Prime Ministers] Pawlak and Oleksy, is yet another person whose experience with Wilecki has been bad. In the early days of her career at the Ministry of National Defense, Gen. Wilecki kept her waiting at the gate to General Staff Headquarters before she was admitted. He has recently been quoted as saying in reference to Danuta Waniek that he is "not fond of warm widows."

To the Left Democratic Alliance [SLD], Wilecki is a symbol of all the harm done to the Army by the former president. Keeping the general in his position of chief of the General Staff may prove advantageous to Kwasniewski, the SLD leader until recently, serving as a political alibi of sorts. Kwasniewski would then be able to publicly declare: Look gentlemen, I can work with anybody, even Wilecki.

The Toothless General

The case of Gen. Wilecki, however, cannot be confined to personal details only. Wilecki projected a vision of independent management of military affairs. His ability to carry out this concept attests not only to his strength of character but also to the deep crisis in the administration of the national defense system.

Two ministers of defense proved powerless with regard to the general—Onyszkiewicz and his successor, Piotr Kolodziejczyk. In Drawsko in September 1994, high-ranking generals led by Wilecki voted in Walesa's presence to have Kolodzieczyk dismissed. The Sejm was powerless to stop Kolodziejczyk's downfall.

Walesa was at a loss, as well. The Sejm rejected presidential bills calling for such measures as subordination of the chief of the General Staff to the president. The general came out victorious each time, securing independence for the Army and almost complete autonomy for himself under the presidential umbrella.

President Kwasniewski wants to show that every president has the Wilecki he deserves. His first and most important decision on defense issues to date was to withdraw the law on the minister of national defense from the State Tribunal that had earlier been appealed by President Walesa and to sign it, despite the formal errors it contained.

Constraints on Wilecki

This law, initiated by Janusz Onyszkiewicz, became effective on 14 February of this year. It was designed to limit the power of the chief of General Staff. It places Wilecki in a role where to retain his position he himself must dissolve the empire he created over the past few years.

Wilecki has, until now, taken advantage of loopholes in regulations and of decisions made by the commission chaired by Krzysztof Zabinski, head of the Office of the Council of Ministers in Bielecki's government. The commission recommended in 1991 the separation of the civilian-military part of the Ministry of National Defense from the military-General Staff part. The aim was to put a limit on the influence of "top notch" post-communist ministerial officials in the Army. Poland's access to NATO had not yet been planned at this juncture. It would have required civilian control over the Army—that is, full supervision over the Armed Forces from politicians (while retaining the Army's autonomy on issues of command).

Wilecki made sure civilian influence in the General Staff was reduced to a minimum. He established structures in the General Staff to copy those in the ministry. He said time and again that the times of political commissars had ended, and at official ceremonies or talks would obsessively stress the importance of the office of the chief of the General Staff. His belief in the appropriateness of his actions was reinforced by Walesa himself, known to have often repeated that "civilians are good for nothing."

Conflict Within the Commission

The time has now come to refashion the structures of the Ministry of Defense and General Staff to have them conform to NATO standards and to create a modern system of command for national defense. Is Wilecki the right chief of the General Staff for Kwasniewski and Stanislaw Dobrzanski, PSL's [the Polish Peasant Party's] minister of defense—in this period of reform?

One of Dobrzanski's first steps was to close down the General Staff's financial department. "I am sorry this has happened," Wilecki remarked in a composed and diplomatic tone. His tone was less diplomatic and not as composed when he unofficially spoke of the decision.

This February, the Ministry of National Defense took over Army Information Services, previously subordinated to the General Staff. This step was accompanied by Dobrzanski's decision to recall General Konstanty Malejczyk, a close associate of Wilecki. He was replaced by Colonel Kazimierz Glowacki, a person formerly associated with Kolodziejczyk and despised in the General Staff.

"The Army Information Services are the eyes and ears of the Army. They are to serve its needs and not spy on its officers," Wilecki declared in the spring of 1995. "The new law says I am to command the Army, so I must have the proper instruments," he advocated this spring.

The general has been wary of acting openly and tries to speak in a safe and smooth Aesopian style. He is also skillful at behind-closed-doors political infighting.

The activities of the commission headed by the deputy minister of defense, Andrzej Karkoszka, have been an accurate indication of the scale of Gen. Wilecki's concessions. The commission is composed of both civilians and representatives of the General Staff. Its task is to devise a model of the status of the ministry and of the structure of the ministry and General Staff in the future.

Conflict is written into the very makeup of the commission. The General Staff and ministry are gigantic structures at present, with the General Staff currently employing approximately 1,800 employees and the ministry employing approximately 1,400 (most of whom are uniformed employees). Almost a quarter of Polish generals do not serve their country in the field but behind a desk at headquarters. Poland continues to have 480 job positions for generals, more than the Bundeswehr.

The ministry is forcing the creation of separate commands for sea, air, and ground forces, thereby reducing the role of the General Staff to no more than a planning unit and mobilization organizer.

The commission was to have completed its work in March, but, to quote Dobrzanski, "important new issues are constantly coming up." The reason is that the General Staff has attempted to halt the progress of work in the commission through its representatives. (As we have unofficially learned, Deputy Minister Karkoszka has threatened to quit if these practices continue.) Although Wilecki has made concessions, he is still trying to preserve as much power as possible. Nevertheless, when decisions are made, he will have to carry them out. After all, as he noted himself: He is a soldier, not a politician, and will follow orders.

The Unsinkable General

Though the general is playing with plain cards, he is trying to win a grand slam. He knows well that, despite pressure from his associates, Kwasniewski will find it difficult to relieve him.

The situation seemed somewhat different last December. Officers from the General Staff were red with anger after reading an interview with the new president in POLSKA ZBROJNA, the Polish Army daily. Kwasniewski said that persons responsible for politicizing the Army should bear the consequences of such actions. Army personnel reckoned their chief's fate had already been doomed, it seems. Wilecki then turned ill and disappeared from the scene. The press openly speculated about who could be his successor. POLSKA ZBROJNA printed medical reports to counter presumptions his illness was of a diplomatic nature.

There was much evidence to show Wilecki's involvement in politics. The lunch in Drawsko or the campaign on behalf of the BBWR, to cite just two examples. The general could not simply hand in his resignation because he would confirm the charges made. A recent statement from Danuta Waniek—that Wilecki does not elicit trust because his ties to Walesa are "too close and ostentatious"—has worked to his advantage. Wilecki's prompt discharge might be seen as political gang warfare. Kwasniewski has to tone down the statements made by his associates to avoid being held hostage by their dislikes.

The General: Always the President's Man

Gen. Wilecki is now beginning to occupy a meaningful role in Kwasniewski's political and constitutional concepts. Kwasniewski does not intend to relinquish the existing presidential prerogatives providing for his supervision of national defense matters. On 21 May, during a meeting of the constitutional commission, his representatives presented the concept of a National Defense Committee, which would act as a "supergovernment" in times of crisis. He has at the same time declared that the Army should be apolitical.

From the very begining of his term, Kwasniewski has tried to project himself as a man of compromise. His openness on defense issues is meant to be symbolized by such initiatives as the National Defense Committee, the highest ranking advisory body to the president, whose members are to include representatives from both the coalition and the opposition. The idea seemed simple at first, especially because of the consensus on national security affairs from all parliamentary groups. Yet, in a situation where most opposition members have refused to join the committee, Wilecki may appear as one of the few persons from outside the coalition group willing to become a member of the committee.

"Keeping Wilecki in the position of chief of the General Staff ought to send a message to the opposition that the president is mindful of opinions other than those formulated by his own entourage," one of Kwasniewski's advisers explained. On the other hand, Wilecki has spoiled his image of an independent, apolitical officer by making a servile statement equivalent to "The king is dead, long live the king!" in a public appearance shortly after the elections.

The president has continued the pro-NATO policies of his predecessor. "Wilecki has tried by every means to prove to the president how good his contacts with NATO are. Perhaps Kwasniewski has believed him?," a high-ranking Ministry of Defense official wonders aloud.

The truth is somewhat different. NATO politicians, without even attempting the least hypocrisy, have expressed their satisfaction that the dispute in Poland over civilian control in the Army has ended with Walesa's departure. The fact that Wilecki remained in his position was received in Brussels with even a little surprise.

When the Oleksy affair broke out, Kwasniewski was afraid of war on several fronts. The expulsion of Wilecki, who at the time was the commander in chief of the Army Information Services engaged in the inquiry into the case of the former prime minister, would clearly be understood as an attempt to remove an inconvenient person. Gen. Malejczyk's statement after he was discharged from his position of chief of Army Information Services, in which he claimed that the decision was politically motivated and related to the Oleksy case, confirms the validity of Kwasniewski's misgivings. By keeping Wilecki in his position, the president ensured himself a degree of relative calm.

Kwasniewski is also afraid of unrest in the Army. During the election campaign, rumors were heard that, if an SLD candidate were to win, disability pensions, Army retirement pensions, and allowances at discharge from service would be lowered, and mass terminations could be expected. The uncertainty has remained. The very frequent presence of the president at meetings with Army staff and soldiers lately are meant to persuade career soldiers that there is no such threat.

What is more, if Kwasniewski were to discharge Wilecki, he would have to enter into conflict with the Polish Peasant Party, the coalition partner that has offered the general its support.

The PSL Alliance

In the past few years, the Ministry of Defense has several times been the object of political bargaining. SLD parliament members even discreetly conceded recently that the ministerial appointment of Stanislaw Dobrzanski was tied to PSL's support for Jerzy Jaskiernia, the recent SLD minister of justice, when the opposition demanded his dismissal. The defense sector is very much within the PSL's scope of interest.

"Today, just as centuries ago, the Army is made up of peasant sons," Leszek Bugaj, the PSL deputy chairman of the parliamentary national defense commission, told us.

The PSL's concern for the well-being of soldiers is based not only on the traditional [battleflag] motto [referring to peasants conscripted as soldiers]: "They nourish and they defend." For the past few years, Gen. Wilecki and Waldemar Pawlak, the PSL leader, have enjoyed a quiet friendship tightened by joint hunting excursions.

Immediately after the Drawsko affair broke out, Pawlak began top-secret consultations with representatives of the General Staff. Later, after the Drawsko affair had been aired, he fired Minister Kolodziejczyk from his post, despite widespread consternation, despite the position taken by the SLD and the recommendation of the Sejm extraordinary commission that he be asked to stay. What more ostentatious support could Wilecki ask?

It is no surprise that the heads of General Staff are clamoring for PSL support. As reported by the Press Office of the Sejm on 2 May—Gen. Wilecki, accompanied by his closest aides, paid a visit to the PSL speaker of the Sejm, Jozef Zych. From sources in the General Staff we have learned that he asked for Zych's support in talks with the president and the SLD, whose parliamentary deputies are hostile toward the General Staff.

According to the provisional constitution [the so-called small constitution], the motion for discharging the chief of the General Staff must be submitted by the minister of defense. Thus, formally, Wilecki's future is in equal measure in the hands of both Kwasniewski and Dobrzanski.

The Dispute Over Who Will Run the Show

The argument in favor of Wilecki has until now been founded on the belief that he is immensely popular among Polish Army staff. Officers from the General Staff have pointed out the general's immense professionalism. Every criticism of his actions was perceived as a blow directed against the prestige of the Army and as "destruction of the commanders' authority." These same officers are now expressing concern not over who their chief of General Staff will be, but whether a change in this position will impact the financial situation of the Army and whether the SLD will begin a war over who will run the show in the Army. Generally speaking, the Army has had enough of politics.

"We are getting kicked in the back because Gen. Wilecki has been too close to president Walesa" one general told us just a few weeks after Kwasniewski's [election] victory.

On the other hand, according to high-ranking officers, SLD politicians and their supporters within the Army may attempt to influence the ideological image of the Army. One of the postulates of the Karkoszka commission is the elimination of the Instruction Department in the General Staff. "The idea is to have the same people responsible for instructing soldiers as those who in the People's Republic of Poland worked in the Army's Chief Political Section," they explain.

The officer corps makes quiet mention of the fact that President Walesa and Gen. Wilecki did not allow screening procedures in the Polish Army to start as announced in 1992 by [Defense] Ministers Jan Parys and Romuald Szeremietew from [Prime Minister Jan] Olszowski's cabinet. (In Czechoslovakia, almost all the generals had to resign; the entire staff went through a severe screening procedure. In united Germany, 90 percent of the officers from former East Germany did not meet Bundeswehr requirements.) Instead of rapid personnel changes in our Army, a hasty transformation of consciences took place.

Busts of such patrons of military units as Swierczewski and Berling were replaced by those of Marshals Pilsudski and Rydz-Smigly. The generals, led by Wilecki, hastened to church to legalize their civilian marriages and wrote "prayer books." The chief of General Staff readily referred to national tradition and profusely quoted Pilsudski.

This sudden change of costume brought a pitying smile from outside observers. Voices were heard saying that the Office of the Ordinary of the Army [the bishop chaplain] had become the new Chief Political Section and that the Bishop Chaplain Slawoj Leszek Glodz codecides promotions of generals.

Perhaps the reason the combat readiness and professional training of the Polish Army is better than in other countries wishing to join NATO is because the Army staff was allowed to stay.

Until recently, officers either tacitly or openly ridiculed Army chaplains and the head chaplain. Yet today, they have paradoxically become aware that the manner in which the Army ordinary is treated is a measure of the intentions of the new president toward the Army. It will be a measure of the degree to which Kwasniewski's team has accepted transformations of conscience in the Army.

Bishop [Chaplain] Glodz is himself seeking a platform of agreement with the president. Last December he announced that prayers must also be said for the new commander in chief of the Armed Forces and invited Kwasniewski for an evening of Christmas carols at the Army chaplains' cathedral in Warsaw. Members of the clergy administering rites in the chapel of the presidential palace are also under the bishop's care.

The General Will Not Be Needed Long

When will the president have no use for the general? Basically, when the Oleksy affair has finally been resolved and the reform of the General Staff and ministry is completed. Perhaps it is true that, as Kwasniewski said in the beginning of May, there will be no drastic personnel changes in the Army in the coming weeks or months.

The staff at the presidential palace and SLD deputies will be urging the president to recall Wilecki. Their calculations are cool-headed: parliamentary elections are slowly approaching; in case of a right-wing victory, the chief of General Staff will find support in a right-wing minister of defense.

The question of whether Wilecki's continued presence will not draw the votes of career officers' away from the SLD is a far more important consideration. During the last presidential elections, the SLD had its observers at polling stations where career soldiers and their families voted. The SLD estimates indicate that a majority chose Kwasniewski. These were not only votes against the existing commander in chief of the Army—Lech Walesa—but also, indirectly, against Gen. Wilecki.

Professional soldiers and their families and the civilian staff in the Army are a large and disciplined electorate. Their overriding desire is for an end to the row over the Army associated with the general who would not bow to ministers. They will soon ask the president, whose roots are with SLD: What has changed?

[On 3 June the POLSKA ZBROJNA military daily carried on page 3 a 2,000-word article by Colonel Tadeusz Mitek entitled "Ruthless Attack" in response to the above item. "The entire text," writes Mitek, "is a full-blown personal attack. It is replete with errors and premeditated misstatements, farfetched interpretations, and sheer innuendo." Having given an extensive list of examples in support of the above, the daily goes on to state: "Without seeking any likely intentions, the GAZETA WYBORCZA text has to be viewed as outlandish and highly irresponsible, albeit probably congruent with the ideological line pursued by the paper. By failing to professionally assess the real achievements of the chief of General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces and his competence as a commander and leader, the daily is drawing the general into a ploy for reasons it alone fathoms. This is highly detrimental to state defense and to the domestic and international image of the Polish Armed Forces. It is by no means the first of such attacks launched by GAZETA WYBORCZA."]

Romania: Vacaroiu Suggests 3 Nov Date for General Elections

AU0506182596 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1700 GMT 5 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A meeting is currently taking place at Victoria Palace between the government leadership and the leaders and representatives of all parliamentary political parties. At the start of the meeting, Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu suggested that they discuss the amendments to the law on general elections and the format of the list with signatures required for the candidatures to the country's presidency. The prime minister also suggested that the general elections should be held on 3 November, so as to better correlate the general elections with the Law on Political Parties.

Romania: Returns Reported for Mayoral Seats in 24 Counties

AU0606204496 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1900 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Central Electoral Bureau [BEC] continues the operation of centralizing the nationwide returns of the 2 June local elections. The final results will be known probably tomorrow.

Herewith we list the number of elected mayors and the political parties to which they belong, in 24 counties:

Arad County: PDSR [Party of Social Democracy of Romania], eight; Independents, five; PDAR [Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania], three; CDR [Democratic Convention of Romania], two; USD [Social-Democratic Union], two; UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania], two mayors.

Arges County: PDSR, 13; Independents, three; CDR, USD, PRM [Greater Romania Party], PS [Socialist Party], and PDAR, one mayor each.

Bistrita Nasaud County: USD, 10; PUNR [National Unity Party of Romania], five; Independents, two; CDR, two; PDSR, one.

Brasov County: PDSR and CDR, four; USD, three; Independents, three; UDMR, two; PUNR and PL '93 [Liberal Party '93], one mayor each.

Braila County: PDSR, eight; PSM [Socialist Party of Labor], three.

Caras-Severin County: PDSR, 11; CDR, five; Independents, five; USD, three; Union of Croats in Romania, two; and Pensioners' Party obtained one mayoral seat.

Cluj County: PDSR, 10; USD, six; UDMR, six; PUNR, three; CDR, two; Independents, two; PDAR, one.

Covasna County: UDMR, 25; Independents, four; PDSR, two; Social Democratic Alliance of Covasna, two mayoral seats.

Dambovita County: PDSR, 15; CDR, two; Independents, two; USD, PUNR, PS, and PDAR, one mayor each.

Dolj County: PDSR, 17; USD, three; PSM, three; PUNR and CDR, one mayoral seat each.

Gorj County: PDSR, 12; USD, one; PAC [Civic Alliance Party], one; Independents, one.

Mures County: UDMR, 24; PUNR, 11; PDSR, nine; Independent, four; USD, one.

Neamt County: PDSR, 14; USD, six; MER [Ecological Movement of Romania], two; PRM, two; Independent, two; CDR, one.

Satu Mare County: Democratic Front of Germans, five; PDSR, four; UDMR, four; PL '93, three; PSM, two; USD, CDR, and Independent, one mayoral seat each.

Salaj County: UDMR, 13; PUNR, four; CDR, three; PDSR, two; PS, one; New Romania Party, one.

Suceava County: PDSR, 16; USD, five; PSM, one; PDAR, one.

Vaslui County: PDSR, eight; PRM, one; PL '93, one; PSM, one; USD, one.

Valcea County: PDSR, 13; CDR, five; PSM, four; USD, two.

Ialomita County: PDSR, 10; USD, four; CDR, one.

Calarasi County: PDSR, 12; CDR, five; USD and Independent, one each.

Teleorman County: USD, four; PDAR, four; PDSR, one; PAC, PS, and Independent, also one each.

Bacau County: PDSR, 11; Independents, four; USD, PUNR, and PRM, three each; PDAR, two; CDR and PSM, one mayoral seat each.

Maramures County: PDSR, four; Independents, and CDR, three each; PAC and PUNR, two each; USD, one mayor.

Prahova County: PDSR and USD, 10 each; Independent, two; PUNR and PSM, one each.

The number of local councilors elected in 11 counties and the political party to which they belong looks as follows: PDSR 1,860; CDR 1,433; USD 1,291; UDMR 1,222; PUNR 636; PS 488; Independents 475; PDAR 428. Other political formations obtained under 250 mandates each.

Romania: PDSR's Nastase Urges Defense Industry Support

AU0606194596 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 30 May 96 p 1

[ROMPRES report on statement by PDSR Executive President Adrian Nastase in Cugir; date not given: "The Defense Industry Is a Kind of Suitcase That Got Lost at the Airport"]

[FBIS Translated Text] During his electoral campaign tour, Adrian Nastase, executive president of the Party of Social Democracy of Romania [PDSR], also visited the Mechanical Enterprise in Cugir. Adrian Nastase spoke extensively about the prospects of the defense industry:

"The defense industry represents a kind of suitcase that got lost at the airport on the conveyer belt and that nobody came to collect, neither the Ministry of Industries nor the Ministry of National Defense," he said.

"There is no need to destroy our defense industry in order to become a market for Western industrialists. Regardless of our euro-atlantic integration options, the price must not be the destruction of our defense industry. In the future, the Ministry of National Defense should not spend more than 20 percent on imported goods; the rest should be manufactured in our country, which will also preserve jobs."

Romania: Tinca Views Military's Role, Equipment

AU0406124196 Bucharest ZIUA in Romanian 29 May 96 p 3

[Interview with Dumitru Tinca, minister of national defense, by Sorin Rosca Stanescu and Tana Ardeleanu; place and date not given: "There Will Be No Russian Military Invasion"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Many Officers Know the Russian Language

[Stanescu] As minister of defense and head of this institution, do you keep records of the higher-level officers who completed their higher education in Moscow?

[Tinca] No, I keep no such records. If I did, I would expose myself to all kinds of speculation. Everything can be found in the file of each officer, which is available whenever he is promoted, goes abroad, or anything significant happens during his career. Therefore, there are also officers who probably studied in Moscow. Now, some are studying in the United States, Germany, or France. I proceed from the assumption that there is no connection between their spoken language and loyalty; I do not think that the language might affect an officer's loyalty. I keep thinking of Titulescu [Nicolae Titulescu, Romania's foreign minister between the two world wars], who was a great lover of France. But this did not prevent him from becoming the great patriot and diplomat. He contributed to remaking Greater Romania. It would be a simplistic approach to believe that if someone speaks French, Russian, or English, he is bound to side with the French, Russians, or English. Moreover, I believe that you can better serve your country if you can speak foreign languages. I must admit that the Russian language is quite frequently in use. As a matter of fact, it can come in quite handy for those speaking it, because if they do not know any other language, they can find their way about with Russian, too, at the various courses organized by NATO in Germany, where classes are held in English, German, and Russian.

[Ardeleanu] We are now in an electoral year. At such political moments, the longstanding battle between the structures of the former Securitate and the Army is usually resumed. The structures of the former Securitate chide the Army for the fact that it did not eliminate the agents of Soviet military espionage, something that Ceausescu managed to do with those placed in the Securitate.

[Tinca] Several measures were taken to cleanse the Army and defend it against certain vulnerable points related to Russia or political espionage in general. The former Securitate fought against these spies, and it knows that they are still hidden somewhere. I would recommend a wiser approach, if such a thing is possible. Too much time has been wasted on individual aspects, to the detriment of the broader view. The change currently taking place in the Army will clarify things by itself. The democratization and modernization of the Army, the reduction in the number of personnel, the higher education, and the change in mentality will also resolve the battle you were referring to. To do other than that would mean to waste valuable time, which is so needed for implementing the profound changes we have set out to do.

[Stanescu] Regarding our adherence to NATO, is not the fact that there are still people in our structures—and at the level where they will be in contact with the NATO structures—who might act for the Russians considered as a kind of hindrance?

[Tinca] NATO took very strict measures to protect its secrets. This was one of the problems discussed last year. Various procedures and structures were set up to preserve the confidentiality of the data we exchange during our cooperation. As a matter of fact, NATO also cooperates with Russia. This is not only a problem for Romania. The other countries of the former Warsaw

Pact, which currently wish to join NATO, are also faced with the same problem. I dare say that, if this is a problem at all, then it is less so for us than for other countries. We had not sent officers to studies in Moscow after 1969. However, we sent a few after 1990, and we want to continue this practice. The other countries have continued sending their officers for training in Moscow. If this is not a problem for our neighbors, why should it be for us?

The Generation of Those Trained in Moscow Is Somehow Passe in the Romanian Army

[Ardeleanu] Do you choose the people who are in constant contact with NATO from among those trained in Moscow?

[Tinca] Compared to other countries, which have no possibility of making a choice in his respect, since all their officers studied in Moscow, we have the option—should we choose to do so—of selecting from a large number of candidates, since most of them were trained in Romania. But I think that the time of the generation trained in Moscow has somehow passed in the Romanian Army. It is simply a matter of biology.

[Stanescu] At this time, we are neither in NATO nor in the Warsaw Pact. We are in a special situation. What are we going to do if we are attacked? I imagine that we will not be attacked from the West. If a number of Russian dignitaries, both military and civilian, carry out their hysterical threats, how are we going to defend ourselves—by guerrilla warfare?

[Tinca] Moscow has other interests, and in no way will it allow its current situation to be compromised through an external military action. This could unleash a major conflict, which might also mean the end of the world. I believe that we have nothing to fear about a Russian military invasion for many years to come.

[Ardeleanu] Who are our potential enemies?

[Tinca] Threats to us are not tantamount to "military invasion" or "territorial conquest." In the process of consolidation of our society, based on other values, there can be other threats than the ones you mentioned, not necessarily military ones. There is a confused situation in this part of the world. If the security status of Central and East Europe is not assured, the reform processes are bound to proceed with a certain degree of difficulty. NATO integration brings with itself an important certitude, both for the respective countries and for the investors, for instance.

[Stanescu] What is the state of the Romanian Army? Is it stronger now or weaker than in December 1989?

[Tinca] It is stronger than in December 1989, because the Romanian soldier has more time for training than in 1989. He no longer must go to work in the fields, worksites, or mines. He is integrated in a proper training system.

[Ardeleanu] It was not by accident that I asked you about your view of Romania's defense concept. If a country does not figure to be part of the game of the big military alliances, then it might be better for it to choose the solution of rural, urban, or mountain guerrilla training.

[Tinca] Things are slightly more complicated than that. Many people are now wondering, with some regret, why we renounced the concept of all the people's defense. Then each man had a uniform, and we all went to the commons for firing practice and the pretense of defense. The revolution, which lasted for no more than one second in a real war, showed that the dissemination of weapons can lead to unbelievable confusion. Everybody could see what the distribution of weapons led to. In future conflicts, the enemy has weapons and methods which exploit all vulnerable points. You see, you do not first organize an armed defense and then establish a policy, but you should proceed the other way around: You first establish a policy and then you proceed with the army. When you conduct an autarchic policy, close yourself off to the others, and draw a confining line around the country, you have the perception of an omnidirectional enemy. You see enemies all around you. Hence the idea of the "desperation" struggle of the entire people, I think. If you aim at an open policy, then you can see what is going on around you and can project your defense policy with calm and a different approach. One should also take into consideration the political and diplomatic game. One may also have a different view of the Russians, than if we were to behave like hedgehogs.

Russian Armament Is Still the Basic Equipment

[Stanescu] Are we better equipped than in 1989?

[Tinca] This is a good question. If you consider that quantitative elements are relevant for a good supply now and in the future, then I must say that we are worse off now than in the past. However, I believe that the supply level should be judged by the quality of the equipment available. If we do not take adequate steps, the quality of our armament will increasingly become a problem. Since 1969, we have received nothing from the Russians, and they have not stayed put at the 1969 level; they have also evolved in the meantime. It was difficult to obtain something from the West, given the embargo conditions then, but there were several cooperation ventures in helicopters, planes, and so forth with the West. The only solution was to assimilate the technology of the weapons available to us and manufacture weapons ourselves. However, Russian armament—which we assimilated and developed as best we could—is still our basic equipment. In the current conditions, what we produced has been undoubtedly surpassed by the Russians, who have improved in the meantime. Nevertheless, we started certain cooperation programs with Western companies.

[Ardeleanu] What is more profitable: To refurbish our arms industry—here the problem is whether we can receive top technologies right now—or simply to buy sophisticated armaments?

[Tinca] Even if we had money, it would not be wise to simply buy. No way. We must see what the defense industry's needs for the future are. The Arab market—Iraq, Iran, Libya—is no longer available. Even if it were still there, it would no longer buy our produce. Therefore, we should proceed to a restructuring, followed by a retechnologization process. The second problem is whether we are going to get access to the Western technology. I dare venture the opinion that there are no longer obstacles to that. I do not want you to believe that absolutely all technologies are available to us. I also believe that the financial impediment is only half an obstacle. The government has no money, which is pretty obvious. However, it can guarantee financing from abroad. For instance, we have recently acquired five radar stations for our civilian air traffic. They cost more than $100 million. But we did not pay a single cent now. The government guaranteed the necessary loan. There are several other projects which we have started in the same way. If we find other financing possibilities, the government is prepared to guarantee them.

The MiG's Will Stay in the Air While We Have No Attack Helicopters

[Stanescu] A number of MiG planes have crashed recently. Would it not be better for them to be grounded and the Ministry of National Defense to buy other planes?

[Tinca] Talk to the Western experts who will tell you that the aerodynamics of the MiG-21 is one of the best. These MiGs will be reequipped and you will notice the improvement. They will have more electronic gadgets and their performance will increase. There will be practically no big difference between them and the Western planes. This project will cost us $300 million. What do we achieve with these planes? A postponement. We will carry them until the years 2015-20. We have no money to buy new planes. There are other priorities, too. Do you know that we have no attack helicopters? We are entitled to 120.

[Ardeleanu] What about antiaircraft defense? Are there any changes there?

[Tinca] I can guarantee you that something will change. But exactly what depends on many unknown factors. If it were only up to us, the system would be operational within four to five years. But it can happen that we will be delayed from one budget to the other. Therefore, I cannot give you any concrete figures. We did not manage to implement the changes, but the process has started.

[Stanescu] What about the motorized infantry? What are we doing with our tanks?

[Tinca] Thousands of Romanians have worked to manufacture the Romanian tank. If I had been among the constructors, I would be very proud of this achievement. From practically nothing, they have produced a huge tank of 10 metric tons, which can move and fire. But now this tank is no longer quite up to the requirements; it has certain deficiencies. But it can still contribute something: The people who worked on it know how to manufacture a tank; hence, they do not start from scratch. We do not plan to purchase tanks, since this would be pointless. We must only modernize the existing ones, and we are doing this together with the Germans. There are two ways for that: First, we modernize what we already have in each individual detail and then we conduct a study which takes into consideration the overall picture to practically manufacture a new tank. The modernization stage has already started. The other stage, that is the overall study and the improvement of the tank's combat and power performance, is still in an incipient phase. I hope that within a year we will have scored some concrete results in this respect. I hesitate to give you an exact date for that, because it is all a matter of money. It took us two months to find the 3 million German marks need to just start the study. We found them, now we can proceed with the study.

We Have Only One Submarine; It Is Faulty and Can Only Be Detected by the Russians

[Ardeleanu] NATO maneuvers will take place in the Black Sea. How many submarines do we have?

[Tinca] We have only one submarine. It is not operational because it has to be repaired. The repairs must be done with the Russians, and they are asking for a huge price. We are currently looking for other possibilities. After we solve the other problems, we might purchase other submarines. I would like to tell you that our present submarine is very good. It can probably only be detected by the Russians since they built it.

[Stanescu] What about our seagoing fleet?

[Tinca] Here, the problems are as big as in the case of our aircraft. Planes crash and provide a spectacular show in the process. They will continue to fall and provide such moments, since this is the case with aircraft. Nothing similar has yet happened with our navy. There are certain vessels that must be given up and set aside, since major repairs are very expensive. However, if you look at the situation on the Danube, we have some pretty efficient monitoring ships.

[Ardeleanu] Would you be so kind as to tell us how another department, the "secret service," was modernized?

[Tinca] From all the informative bulletins that reach my table, the best ones are those put together by the Army's Intelligence Service. They are done with a good feel of events and good thinking. Regarding the other service, the counterintelligence, here we have achieved a change of attitude. The Counterintelligence Service belongs to the Army and is totally different from the one before, which was part of the Securitate. It is oriented toward the realm of the Army. If something happens that does not affect the Army and we get wind of it by chance, we convey the information to the other services. If we need something which is to be found in the "realm" of others, we ask them for the information. They do not interfere in our affairs, but we cooperate. The problem of personnel is quite important and not necessarily from the viewpoint of professional training. The people working here are carrying the cross of what the counterintelligence officers used to be in the previous regime. The role of the counterintelligence officer is still not being properly understood. It may happen that even some of them do not properly perceive their new mission.

Who Is Conducting Diplomacy in Romania, the Army or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

[Stanescu] A very intensive diplomatic activity is being conducted by our country. Sometimes, the diplomacy carried out by the Army seems more active than the that of Foreign Minister Melescanu. You are colleagues in the government. Do contradictions emerge between the two of you?

[Tinca] We are going through a situation when the Army's external activity is more intensive. This is required by our current circumstances. What we are doing is only part of a whole, which is in the charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. You just take all we do and put it on a balance scale and then take what the civilian side, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, does and put it on the other scale. You will see that the balance tips in their favor. Melescanu is minister of state and he coordinates all the external activity of all the state's institutions, include the Army. All my reports go through his hands. There is no need for me to bother him with step by step consultations, because I know how he thinks and he knows how I think. As a matter of fact, we grew up together. If I talk to our partners in Hungary, our communication channel is smoother. In the military sphere, there is very little political interference that can affect the dialogue. In Melescanu's case, if he puts a wrong comma or makes a hapless remark, a whole diplomatic scandal may ensue.

[Ardeleanu] You have accumulated vast experience in diplomacy. Would you accept or turn down the Foreign Ministry portfolio in another government?

[Tinca] I am surprised by this question, because I have never thought of it. It depends on the respective government and its orientation. I must see exactly what the policy, leaning, and goals of that government are. I hope to always be able to go back to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—where I come from—not as a dignitary, but in the corps of professionals, which has an extremely important role to play.

Slovenia: Signing of EU Association Agreement Authorized

AU0606155496 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] At its session today, after Slovenia received firm assurances that Great Britain will not prevent the signing of the agreement between EU and Slovenia, the government again confirmed the text of the agreement on Slovenia's association with the EU that both sides initialled in Brussels on 15 June last year. At the same time, the government authorized Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek to sign the association agreement.

Considering other international issues, the government today confirmed the memorandum on cooperation for several years with the PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] program. On the basis of that agreement, Slovenia will receive ECU100 million for the 1996 to 1999 period.

Slovenia: Thaler Says 'Last Obstacle' to EU Association Removed

AU0606153196 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The die was cast last night, and today is a day of celebration for Slovenia. This is how Acting Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler commented at a news conference on last night's piece of news from Rome that Great Britain will not hamper the signing of Slovenia's association agreement with the EU. Nadja Pengov attended the news conference:

[Begin recording] [Pengov] The last obstacle has been removed, and the agreement will be signed, Zoran Thaler said, adding that this is the first exception to the boycott of EU decisions that Great Britain has made due to the broader international implications of the association agreement, which London supports.

This is a success of the Slovene diplomacy, Government, Parliament, and president and the European progressive forces. The signing includes the work of all foreign ministers to date, Thaler said. What does the signing of the agreement mean?

[Thaler] That Slovenia has finally caught the train to full membership in the EU.

[Pengov] And what else?

[Thaler] Our final withdrawal from the Balkans, at the moment, in a pejorative political sense.

[Pengov] The association agreement will also be connected to our ambitions to join NATO. Relations with our neighbors—for example, with Croatia—will also be made easier. The agreement will be ratified in 1997.

In response to the question whether the package of already known documents for signing will include the special letter with details from the Solana package, Thaler said the following:

[Thaler] That letter will not be part of the association agreement. The Council of Ministers will only take it into consideration. These two known sections on two- or three-year clauses will be an annex to the EU association agreement.

[Pengov] There will be no bilateral concessions to Italy. There will be no debate next week on the property of the people who opted for Italian citizenship. Thaler is convinced that the issue has lost its political charge and that there are, nevertheless, still some issues that should be discussed with Italy, but were put aside for a long time.

Thaler failed to give a clear reply to the Drnovsek-[Italian Prime Minister] Prodi meeting at the middle of this month. He confirmed, however, that Slovenia has made a suggestion.

Slovenia: Will Shows Piran Municipality Inherits Land in Croatia

AU0606185496 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 24 May 96 p 1

[Article by Boris Suligoj: "A Will Has Been Found According to Which Piran Inherits Savudrija"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Piran, 23 May—A copy of a will has been found in the Piran archives, according to which Antonio Caccia, a Swiss citizen from Piran—he died in February 1893—left all his land on the Savudrija Peninsula to Piran Municipality. This document may still be important in the negotiations regarding the maritime border between Slovenia and Croatia. According to international law, inherited wealth is inalienable. If the inheritance happens to be in another country, then the matter on how the inheritor can use it is, of course, a matter of agreement.

In Piran, it has been know all along that Piran Municipality had once received this land from Antonio Caccia because of the two memorial plates that are built into the stairway of the Piran municipal palace and affixed to the Savudrija church. In 1947, according to the agricultural reform, the lands in question were nationalized and taken away from the municipality. One and a half years ago, Piran Municipality officially requested the return of these lands, but it seems that their demands have not been taken seriously.

This will was believed to be in existence but had never been found, and the Piran archive had been trying to locate this document for quite some time. A few days ago, Daniela Milotti, a Piran historian, was looking for some data in the old archive of Piran Municipality and, quite by chance, found a copy of the aforementioned document. The original is being kept in a Swiss archive, because Antonio Caccia had written the will in Lugano in October 1891, and he died one and a half years later in Ticino. The document shows that the honorary citizen of Piran left the following areas of the Savudrija Peninsula to the municipality: St. Peter, Mazzarie, Corona, Medeghia, Borozia, Valfontana, Alberi, and Monte.

At that time, the will was sent to Piran, where the municipal council considered this document and reached some conclusions on how it could repay its debt to its benefactor. Perhaps the experts will be able to say to what extent the discovery of the will may influence the negotiating positions on the delimitation of the border.

Slovenia: Divisions Within SKD, Coalition Discussed

AU0506173796 Ljubljana MAG in Slovene 29 May 96 pp 20-23

[Article by Janez Markes: "Coalition Solution"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] After a group of the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia [LDS] deputies formulated a stance and recommended (requested) that the party council break off the agreement with the Slovene Christian Democrats [SKD], SKD President Peterle demanded resignation statements from all SKD government ministers in case the party would be forced to leave the coalition. The resignation statements were signed by Interior Minister Andrej Ster, Culture Minister Janez Dular, and Agriculture Minister Joze Osterc, but not by Igor Umek, minister of transport and communications, and Janko Dezelak, minister of economic relations and development. These two are supposedly believed to be more or less formalized LDS sympathizers.

Reportedly, the two also tried to woo Osterc to their side, but he signed the resignation statement nevertheless. Umek turned out to be the chief "renegade" while Dezelak, on the occasions when Umek was not present, reportedly started wavering, but ultimately did not yield. There are also other things binding Janko Dezelak to relative obedience to the LDS. According to our information, upon leaving the post of the director of the Agency for Rehabilitation of Banks and assuming the post of the minister of economic relations, Dezelak, among other things, had approximately 10,000 German marks worth of redundancy money paid out to him. This is a scandal of wider dimensions that is primarily of a moral nature. Namely, Dezelak did not interrupt his employment, he merely changed his post within the same system of the state administration. At the times when the state is urging the passing of a package of economic measures and is raising pensions by a mere 0.1 percent, the senior state officials are handing each other money the way it suits them. Janko Dezelak is, of course, not just anybody; he is the deputy prime minister and the SKD vice president.

At the end of the week in which Minister Thaler fell, it was expected that the LDS council would break off the coalition agreement with the SKD, but nothing happened. It seemed last week [12-18 May] that the meeting in question would take place at the beginning of this week, therefore, soon after the Pope's visit, but nothing came of that either. Then there was talk of 28 May and, after the LDS news conference, they announced that the meeting of the party council would take place at the beginning of June. Drnovsek would like to let the passage of time drown the coalition problem, the SKD started saying. On the other hand, the party had to reconcile itself to the fact that they would not leave the coalition but would have to allow themselves to be thrown out of it or the affair would not have the desired effect.

Last Tuesday, Prime Minister Drnovsek departed on a three-day visit to Belgium and Luxembourg. He met with European Commission President Jacques Santer in Brussels. Well-informed circles learned only an hour after their talks that Drnovsek had told Santer that the coalition would remain unchanged until the elections. [passage omitted]

Upon returning from Europe, he announced the freezing of the coalition agreement and said he would negotiate with the SKD separately on individual economic projects. Something similar will probably also happen to the acting foreign minister. The prime minister and his party, who have already proven that they could not care less about the will of the voters, will, with their footdragging, show that they do not care about the conclusions of the parliament either.

The chronology of the current government coalition is rather checkered. In 1992 the prime minister still took some trouble to make it appear balanced: At the time, Janez Jansa [Social Democratic Party of Slovenia, SDS, president] was still in the government. If that situation was understandable following the disintegration of Demos, since it appeared as if Drnovsek was setting up the political center, then the situation crystallized after the Depala Vas incident and Jansa's ouster. From then on the Christian Democrats did not have any real initiative so to speak, and they had to content themselves with whatever the prime minister intended for them, which was not much.

The SKD's fundamental mistake was that they allowed control of the financial flow that came into the party's domain to slip from their hands. Namely, it was money that influenced their decision not to leave the coalition at the time when this, strategically speaking, still made sense. The latest vote in Thaler and the readiness to leave the coalition (which probably will not happen) unmasked the party's political geometry, which had, in broad outlines, already been present earlier.

Zvone Bajc, director of the republican administration for telecommunications and an SKD member, was not removed merely to set an example for the unsuitable vote in the foreign minister. According to some information, Bajc overstepped the critical boundary of what was permitted in the telephone network, which is otherwise controlled by the LDS. Igor Umek's ministry, whose personnel were in cooperation with other people coshaped by former SKD Secretary General Edvard Stanic, is also under considerable LDS control.

The same goes for the Ministry of Economic Relations and Development of Janko Dezelak. These, precisely, are the two ministers who failed to sign the resignation statements and due to which the SKD has had the biggest reservations about leaving the coalition in the past few years. The roads and the highways, which Drnovsek is opening now, were supposed to be SKD's electoral trump card, however, in the crucial moment, the transport minister is sympathizing with Drnovsek.

Dissatisfaction with the financial lobby in the SKD, which equals the LDS lobby in the party, is growing rapidly. The Christian Democrats have reportedly also become more watchful regarding Rejc's lobby, which is another secretive financial field and another potential danger for the party. The vote against Thaler had no connection with either of the two lobbies. According to our information, it was a rather spontaneous reaction to events. This means that the initiative, allegedly encouraged by Lojze Peterle, who so far has not meddled in the financial affairs much, is strengthening within the SDK. On the other hand, the situation itself compelled the SKD to take this stance. The spontaneous "revolt" in the parliament alarmed the so-called pragmatists in the above-mentioned ministries and those who stand behind them. Namely, it pushed them into a very unpleasant and psychically strenuous position. If they identify with the SKD, the LDS will unveil all their sins, which are not few, and if they opt for their godfathers, they will only play in the second league, as those who had crossed over to the LDS—Bavcar, Kacin, Rupel, and Omerza—prove.

When Foreign Minister Lojze Peterle resigned (to be honest, this was a solo action) the party did not support him, precisely out of the belief that one must be a part of the team in order to achieve something and—what is the most important—prevent something. It has become clear now that little was achieved or prevented; however, there is the problem of how to cure the hangover from the recent "political drunkenness."

Drnovsek is not in an enviable position either. His absolute assumption of power and his conflict with the first man of the political underground (who actually masterminded the grand coalition) has failed. For the time being, Kucan is still too strong for him, but the question is whether Drnovsek will be able to humiliate himself again before Kucan and admit his superiority. Just as the success story was suddenly over with the departure of the United List from the government coalition and as the carefully timed media theories about double-digit inflation started circulating in the public, Drnovsek suddenly announced a package of economic measures. As if financial rehabilitation would only be needed if the right parties abandon the coalition.

Last Thursday Jansa's Social Democrats brought 40,000 signatures for a referendum on the so-called honest elections in the parliament, which complicated the prime minister's already difficult existence even further. Above all, Drnovsek needs time, but this will be in short supply because the elections are drawing nearer, the political scene is becoming increasingly nervous, and he has all too many enemies. He had evidently overestimated his capabilities and, for the first time, he ended up in the political "market economy" where one must fight on the open market. This is essentially different to the present political style, which brought Drnovsek into politics and which might, if he does not get in line with his godfathers, spit him out. Drnovsek should not be underestimated, though, because, just as he is resorting to "competence" in economy, he can always seek refuge in illusionary mental compromises and in the time "solution" that cures most diseases. At the moment, this is one of the major threats to parliamentary democracy in Slovenia.

Slovenia: Slovene Forum Holds Founding Congress in Zbilje

AU0606192996 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 25 May 96 p 2

[Article by Dejan Pusenjak: "The Slovene Forum Is Looking For Another Deputy for the Club"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubljana—At yesterday's founding congress of the Slovene Forum [SF] in Zbilje, the party leader, Ljerka Bizilj, introduced Janez Jug, an LDS [Liberal Democracy of Slovenia] deputy, as one of the "cofounders" of the SF. She also announced that within the next two weeks—when the collection of the 200 signatures needed for the registration of the political party will be over—the party will try to win over yet another deputy. In this way, the SF will be able to establish its own deputies' club.

The approximately 30 participants at the founding congress elected Jug as one of the two vice presidents of the party, as well as one of the members of the party presidency. The presidency consists of three people. Jug has in fact been a LDS deputy for eight years, and he had successfully hidden being a "cofounder" of the new party from his fellow deputies until the founding congress in Zbilje. According to statements by LDS representatives, Jug had been put on the party's list of candidates for this year's elections. He has not resigned from the LDS deputies' club yet, or from the party, but he will probably have to do so within the next 14 days. If he does so, then he will be the third LDS deputy to leave the party (after Dr. Leo Seserko and Ljerka Bizilj).

At the founding congress, Jug mentioned that his main reason for the move to the new party was the lack of attention to ideas and suggestions into which he had invested a great deal of his knowledge. As he put it, the "devaluation of knowledge" had given him the feeling that he was only "a person who pushes the gray button."

In Zbilje, Ljerka Bizilj did not want to reveal which of the current deputies may move to the SF in the near future and thus enable the formation of a delegates' club.

Andrej Lenarcic, the current leader of the independent deputies' group, has been mentioned as a serious candidate. The independent group would thus however lose its third member.

Federal

FRY: Institute Warns of Devastating Economic Collapse

AU0606143396 Belgrade BETA in English 30 May-6 Jun 96

[BETA headline: "Predictions of Economists on the FRY Economy—The Dynamics of the Fall"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text]

New Hyperinflation in Sight

The Yugoslav economists do not trust that the actual government is ready to undertake a major economic reform in the year when federal elections are to be held; therefore, they predict a deep economic crisis.

The dynamics of the crisis was described by the Belgrade Institute of Economic Sciences (IES). According to the Institute experts, its outcome could be a sharp acceleration of the inflation rate next fall and the country's fall into a hyperinflationary whirlwind by mid-1997 at the latest.

The IES experts hold that the agreement between Yugoslavia and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) will not be reached by the end of the year, and that the resulting shortage of the working capital and the unfavorable export-import ratio will remain the major problems of the domestic economy.

Under such conditions, the government could opt for continuation of the restrictive monetary policies and the preservation of the price stability, which would deepen the recession; thus, the industrial output in 1996 would be only 1-2 percent higher compared to 1995, when the international sanctions were still in effect.

Temptations

However, this scenario is highly unlikely, owing to enormous pressures upon the government and the Central Bank to go into monetary expansion. In July the government will have to pay for wheat in cash, as opposed to several past seasons in which it managed to get away by paying less than it should have, or paying with worthless money, or in installments, or by manipulation with securities.

The 1996 wheat yield is estimated at 1.8 million tons, which according to independent experts is an exaggerated figure. Zaharije Trnavcevic, Chair of the Serbian Parliament's Council for Agriculture, estimates the 1996 wheat yield at 1 million tons, which corresponds to the usual demand. Last week the price of wheat at the Novi Sad Exchange was 14.7 U.S. cents per kilogram.

Money printing will be required by the bankrupt socialist companies which keep producing enormous losses. Managers of the largest companies at the same time are the members of the Serbian Government. In April the workers' strikes erupted in Nis, spreading later on to other cities in Serbia. The government managed to calm down the workers by promising them money, while the strike organizers were taken into custody on several occasions.

The delays in collecting public revenues could also force the government to opt for the money printing in order to pay the pensions and calm down the population on the eve of the elections scheduled for the fall.

Finally, the enormous and growing internal debt could tempt the government to try to annul it through inflation, as was done in 1993. Bosko Zivkovic, collaborator of the Mecon Center for Economic Studies estimates the internal debt at 60-70 percent of the 1995 GNP, amounting to $10 billion.

The last savings of the population are also a great temptation for the government. Economists hold that people still keep at home some 3 billion German marks, but there are some even higher estimates in circulation. If the calculations of the economists are correct, the government may attempt to take the money through hyper inflation, simply by reducing the average salary to around $20 a month.

Malignant Growth

The scenario claiming that the government would prove unable to resist temptations is much more feasible, says Stojan Stamenkovic, the main IES prediction expert.

If the money printing starts in July, the first consequences reflected through production and prices would be felt in August at the latest: the prices would grow much faster than the production, Stamenkovic says.

Inflation would grow even faster, and in December the monthly inflation rate would reach 26 percent, or 1,500 percent per year. Thus, the 1996 December prices would be 300 percent higher than those of December 1995. In other words, the inflatory explosion would take place in December 1996 or January 1997.

However, the Yugoslav authorities have a way to reduce the inflation rate under the conditions of monetary expansion by bringing in the money deposited on their foreign accounts. If they prove willing to use that money, estimated by BETA's sources close to the government at $350 million, the inflation rate would be significantly reduced. Then, the 1996 December inflation rate would be 13-14 percent per month, instead of 26 percent, keeping thus the yearly inflation rate on the 100 percent level.

"Thus the government would postpone the hyperinflationary chaos for five to six months," Stamenkovic holds.

The Government and the Reform

According to the IES experts, the FR Yugoslavia could well experience a foreign trade deficit up to $1.3 billion. Therefore, the import would show a declining tendency by the end of the year, which would additionally affect the production and boost inflation.

The foreign trade deficit in the first four months of 1996 was officially estimated at $477 million, while domestic experts, in a survey carried by the Belgrade Economic Institute, claim that the shortage of foreign raw material, accompanied with the shortage of credits, are the main limiting factors of the production growth.

"A new economic collapse, this time through destruction of companies, would be much more devastating than the 1993 monetary collapse. Namely, simply by using will power, one can overcome conditions of a monetary collapse, while by the collapse in the sphere of reality the country would join the circle in which only the poorest African countries are found today: there is no additional production owing to the shortage of additional capital, and there is no additional capital as for its creation an additional production is needed," says Nikola Zelic, collaborator of the Mecon Center for Economic Studies.

In this case the only way out is for the government to venture upon a deep structural reform, economists say. The elements of such a reform would be the following: the strict fiscal adjustment, the economic liberalization at home and towards the world, the changes in customs regulation included, the securing of money from abroad, the mobilization of money held by people at home through rebuilding their trust in government bodies, privatization and restructuring, and delivering the companies from caring over surplus workers, which would in turn be taken care of by the state.

FRY: Seselj Says IFOR Actions Could Provoke 'Bloodshed'

LD0606140196 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1305 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 6 June (SRNA)—Vojislav Seselj, president of the Serbian Radical Party [SRS], warned today that IFOR [Implementation Force] and NATO are implementing arbitrary and irrational policies in the [Bosnian] Serb Republic.

"This is demonstrated by the attempt to arrest Chetnik commander Slavko Aleksic, a member of the central fatherland administration of the SRS, on a whim and for some dirty motives," Seselj said at today's news conference.

He said the SRS "will not tolerate such arbitrariness" and that such behavior "could provoke great bloodshed."

"Plans to carve up the Serb Republic into two, at Brcko, are clear and dangerous. As long as NATO troops are in the Serb Republic there is a real threat to the Serb people, but it will be easy for us to deal with the Muslims and Croats," Seselj said.

He condemned the opening of a U.S. information center in Pristina because "it is clear that this is a precursor to the opening of a U.S. Embassy and the separation of Kosovo from Serbia."

Seselj said the visit of Antonio Cassese, president of The Hague tribunal, to Belgrade was ridiculous.

FRY: Serbia's New Democracy Supports Ousted Bank Governor

LD0606144896 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1237 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Nis, 6 Jun (SRNA)—Goran Mitic, member of the New Democracy (ND) Executive Committee and chairman of the party's regional council in Nis, said today that ND will not support the federal government's proposed privatization plan.

"The ND will support the privatization program set out by a group of professors around Dragoslav Avramovic [former governor of the Yugoslav National Bank]," Mitic said at a news conference.

He added that the ND's commitment to Avramovic's approach to privatization is the only way "of defending an ownership transformation policy which will guarantee the country's rapid economic recovery."

He added that the ND counted on having the post of finance minister in the reshuffled government of the republic because, he said, when it joined the coalition with the ruling party, it counted on "a division of responsibility in financial matters."

FRY: Supreme Defense Council Examines Army Personnel Policy

LD0606164496 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1321 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 6 June (TANJUG)—A session of the Supreme Defense Council was held in Belgrade today. The session was presided over by Zoran Lilic, president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY]. At its session today, the Supreme Defense Council examined personnel issues within its competence and adopted decisions on the promotion, appointment, and retirement of officers of the Yugoslav Army, the military office of the FRY president has announced.

The Supreme Defense Council also examined the issues of financing the Yugoslav Army and providing housing for the professional officers of the Yugoslav Army. The Supreme Defense Council also examined other issues within its competence.

The session was also attended—in addition to Supreme Defense Council members, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic—by Federal Prime Minister Radoje Kontic; Federal Minister of Defense Pavle Bulatovic; Colonel General Momcilo Perisic, Yugoslav Army chief of General Staff; and Council Secretary Slavoljub Susic.

Serbia

Serbia: New Democracy Accuses Hague Tribunal of 'Partiality'

AU0606143796 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 6 Jun 96

[Report by Dragan Nikolic]

[FBIS Translated Text] At a regular news conference of the New Democracy, Radivoje Lazarevic, head of the party's Executive Committee, addressed correspondents on the current political situation. Dragan Nikolic reports:

[Nikolic] The main topic of Lazarevic's address was the implementation of the Dayton Agreement. The party welcomes the latest round of talks in Geneva and takes the view that the talks will contribute to the more energetic realization of the policy agreed in the past. What is considerably slowing down the Dayton Agreement is, above all, the absence of the promised financial aid from the international community to the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, above all, to the Serb Republic, which has not received any help from this arrangement so far.

What is also worrying is the fact that the international community is insisting more and more on a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina. This will reduce significantly the state powers of the Serb Republic. In the view of the New Democracy, this is unacceptable.

Speaking about the work of the Hague Tribunal, Lazarevic said that the tribunal has shown obvious partiality and inclination to try one nation. The most prudent thing for our country would be to organize and hold war crimes trials in domestic courts.

Serbia: Milosevic Accused of Trying To Help Hand Over Karadzic

LD0606141896 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1328 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 6 Jun (SRNA)—Aleksandar Taskovic, vice president of the Assembly People's Party [SNS], today accused Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic of indirectly aiding and abetting attempts to hand over Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic, and General Ratko Mladic to The Hague tribunal.

"Milosevic will not directly arrest Karadzic and Mladic because a good many socialists would not forgive him for this, but he is paving the way for IFOR [Implementation Force] to be able to take action," Taskovic said at a news conference in Belgrade.

According to him, "it is to Milosevic's advantage that he knows full well that Karadzic is not the kind of person to make accusations against the president of Serbia if he were to face the Hague tribunal." [passage omitted]

Serbia: 'Noose' Said To Tighten Around Karadzic, Mladic

LD0606142196 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1329 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 6 Jun (SRNA)—Zoran Cvijic, chairman of the Serb Liberal Party Executive Committee, expressed concern today over the fate of Radovan Karadzic, president of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, and of General Ratko Mladic, commander of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic Army.

He told a news conference today that "the noose around the Serb leaders is being tightened, which is best confirmed by a recent attempt by IFOR [Implementation Force] to arrest a Serb officer in Lukavica."

According to him, "the only reason for postponing their arrest are the elections in Russia, which has changed its attitude regarding NATO expansion and has publicly supported Karadzic's and Mladic's arrest."

"The international community is applying two different criteria to the same thing. When it comes to the fate of Karadzic and Mladic, the Serb Republic is treated as part of Serbia; when it comes to its [Serb Republic] statehood, it is then viewed as a separate entity," Cvijic believes.

Serbia: SNS Official Calls For Lifting Media Censorship

LD0606163396 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1328 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 6 Jun (SRNA)—Aleksandar Taskovic, vice president of the Assembly People's Party (SNS), called on Aleksandar Tijanic, newly elected Serbian minister of Information, to lift media censorship in Serbia.

In an open letter, Taskovic reminds Tijanic of the provisions of the constitution which are binding on him in this post and of the professional code of conduct of journalists.

"The heads of media organizations in Serbia are exerting rigid censorship of contributions by opposition parties, and are not concealing their communist leanings, something which is contrary to the journalists' code of conduct," the SNS vice president writes. [passage omitted]

Kosovo

Kosovo: Rugova Urges World To Follow U.S. 'Example'

AU0606205796 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1635 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Last evening, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, president of the Republic of Kosova, received a seven-member German Bundestag delegation led over by Gert Poh, Greens' foreign policy spokesman. President Rugova also received Doris Pak, head of the European Parliament [EP] delegation for south-eastern Europe. Here is a report by Shaban Arifaj:

[Arifaj] During the meeting, President Rugova briefed the German Bundestag delegation on the grave and tense situation in Kosova due to the systematic repression by the Serbian regime. Talking about a peaceful solution to the Kosova issue, President Rugova recalled that the people of Kosova have declared their stance in a referendum for independence, adding that Kosova, an independent and neutral state open to Albania and Serbia, is the optimal solution to achieving peace and stability in the region.

Rugova stated that the Kosovar leadership has demanded an international temporary civil administration with the goal of creating the preliminary conditions for resolving the Kosova issue through talks and in the presence of a third party, always respecting the political will of the people.

Rugova invited the international community, and Germany in particular, to be committed in creating these preliminary conditions for holding talks, as well as increase their presence in Kosova by following the example of the United States and opening their offices in Prishtina.

After assessing the moves of some countries to declare their normalization of relations with Belgradeas hasty, President Rugova expressed his conviction that the EU countries will be committed to a just solution of the Kosova issue.

Meanwhile, the German delegation members stressed, besides their constant concern over Kosova, that the Bundestag will be committed to a fair and permanent solution to the Kosova issue.

President Rugova also met Doris Pak, head of the European Parliament delegation for south-eastern Europe, with whom he discussed the current situation in Kosova and its solution.

At this meeting as well, President Rugova demanded an international presence in Kosova through the opening of offices in Prishtina and thanked Mrs. Pak for her commitment at the European Parliament on the Kosova issue.

For her part, Mrs. Pak stressed the continuous concern over Kosova and added that the European Parliament has approved a resolution requesting an international conference on Kosova.

After this meeting, in a statement for the Information Center of Kosova and other mass media, Mrs. Pak stressed, among other things, that Kosova needs Europe and Europe needs Kosova. She assessed the personality of President Rugova highly and stressed that a politician who enjoys respect in Europe and also among the Serb politicians in Kosova may greatly assist in changing the situation in a peaceful way to the benefit of the Kosova populated by 90 percent of Albanians.

Kosovo: U.S. Office Called 'Most Direct Support'

AU0606180296 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1635 GMT 6 Jun 96

[Telephone report by Leke Musolli from Pristina]

[FBIS Translated Text] The promise that the Americans made to open a U.S. information office in Prishtina [Pristina] has already come true. Thus, as of 5 June, the U.S. flag has been waving in Prishtina, a century-long desire of all Albanians in Kosova and an expression of the U.S. direct commitment to be present in Kosova and to influence a just and final solution to the Kosova issue. The active attitude and pragmatic presence of the U.S. administration in Kosova was precisely confirmed by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Mr. John Kornblum, who conveyed to President Rugova President Clinton's pledge that the United States will be committed to defend the rights of the Kosovar people and peace and prosperity in this part of the region.

Meanwhile, the top official of the U.S. State Department Mr. Kornblum made known to the Serbian side in Belgrade and Prishtina that the time has come for all parties to think rationally in order to exert their influence in reducing tensions in Kosova and to work seriously in initiating an Albanian-Serb dialogue that would lead to a peaceful and democratic solution of the Kosova issue, an approach that the Kosova leadership headed by Dr. Rugova has constantly demanded everywhere.

Political analysts in Kosova assess that the opening of the U.S. office in Prishtina is the most important step taken so far and the most direct support that the United States is giving to Kosova, its people, and President Rugova.

Kosovo: LDK Leaders, UNCHR Delegates View Serb Refugee Issue

AU0606160796 Tirana ATA in English
1252 GMT 6 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Prishtina, June 6 (ATA)—A delegation of the UN High Commissariat for the Refugees (UNCHR) paid a visit yesterday to Prishtina, the Information Center for Kosova reports.

The delegation which comprised Margaret O'Keefe, coordinator of Belgrade's office, Rene Van Royen, coordinator for special operations in former Yugoslavia, and Bo Shack, official of UNCHR, met yesterday Dr. Fehmi Agani, Hydajet Hyseni, and Edita Tahiri, members of the Democratic League of Kosova [LDK].

The meeting discussed the problem of the Serbian refugees in Kosova. LDK officials declared that the bringing of Serbian refugees to Kosova has not a humanitarian character but is a continuity of the Serbian efforts to change Kosova's ethnic structure and its colonization.

They argued this by the fact that the population in Kosova has the highest density in Europe and a low economic development.

"At a time when Albanians are forced to leave Kosova, due to the Serbian violence, and are hindered to return, the bringing of Serbian refugees can be nothing else but a political action with a destabilizing aim," they said.

They added that to the Serbian refugees are offered good living conditions and jobs opened by the sacking of Albanians.

"Serbian refugees are the main factor of conflict in Kosova because they come from fighting areas," the LDK officials explained. They offered several cases of aggressive actions of the Serbian refuges in Kosova against the Albanian population.

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